


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29 AUGUST 1989



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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UP489-053

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Republic Officials Confer on State Structure, Nationality Policy

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[Summary, by M. Trouskaya, of statements made at a meeting of republic officials on state structure and nationality policy. "To Restore the Principles of Leninist Nationality Policy"]

[Text] In accordance with the plan for the preparation of the Central Committee Plenum on inter-nationality relations in the CPSU Central Committee, a conference took place at which problems touching on various legal aspects of the strengthening and development of the Soviet socialist federation were discussed.

We are publishing a short summary of the statements of a number of the conference participants, although with the time that has passed after it life has introduced corrections.

V. Yakovlev, director of the Institute of Soviet State Construction and Legislation at the USSR Supreme Soviet:

Not long ago, the All-Union Conference of Specialists in the Sphere of Constitutional State Law was held in Minsk. For this reason I bring to your attention the collective conclusions, elaborations, recommendations, and proposals developed at this conference.

The improvement of nationality and inter-nationality relations is part of the revolutionary transformations that are taking place in our society. It is obvious that this process, which is an integral part of restructuring, has one common general task—to overcome the excessive centralization and to eliminate the administrative-command system of the management of all spheres of life.

Along with this, it goes without saying, there are also specific tasks that pertain to national [natsionalnoe] development.

It seems that the general path here is the development and improvement of our federation on democratic principles. And in no case a transition to a confederation. As a matter of fact, there is a fundamental difference between a federation and a confederation. If a federation is a union [soyuznoye] state, then a confederation is a union of states. If a federation is state and legal relations, then a confederation is international-legal relations. A confederation, as history shows, is a temporary formation, which ceases to exist rather quickly. Or in place of it a federal, and sometimes a unitary, state comes into being.

The basic reason for the difficulties in inter-nationality relations lies precisely in the deformation of federative [federativnyye] relations. Excessive centralization and command-administrative methods have in many

respects deformed it, but have not eliminated the democratic and humanistic principles. And the task consists in eliminating the defects that were permitted in the past. The repudiation of federation would signify the appearance of the danger of national isolation and seclusion in all spheres, including in the sphere of economics, and this is a blind alley.

We must anchor in the Constitution of the USSR such principles as the combination of the sovereignty of the USSR and the sovereignty of the union republics, internationalism and democratic centralism of the construction of our federation. It goes without saying, with the preservation of the right of the union republics to leave the membership of the Union and the preservation of the inviolability of the territories of the union republics.

In the course of the discussions, especially in the provinces, the idea of the necessity of concluding, in place of the union agreement of 1922, a new union agreement was advanced—an agreement which would to a greater extent guarantee the realization of the thesis of strong republics. Many think, and I share this point of view, that there are neither political nor legal reasons for concluding such an agreement in present-day conditions. The conclusion of a new agreement would also be an indirect acknowledgment of the illegitimacy of the presence, in the Union, of a whole number of union republics that did not sign the agreement of 1922, which would not correspond to either the truth or the living realities that have taken shape.

Some scholars propose to construct the federation in such a way that not only union republics, but also autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous areas [okruga] would enter directly into the Union, which would to a greater extent be conducive to the right of nations to self-determination and to the equality of all peoples. The question is also being raised about transferring some of the autonomous republics to union republics, and about withdrawing autonomous oblasts and autonomous areas from the composition of the krais for their direct subordination to union republics. But the direct subordination of all nationality state formations to the center would be, in essence, to some degree, a present-day variant of the Stalinist idea of autonomization and it would lead to still greater centralization with all the ensuing consequences.

A directly opposite proposal was also advanced: That in the union parliament only union republics be directly represented, but that autonomous republics and other national state formations would enter only into the higher organs of power of the union republics. This proposal was supported by the scholars and was subjected to criticism.

The majority of the participants of our discussion supported a sufficiently detailed, thorough regulation of the horizontal relations between union republics, for example, in regard to the questions of the use of, let us

say, natural resources, large rivers, large water reservoirs, etc. Such relations arise in actual fact, but they are poorly regulated by law.

In the course of the discussion, various proposals were introduced that were aimed at the expansion of the rights of the autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous areas in the sphere of state, economic, and socio-cultural construction. Especially in the sphere of culture, public education, and the protection of nature. In order for the Soviet federation to have a living and developing character on the plane of the improvement of the state system and autonomy, it is proposed to examine the question of conferring on some autonomous republics the status of union republics, and on a number of autonomous oblasts—the status of autonomous republics.

The next problem is the problem of the free use of the national languages of the peoples of the USSR, as well as the Russian language as the means of inter-nationality intercourse. These questions need to be regulated in a special Law on Language. Moreover, it should be adopted at the all-union level, with the appropriate concretization in the laws of the union republics. Perhaps on the territory of the USSR the Russian language should be recognized as the means of inter-nationality intercourse. At the same time, it is necessary to stipulate that the union republic has the right to define the language of its republic as the state language.

In the determination of the legal regime of the language of the union republic, the possibility of citizens of the USSR to use their native language and the language of inter-nationality intercourse in the various spheres of state and public life must not be infringed. Obviously, it is necessary to guarantee to citizens of the USSR the free choice of the language of instruction. In the law mentioned, other questions that have an all-union character could also be regulated. In particular, about the language of the work of the organs of power of the USSR, the publication of laws and other legal acts, on the guarantees of the labor laws of citizens, regardless of the knowledge of one language or another, on the registration of official documents characterizing the status of the individual, on the language of court, administrative and notarial proceedings, about the right of citizens to turn to all institutions and organizations in their native or any other language of the peoples of the USSR of which they have a command.

On USSR citizenship and citizenship of the union republics. Whatever different opinions were expressed on this account, the improvement of legislation on citizenship is called upon to preserve and secure in the future the equality of citizens in this respect. In the new wording of the Law on Citizenship, the preservation of a single union citizenship must remain fundamental. A citizenship according to which a citizen of a union republic is a citizen of the USSR, and a citizen of the USSR is a citizen of a union or autonomous republic on whose territory he resides.

At the same time, it is evidently necessary to expand the rights of the union republics in the question of citizenship, in particular, to hand over to them the solution of the basic mass of questions connected with the acceptance into Soviet citizenship, withdrawal from it, etc. In our country more than 50 million people, persons of certain nationalities, live outside the limits of their national state formations. In our view, it is expedient to anchor the guarantees of the realization of their rights in a special law.

And, finally, on the new functions of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on the formation of permanent commissions on inter-nationality relations in the Councils of People's Deputies. Perhaps it would be expedient to establish that the Council of Nationalities, without fail, preliminarily examine all questions submitted to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies or to the USSR Supreme Soviet that pertain to inter-nationality relations and develop proposals in regard to questions of national-state construction attributed to the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Council of Nationalities could be entrusted with control over the execution of constitutional and other legislation concerning the observation of the rights and interests of the union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous areas, as well as for the creation of appropriate conditions for the ethnic groups which do not have their national state formations.

Possibly, it is expedient to charge the Council of Nationalities with the examination of disputes that arise between union republics, as well as between union republics and the autonomous units of which they are composed.

The last aspect on which I would like to dwell is the question of strengthening the protection of the rights and personal freedoms of citizens, of the strengthening responsibility for the kindling of national differences. There are numerous proposals on this account. For example, taking into account that the manifestation of racial or national enmity and differences contradicts the norms of morality common to all mankind and is incompatible with socialist legality, it is proposed to supplement Article 34 of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics with appropriate provisions to the effect that the perpetration of a crime on the grounds of racial and national enmity, or differences or because of nationalist motives is an aggravating circumstance.

G. Tarazevich, chairman of the Presidium of the BSSR Supreme Soviet:

I will set forth the results of the work of the group of deputies which the USSR Supreme Soviet instructed to bring in proposals concerning the delimitation of the competence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Our group received proposals from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviets of the union republics, other republic

organs, and public organizations, from deputies and scientific institutions. Taking them into consideration, we prepared our conclusions.

First of all, the deputies formed the common view that in the Constitution of the USSR the enumeration of all the powers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics must be exhaustive, that is not containing any references, as this was the case previously. The Union Constitution should also clearly set forth that the republic has the right to solve all questions of state, economic and socio-cultural construction which are not attributed to the competence of the Union by the Constitution and the laws of the USSR. In cases where questions of one sort or another, which are the subject of the joint jurisdiction of the Union and a union republic, are not regulated by a law of the USSR, the republic has the right to adopt its own act concerning this question.

Questions that relate to the delimitation of the powers of the Union and the union republics should be solved only through the adoption of a law, which, naturally, will exclude the possibility of the encroachment of the union ministries and departments in the solution of these questions.

Now about some principles of the definition of the competence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that apropos of the new content of Article 73 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Here we took into consideration the draft General Principles for Restructuring the Management of the Economy and Social Sphere in the Union Republics on the Basis of the Expansion of Their Sovereign Rights, Self-Government and Self-Financing.

Great debates were called forth by the formulation, by the Estonian and Lithuanian union republics, of the question of the transfer, to the exclusive ownership of the republic, of the land, mineral wealth, waters, and forests. These problems were discussed comprehensively. And I should say that the majority of the members of our group came to the conclusion that we should not remove into nationality quarters that part of the national property which in the true sense is common for our entire Soviet federation. However, this situation should not prevent the expansion of the powers of the union republics in regard to the disposition of all natural resources on their territory.

The group of deputies devoted great attention to the problems of the delimitation of the competence of the Union and the union republics in the socio-cultural sphere. We proceeded from the necessity of a sharp expansion of the powers of the republic organs in the solution of so vitally important questions for the population as health protection, social security, public education, and culture. It is proposed in these spheres to leave to union organs the functions of coordination, the developments of state-wide programs in the sphere of their

activity, the realization of measures aimed at guaranteeing the interests of the population of all union republics and all regions. This pertains, for example, to the development of standards that have to do with the guarantee of ecological safety and with the solution of other questions that have precisely an all-union significance.

At the same time, the management of some concrete institutions and organizations should be left to union organs, if they will be preserved in these spheres, but only if these institutions and organizations function to serve the interests of all the republics. All remaining questions of the daily management of the social sphere should be attributed to the jurisdiction of the union republics.

A few words about the proposals for the delimitation of the powers in the sphere of state construction and legislation. Here we were also guided by the necessity of the maximum expansion of the powers of the union republics.

To the Union, in the sphere of state construction, should be left the solution of such questions as the acceptance of new republics into the membership of the Union, the confirmation of changes in the borders between union republics, and the solution of territorial and other disputes between them. It is natural that the determination of the state border of the USSR must be left to the jurisdiction of the Union, as well as the solution of questions of war and peace, the defense of the sovereignty of the Union and the union republics, and the provision of the country's defense and state security. In the sphere of foreign policy, obviously, the coordination of the relations of the union republics with foreign states and international organizations, should be left to the Union, keeping in mind the significant expansion of the independence of the republics in the sphere of contacts with foreign countries.

Great disputes were called forth by the delimitation of the powers with respect to the legislative regulation of social relations. Here we were guided by the principle: The Union establishes mainly the foundations of the legislative regulation of these relations, the common norms and common principles. The union republics will implement the concrete filling in of these principles through the adoption of codes and other laws.

In order to defend the rights of the union republics from the illegitimate interference of the central organs of the USSR and, above all, the ministries and departments, it is proposed to develop a special mechanism, which would make it possible to react effectively to every such intrusion.

And still another question. Not long ago, an attempt was made to the effect that union laws operate on the territory of a given republic only if they have been sanctioned or ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the given republic. The view was expressed that the republic should have the right to hold up their

operation, if they violate its rights and interests. Such proposals, in essence, would signify the transition from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a federation to a confederation. But once the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a sovereign union state, and not a sum of republics, union laws must have supremacy over republic laws.

A. Romanovskiy, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

The Constitution of the USSR and the Constitutions of the union republics are in need of fundamental revision.

In connection with this, I will state a number of proposals.

The Constitution of the country preserves for every union republic the right of free withdrawal from the USSR. But, you see, the possibility of withdrawal from the composition of the Union of any one of the union republics affects the interests of all the others. For this reason, it would be desirable to write in the Basic Law that the consent of all union republics is required for the withdrawal of a union republic from the composition of the USSR. In our view, this question deserves discussion.

It would be expedient to anchor in the Constitution the equal representation of the union republics in such organs as the committees of USSR Supreme Soviet and the commissions of its chambers, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the future USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision, having made provisions for the annual replacement of the chairmen of these organs, being elected in turn from the chairmen of the union republics in the order of their enumeration in the Constitution of the USSR.

The public knows of cases where ministries and central departments through their insufficiently considered actions are damage the interests of the union republics. It seems that the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision, on its own initiative or on the basis of proposals of the union republics, will go before the USSR Council of Ministers with presentations concerning the abolition of unconstitutional acts of ministries and departments that violate the sovereign rights of union republics. It also seems that in the future Law on Constitutional Supervision it is expedient to set forth the guarantees of the activity of the persons elected to the committee, in particular their immunity.

It would be sound to include in the Constitution of the USSR a norm according to which the highest organ of state power of a union republic has the right to protest decrees and orders of the USSR Council of Ministers, not holding up their implementation, but acts of USSR ministries may be held up by the Supreme Soviet of a union republic in the presence of their clear non-conformity with the acts of the supreme organs of power

and government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We note that analogous rules have been established by articles 15 and 17 of the Agreement on the Formation of the USSR.

The status of the union and autonomous republics is in need of broad legal consolidation. It is impossible to acknowledge as correct a situation where there are laws on the local Soviets of People's Deputies, but no laws on union and autonomous republics.

In our view, the direct contacts between union republics, too, should be regulated through legislation and provisions should be made, in case of necessity, for the creation of permanent representations of some union republics in others.

Being in the composition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the republics cannot and must not occupy a neutral position with respect to what is happening in the fraternal republics. This pertains especially to the constitutional development of the USSR and the union republics. We have an important document—the decisions of the 19th conference of the CPSU on the gradual execution of political reform and the corresponding changes and additions to the Constitution of the USSR and the union republics. And in this connection, we are surprised by the haste of our Lithuanian comrades, whom we greatly respect, who have published a draft Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR as a whole. We regard this haste as blunt pressure on the other fraternal republics. We acquainted ourselves in the most attentive manner with its content, and we cannot fail to mention its possible harmful consequences.

If this draft is discussed, many propositions can be subjected to criticism. To take, if only, the article on the ownership of the republic. At the very time when throughout the world a broad process of integration is under way, an attempt is made here to remove property common to the whole people on the basis of nationality criteria. The articles of this draft on the national military formations, the supremacy of republic over union laws, on citizenship, migration, visits abroad, and a number of others, are aimed not at the consolidation and development of the Soviet federation, but are an evident step backward, to confederation.

N. Fataliyev, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the AzSSR Supreme Soviet:

The Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet is called upon to play a great role in the solution of a broad range of questions pertaining to the interests of nations and nationalities. As is well known, at the 19th Party Conference it was noted that, regardless of its intended purpose, its activity in actual fact is functionally depersonalized.

In our view, a responsible mission must lie on the Council of Nationalities in the regulation of relations between the union republics. As life shows, they can also have disagreements over questions that pertain to their

rights and interests. In these cases, the Council of Nationalities, after careful and thorough study of all aspects of the problem, must take a decision, which, after approval by the Council of the Union, acquires the force of a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is obligatory for all members of the federation.

The normalization of nationality relations, along with the expansion of the rights of the union republics, includes the improvement of the statuses of all types of Soviet autonomy. Today there arises in all acuteness the question of the development of constitutional guarantees securing the comprehensive socio-economic development of the autonomous formations. Moreover, both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the union republics, in which the autonomous units are located, should act as guarantors. With a view to the development of a strategy of a program for the satisfaction of the needs and requirements of the national minorities, congresses and meetings of the representatives of the national minorities should be held once every 4-5 years on the scale of the country, individual regions, and union republics.

Historical practice has convincingly shown what high a price is paid for the distortions of the Leninist principles of the solution of the nationality question. The events of the last years have shown that the great cause—restructuring, including in the sphere of inter-nationality relations—must be done with clean hands and clean thoughts. It is impossible to allow the use of democracy and glasnost for the realization of anti-perestroika, essentially, anti-popular, selfish actions of nationalists and extremists.

Most unfortunately, the matter went so far that in the Constitution there was included, and then also realized in practice, a provision concerning the establishment of a special form of control, and other forms of the support of public order and the guarantee of the safety of citizens were adopted.

In the history of our country, the special form of control was introduced for the first time. And, of course, it is being implemented in strict conformity with the constitutional provision determining the sovereign rights of the union republics. In our view, already now we should carefully think through the legal regulation of the special form of control.

V. Churilov, first secretary of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Okrug Party Committee:

For the people of the North, the problem of inter-nationality relations has a somewhat different ring. We are talking about the survival of these nationalities.

I would like to talk about the economy and ecology, because ecology, for the northern people, is a factor of the preservation of bioresources. And this connection, very living, very agile, and very easily vulnerable, has

been broken in our country. In order to restore it, we must limit the rates of the development of the oil and natural gas complex.

It goes without saying, oil and gas are our common achievement. We are eating this pie all together, but why should the people perish? Why, in moving along the road of the humanization of socialism, should we make helpless gestures in 20-25 years? I think that very serious steps are necessary. The Central Committee of the party has taken these steps, but, it seems to me, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia are delaying concrete deeds. Again and again they are trying to arrange things in such a way that, please excuse me, to solve the question of, let us say, the location of a toilet in Khanty-Mansiysk, we must get in touch with the republic. All say: Be independent, but, unfortunately, frequently everything is limited to words only. Today we must revise many existing instructions, legal acts, norms, and all sorts of other recommendations. It reaches the point of being ridiculous, comrades. Let us say, for a Khant to have a rifle he has to become a member of a society of hunters and fishermen, and for this he needs to pay money, but for him this is a way of life. In order to register a boat, one must again pay. But, you see, few people suspect that the Khant and the Mansa simply do not have any other way of moving about than on water.

I would like to speak about one other aspect. About the degree of participation of people in law-making. Up to now, this process is going from top to bottom. It seems that it should be reinforced with a movement from below. We have submitted a proposal (and various groups of scholars in Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk and Moscow have supported us) concerning the creation of alternative variants of state-legal status of the autonomous area. I think that shortly we will receive the suggestions of scholars and could hold a referendum in our region, to find out what people themselves want, and how they imagine their life in the North in the future.

V. Miller, director of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the LaSSR Academy of Sciences:

Today there was talk here about the negative consequences of the conclusion of a new union agreement. But I think it is expedient to think also about whether there are not also positive aspects here.

It seems to me, the conclusion of such an agreement could make it possible to resolutely repudiate the deformation which, as we now all recognize, took place in the course of long decades and was characteristic for our federative relations. A union agreement without fail must become an integral part of the Constitution of the USSR.

The second question. About the withdrawal of the union republics from the Union. The proposition advanced here to the effect that it is possible only when all the union republics give their consent to it would significantly infringe on their rights and would be in clear

contradiction with the principle of self-determination of nations. It seems to me that it should be the kind of document that would precisely provide for a procedure and the right to withdrawal from the composition of the Union.

And the third question—about the expansion of the legislative rights of the union republics. It seems to me that it is necessary not only to expand the range of questions concerning which they could publish laws, but also to give them additional guarantees, which would make it possible to utilize their powers more fully.

Moreover, it would be possible to make use of a whole series of provisions of the 1924 Constitution of the USSR. In particular, the one that would grant to the highest organ of power of the union republic the right to protest a decree of the union government organs and the right of the Councils of Ministers of the union republics to hold up actions of the union ministries and departments on its territory if these actions are in contradiction with union and republic legislation, with subsequent notification of the USSR Council of Ministers about this.

And about another thing—about the publication of republic laws on citizenship. I propose that it is necessary to grant this right to the union republics.

N. Khomenko, secretary of the Presidium of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet:

First of all, I would like to state my objection to comrade Miller. In our view, we should solve the regulation of the competence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the union republics, of course, on the constitutional level, and not turn to the composition of a new Agreement. And in order for the republic to know which range of questions enters into the sphere of their joint authority, this needs to be clearly reflected in the law. To secure accuracy and legality, obviously, questions that enter into the sphere of exclusive jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the joint jurisdiction with the union republics should be delineated.

And still another direction where, in our view, it is necessary to secure a clear division of competency. This is the sphere of legislative activity, the legislative regulation of social relations.

To the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the sphere of legislation, without a doubt, must be attributed the establishment of the Fundamentals of Legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the union republics. As far as the adoption of other acts, aimed at securing the unity of legislative regulation, is concerned, the concrete problems in regard to which the union legislator can adopt such acts, should be set forth in the union laws.

Allow me to dwell on one question which has not been discussed today. This is the role and place of the procuracy in the system of the federative state. As is well

known, prior to 1936 every union republic appointed its procurator independently. In 1936, the procuracy was centralized, this situation found its consolidation in the Constitution of that year, which also provided for the centralization of legislative functions and its attribution in terms of all basic parameters to the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In such conditions, the centralization of procuratorial supervision, without a doubt, was logical. However, after February 1957, when legislative functions were once again returned to the republics, such a structure of the procuracy, in our view, lost sense and does not correspond to the sovereign status of the union republics, which have their own developed system of legislation.

Most rational, and corresponding to the federative nature of the Soviet state, in our view, would be the kind of solution of the question in which the procuracy would be organized as a republic organ. Moreover, the procurator of a republic should be appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the union republic and be confirmed by the Congress of People's Deputies.

As an alternative to this, in our view, correct solution, one could also propose a solution under which the procurator of a republic would be appointed by the USSR Procurator General and confirmed in his post by the Congress of People's Deputies of the union republic, to which, like the USSR Procurator General, he was subordinate [podkontrolen].

L. Grigoryeva, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Yakutsk ASSR:

I have two concrete proposals. We should without fail form a State Committee for the Nationalities of the North. For 20 years various decrees of the Central Committee of the party and the government were adopted, but they were almost not adopted because they were not coordinated and not controlled.

The next thing. The time has come for the USSR Academy of Sciences to have a specialized scientific research institute for problems of the nationalities of the North.

S. Avetisyan, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet:

In our view, in the theoretical elaborations of the political aspects of the nationality and state structure of the USSR there still predominates the justification of the nationality and state structure of our country that has taken shape. Attempts to substantiate the impossibility of the formation of many autonomous units and the transformation of some forms into others, the transition of autonomous formations from the composition of one union republic to the composition of another, etc.

The legislation regulating the corresponding spheres of social relations today is aimed not at the stimulation of

further progressive development and improvement of socialist federalism, but at the preservation and strengthening of the status quo.

What has been said pertains still to a greater degree to the federative structure and autonomization since certain costs were allowed in the beginning stage of the formation of our union state. For this reason, it seems expedient to examine the question of the withdrawal, by constitutional means, of some autonomous formations from republic subordination, taking into consideration the concrete situation, having transformed them into national-state formations in the composition of the USSR. This would correspond to the decision of the 19th Party Conference concerning the revision of the status of autonomy. And nations and nationalities that do not have their national-state formation to grant the right to unite into one of its forms.

In the Constitution of the USSR there are contradictory provisions concerning the rights of the union republics and autonomous formations. Article 70 of the Constitution regards the right of nations to self-determination as something obviously realized in the USSR and, therefore, has a declarative character. But according to articles 78 and 84, the territories of a union and autonomous republic cannot be changed without their consent, at the same time such a right is not stipulated for autonomous oblasts and autonomous areas. This is a violation of the right of nations to self-determination.

G. Troshkina, chairman of the ispolkom of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Khakass Autonomous Oblast:

In accordance with Article 71 of the Constitution of the RSFSR and Article 1 of the Law on the Khakass Autonomous Oblast, the oblast is in the composition of Krasnoyarsk Kray. In so doing, neither the Constitution of the USSR nor the Constitution of the RSFSR regulate the rights of an autonomous oblast. The legal situation of the oblast in essence is reduced to the level of a territorial-administrative unit of the kray. But, you see, autonomy in the Leninist understanding signifies the right of independence, the execution of state power or government, granted by the Constitution to any part of the state. Some powers in our oblast have proved to be either not concretized or unregulated. And even the newly developed draft Law on Local Self-Government does not take into account the autonomous oblast.

Thus, in legal respect, the autonomous oblasts of the RSFSR, in terms of their situation, have proved to be in worse conditions than, for example, the autonomous republics and non-autonomous oblasts, which are equivalent to them in terms of their economic and social potential. And, as a consequence, since the oblast is a constituent part of the kray and limited in its rights, conflict situations arise between them.

The unjustified dependence of the oblast on the kray is most appreciably realized in the sphere of capital construction, in local and food industry, in the distribution

of funds for food products, building materials and structures, in the distribution of above-plan production of agriculture, and in regard to many other directions. Thus, in Khakassia, of the 13 enterprises of local and food industry and the construction materials industry located on the territory of the oblast, only one is subordinated to the oblispolkom, and then conditionally, without the right of planning production and distributing the products. The remaining 12 are found in the complete jurisdiction of the krayispolkom. As a result, many processes which should have been controlled by the oblast proved not to be under its control.

All of this is indicative of the fact that the autonomous oblasts of the RSFSR have proved to be in a difficult and even incomprehensible position. It needs to be said that their inclusion in the composition of the krais and subordination to the kray authorities was a logical and justified step in the first stage of their creation. I think that the ossification of the forms that were adopted previously today should be revised.

In order to give full-fledged development to the national regions, it is necessary to grant to the autonomous oblasts the right of legislative initiative in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in all questions concerning the economy and the social sphere.

D. Zlatopolskiy, doctor of law, professor of the law faculty of Moscow State University:

Many of the questions which we are discussing here have a discussion character. And it is on this plane that I would like, first of all, to call attention to the fact that now the idea of the transition from federation to confederation has been advanced by certain social movements in the union republics of the Baltic. Above all, this formula was contained in the program of the Popular Front of Estonia. This solution sounded very democratic, the following was said there: The transition from the Stalinist federation to democratic confederation. But this thesis is absolutely anti-scientific in all respects.

First of all, I would not begin to call our federation Stalinist. In spite of the fact that there were distortions. Academician Vyshinsky called it Stalinist. But it was still based on Leninist principles, and these Leninist principles must be restored and strengthened in the Constitution.

There are five of these principles. I think that, correspondingly, five articles should be devoted to them.

As regards confederation. We never have had confederative relations—if we talk about the interrelations among republics. Never. Never and nowhere has the question been formulated in this manner.

The Popular Front of Estonia proposes to go over to confederation, evidently not imagining at all what this is. I, of course, apologize to the leaders of the Popular Front, but nevertheless I cannot speak otherwise. But the

point is that, indeed, a confederation is an international-legal association. And in order to go from a federation to a confederation the consent of the other republics is necessary as a minimum.

I must say that in the socio-political movements in the Baltic there is a great deal that is positive, this is generally known and this is good. They stand for the positions of restructuring, but there are some aspects against which one should come out with all determination and candor. They have been formulated most definitely in Estonia, but such propositions are also contained in the program of Sajudis in Lithuania. Here my Lithuanian friends are present, they know this. There is an analogous situation in Latvia as well. Professor Miller, my friend, also knows this, of course.

How is the question put there? It is thought that the sovereignty of the union republics is primordial and the point of departure. And the sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics springs from this sovereignty. But such a formulation of the question does not stand up to any criticism, it is completely incorrect.

Very complex is the question of the nationality basis of our state system. And they put it in different ways. At one time it was even proposed: If a union republic has less than 50 percent of the indigenous population, it should be abolished. In one of the works in 1969, some author proposed to abolish "only" two union republics—the Kazakh and the Kirghiz. True, he proposed an alternative: As a last resort, he says, one can create a Russian Autonomous Republic in the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan, where the Russians predominate.

I will not say how feeble this idea is. But nevertheless, the formulation of the problem, even in such a form, is significant, it seems to me, even up to now.

Here the representatives of autonomous units have spoken. And so, the question of the national composition of these units is now acute, because the national composition there is very insignificant in percentage terms. The question arises: Why do we have to pose the question about their abolition? In my view, not in any case, not under any circumstances.

Our multinational state cannot be destroyed, we should be proud of it. We must proceed from the fact that we have four forms of national statehood: The union republic as the highest form, the autonomous republic, then the autonomous oblast and the autonomous area. And socialism can be proud of the fact that it has a richness of forms of national statehood.

T. Ivanova, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet:

I think that it is not necessary to talk about the urgency of the question of inter-nationality relations for our republic. In the autonomous units of our republic alone there live more than 25 million people. And, recognizing

the complexity, the contradictoriness, and the multifaceted character of the processes of the inter-nationality development of Russia, I believe that one of the most important problems is the possibility of realizing the sovereign rights of the very union republic—the Russian Federation.

We are sort of ashamed to examine this problem. But, you see, this is the only federative republic in which there are not many institutions. This question is of fundamental significance not only for the republic, but also for the harmonization of inter-nationality relations as a whole.

For example, the problems concerning the competence of the center and Russia arise not only in our republic. They also trouble the other republics.

It is no secret that the authoritarian monopolism of the central departments is foreign to the interests of all the nations. I emphasize this, in the ordinary consciousness it is frequently linked with Russia. So that now it is impossible to separate the solution of some problems from the others.

To take, if only, the lack of statistics on nationality questions. It does not make it possible to assess the level and character of the migration of the various national groups. In the Baltic republics claims arise: Who came, who left, who is working. Although it is perfectly clear that there is no research in this sphere. We need to occupy ourselves with this problem, to consult with people, otherwise this will really lead to the aggravation of inter-nationality relations.

But in order not to permit the further aggravation of the situation, we need a thorough expert examination of the economic projects on the territory of the residence of nations and nationalities, the participation of their representatives in the control over the economic activity of the ministries and departments, preliminary and candid discussion, and consideration of public opinion.

As is shown by the study of the materials which are received in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet from the various regions of the Russian Federation, the acuteness of today's situation in many respects is explained, on the one hand, by the excessive centralization of the management of the development of the nations, and, on the other, by the aspiration in the provinces to minimize inter-nationality interests.

The broad public is increasingly insistently calling attention to the fact that the Russian Federation does not have a number of state, public, and scientific structures, which the other union republics have at their disposition and which are of vital necessity. What questions are people raising? In particular, the following. In Russia, about 30 million representatives of various nationalities are deprived national-administrative autonomy. There has been a reduction in the number of national schools, a decrease in the training of national scientific cadres, a lowering in the quality of the training of specialists, a

narrowing in the sphere of the use of national languages—this is a far from complete list, which today worries people.

It is obvious that in the solution of these problems it is necessary to act together, with the participation of the central state and public organizations that go to make up the political system of our country. It should be said that their attention to Russia is unjustifiably low, and I very much hope that, perhaps, the newly-created institution at the USSR Supreme Soviet will somehow turn to the problems of Russia.

And this work should be organized on a serious scientific basis. You see, it is no secret for anyone that both the Academy of Sciences of the Union, and its institutions have a rather cool attitude to the multifaceted problems of Russia.

Most likely, in correcting the deformations and mistakes of the past, an attempt must somehow be made—although new ways are unexplored—to avoid them to the maximum degree today.

In the interest of securing the genuinely scientific management of the development of the socialist nations, it seems necessary to create, if not an Academy of Sciences of the RSFSR, then at least a system of corresponding scientific centers in Russia, including regional ones, which make it possible to solve the urgent needs of development in the entire complex.

This would make it possible to conduct scientific developments in regard to the improvement of nationality policy, to prepare appropriate recommendations, to study and to disseminate the experience of the inter-nationality interaction of the peoples.

I understand that it is impossible to speak about all the problems. But I would like to bring to your notice those which we must still think about.

Here are some. To create in Russia an organ or committee for inter-nationality questions, which would carry out the practical implementation of a single state policy in the sphere of inter-nationality relations with regard to the federative organization of our republic.

We have more than once in the Presidium had thorough discussions of the problem of the organs of power—to have or not to have two chambers? There were various proposals. This means we will still have to discuss these problems, and, most likely, we will find some kind of solution.

It is proposed also to expand the norms for the representation of the autonomous oblast and the autonomous area in the organs of state power and government of the union republic, to grant them, in the person of the Councils of People's Deputies, the right of legislative initiative in the Supreme Soviet of the union republic, to expand the range of questions of socio-cultural construction, which are once and for all solved by the organs of the ASSR, the autonomous oblasts and areas. Really,

comrades, to open a national theater, one must without fail go to the Council of Ministers or to the ministry of the Russian Federation, and to open a museum—one must coordinate the question in general in the Central Committee. Of course, it cannot be this way.

Here wishes were expressed about the possible formation of national rayons, national rural soviets. But I must tell you, we found interesting documents about this, they relate to the 1920's to the 1930's. During 1937-1938, these formations were abolished. I think that now it would be worthwhile to attentively study the experience of the past on the basis of the available archive and other materials.

These and a number of other questions are analyzed by the commission which has been created in our country and which is headed by V. I. Vorotnikov. In the near future, we will meet and study all the problems.

K. Skvortsov, deputy director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Procuracy:

The existing legislation, as the sad events show that are taking place in a number of regions of our country, at present inadequately guarantees the free development of all the peoples and nationalities. In my view, the chief and leading conception in the regulation of inter-nationality relations must be the active inclusion, in the solution of the problem, of all the legal levers of the many branches of law and the participation of both state formations and the public formations of citizens in this undertaking.

In so doing, it is necessary, not in words, but in deed, to take into account all the international conventions which the Soviet Union has signed and which it has joined.

In speaking about the necessity of beginning to operate all the legal levers for the solution of the inter-nationality problems, it is necessary speak also about the labor, marriage and family, and many other branches of legislation. As a matter of fact, at present the following extremist judgments are being expressed in some regions: To prohibit inter-nationality marriages. From the position of common sense, this is absurd. But such thoughts are being expressed, and, God forbid, somewhere they will be put into practice openly or more often, perhaps, secretly.

It would be expedient to provide for the right of citizens to appeal to the court for the restoration of their rights and legitimate interests that have been violated on the ground of nationality, for compensation of moral and material damage.

It is necessary to introduce additions in the Fundamentals of Land, Housing, and Civil Legislation, having clearly anchored in them the principle of the equality of the rights and obligations of citizens, regardless of racial and nationality membership. For example, it must be clearly said that in every union and autonomous republic, as well as in every oblast and area, it is possible

for citizens, not only of the indigenous, but also any other nationality to receive land for lease. The same pertains also to the receipt of parcels for individual housing construction, for gardening and truck-farming.

The strict observance of the equality of rights of the citizens of all nationalities in the solution of questions concerning registration for the improvement of housing conditions, the observance of sequence and norms in the distribution of housing, and guarantees against groundless banishment. Unfortunately, such manifestations already exist in some places, and it is necessary to put a stop to them legislatively at the very beginning.

It is necessary to establish also administrative responsibility for actions that insult the national feelings of citizens. To stipulate judicial guarantees of the equality of rights of citizens regardless of their racial and nationality membership in the trial of cases concerning administrative violations of the law.

Finally, still another question. On criminal legislation. At the present time, only one article of the code stipulates criminal responsibility for the kindling of nationality dissension, for the violation of the nationality equality of citizens. It does not encompass all the anti-social manifestations, against which it is necessary to wage battle, including by criminal law means.

It seems necessary to establish criminal responsibility for the creation of criminal groupings for the purpose of kindling nationality enmity or dissension.

It seems that it would be correct to intensify responsibility for cases of arson and pogroms, the forced leaving of the place of residence and work, the violation of the normal work of enterprises and institutions being perpetrated on an inter-nationality basis.

It would be correct to provide for certain additions and changes in the Fundamentals of Legal Procedure, in particular about language and jurisdiction.

Ye. Golikov, sector chief of the Ideological Department of the Estonian CP Central Committee:

I would like to begin with the fact that for 32 years I have lived in Estonia and lately, in the conditions of the sufficiently hot "climate" in our republic, I repeatedly had the occasion to paraphrase the famous expression of Aleksander Ivanovich Herzen, who said: I love the Poles because I love Russia.

So then several times, and the last time not longer ago than yesterday, I have declared that I love the Estonians because I love Russia. And having listened to the speech of Tatyana Georgiyevna Ivanova, I want to say that I loved Russia still more.

All of us must understand perfectly well that the unsettledness of many problems, including in the sphere of nationality-state building of the Russian Federation, lies like a heavy stone on the solution of analogous problems in all the union republics.

It seems that one of the cardinal questions that are being actively discussed today—the relations of the center and the subjects of the federation of republics—is in many respects connected with the circumstance that precisely the Russian Federation, which bears the greatest load and has the greatest proportion in terms of many parameters of the total life of the Soviet Union, is not fully a subject of the federation in terms of a whole series of indicators.

There arises the distinctive situation, where Russia is identified with the center, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Russian people, and there are a number of them in the union republics, are endowed with the qualities of the bearers of conservative indications, which we can fully ascribe to a certain period of development of our society. On this ground, inter-nationality tension, if it is not provoked, is stimulated, and it is impossible to forget about this today.

From general debates and discussions we must try to make the transition to real motions in this question. I imagine the matter in the following way: Simultaneously, only in the process of the formation of a full-fledged republic of the Russian Federation, can the following, very important aspect take place, namely the democratization of the center.

The democratization of the center will signify simultaneously also the strengthening of the Union. A strong center is a center that is democratizing itself. What does democratizing itself mean? This is a center in which the share of every subject of the federation increases. For the Estonian SSR today, this problem stands, in essence, at the center of the ideological discussions.

No secret to anyone, let us put it this way, are the eccentricities which are undertaken in the republic by the representatives of the movements, including the Popular Front. So then, these "leaps" to the side of the main line of the development of the Soviet federation in various directions are not connected with the fact that Estonians, by their nature, by their genetic structure are programmed for nationalism. It is clear that we must pay for the sins of former times.

Today we recognize that the rule of law state is still a goal, and not a reality. But the same also pertains to the democratic federation, which is really in need of qualitative revolutionary transformations.

One of the ways of this is the increase of the participation of the union republics in all-union affairs. And here from this point of view, the Supreme Soviet of Russia has the right to have a two-chamber parliament, where the representation of the nationalities must be proportional.

I apologize, very likely, I am out of my territory, but I think that the settledness of these problems would be very helpful to us. And here is why.

If you permit, a couple of words about the situation which is now taking shape in the Estonian SSR. Everything is very equivocal and very difficult.

I have already said that my personal love for Russia is strengthened still more thanks to the heated situation in which we now find ourselves. Believe me, it is very difficult. Here the—in my view—not simply not well thought-out, but self-destructive proposal of a confederation is being advanced. It has found support among rather significant strata of the Estonian population. A very painful reaction of estrangement, if you will, apathy and loss of hope, is coming into being.

I would like to speak about still another circumstance. The Russian-speaking population, which is very heterogeneous in terms of social composition, finds itself in difficult conditions. This population to a significant degree is connected with enterprises of union subordination that are created on the territory of the republic, but who are not developed for its interests. And correspondingly the workers were practically taken here. People work in Russian collectives, they live in Russian rayons. One-fourth of the population of the Estonian SSR does not speak Estonian at all.

I have mentioned the complex nationality structure of the Estonian SSR. 60 percent of the population are now Estonian, 40 percent—non-Estonian. The sharp increase of the number of one ethnic group, of course, leads to the fact that the character of intercourse changes. In particular, the question of language is acute. For educated people, no law is required here, and there is no problem. They speak the language which is convenient for all, which is understood by all. But, generally speaking, I, who have lived in Estonia for 32 years, have an inadequate command of the Estonian language, and I feel awkward every time. And in this there are also nuances, which then develop into difficult problems.

It seems to me that, taking into account the complexity and aggravation of these problems, it would be very urgent to determine what nationality rights, nationality interests, and nationality achievements are. To somehow strengthen legislatively the procedures for the protection of this, that, and the third.

In conclusion, I would say the following. Several days ago, during a very tense period, using the platform of television, I made the proposal to all those who speak and write in the republic: To refrain from any expressions which can insult the representatives of one nation or another. You must think not only about what you say, but also about how people understand us. Today it is sometimes becoming more difficult to solve our problems in the republic because of the fact that not all publications, not all information, which we receive through the central press, radio and television channels, fully takes into account the peculiar character and the situation in the republic. I earnestly ask that consideration be given to this circumstance. You see, tact in

questions of inter-nationality relations is a sign not only of culture, but also of the democratism to which we aspire.

L. Aleksidze, pro-rector of Tbilisi State University:

Today we talk about the unnecessary centralization, about the fact that the bureaucratic apparatus has raged. In the union republics, the inspector of any union ministry could put the question in such a way that, although it contradicted the interests of the republic, they were forced to agree. So is it worthwhile to be astonished at such an explosion in the national republics? And we should not close our eyes to this, to control the processes in a reasonable, general-democratic direction.

For this reason, when we talk about our federation, we need to understand that this is a union of equal republics, which have given a fraction of their sovereignty to the union organ, and they are the source of the sovereignty of the Union.

The strength of the Leninist idea consists in the fact that a union of equal republics and equal peoples was formed, which united and gave certain rights to the center in order to be stronger. But who is the source of the sovereignty of the same Georgia? Of course, the Georgian people. And the right of withdrawal guarantees me the right to withdraw if I see that my sovereignty is undeservedly infringed.

The union agreement was discussed here. I would like to say that the comrades from the Baltic are not right. But I understand them. The events of 1939-1940 left them a very heavy legacy.

One can have a different point of view. But the following seems reasonable. If our present-day laws fully take into account the interests of all of the union republics and the center, then the necessity of the creation of a new union agreement does not arise. For then, I think, the comrades from the Baltic will become convinced that what, in their opinion, hurt them as a sovereign nation has been solved through legislation. If this will not be done, then, obviously, the question of a new union agreement will continue to be raised.

In my view, here someone attempted to contrast the autonomous republic and the union republic, to put them on one level. If the autonomous republic, all the more now, under glasnost, and the union republic do not agree in opinion, this can only call forth conflicts.

When the question is raised of granting all national minorities autonomy, one must speak of national-cultural autonomy. Look, we have national minorities which have their own theater, their own secondary schools, their own newspapers, their own poets are printed in the Kurdish, Azerbaijanian and Armenian languages. That is, in their oblast they thus practically govern themselves.

Without a doubt, the rights of the autonomous republic must be expanded. If we, Georgians, are offended, when it seems to us that we are being oppressed from the center, so the Abkhaz believe that we oppress them. V. I. Lenin talked about the fact that the small nations should not be stepped on. For this reason we should be careful in nationality relations. But to grant the autonomous republic the right to decide by itself where to go means to break up the Soviet federation. It is necessary to give it a maximum of rights, but its decision to go over to another republic cannot be taken without the consent of the Union, as it is written in the Constitution.

And still another question which, I believe, should be given serious thought. If the Union took a decision which contradicts the vital interests of the republic, what then? This is a very complex question. Such a thing is not out of the question. For this reason, I think, it is necessary to create legal guarantees to the effect that a law which a republic considers contradictory to its interests can be held up and be more precisely defined by additional procedures.

The following also took part in the discussion: Sh. Mustayev, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR; B. Lazarev, chief of the Sector for Administrative Law of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences; I. Kuznetsov, deputy director of the Institute of Soviet State Building and Legislation at the USSR Supreme Soviet; N. Oike, chairman of the ispolkom of the Council of People's Deputies of the Chukotsk Autonomous Okrug; A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Presidium of the LSSR Supreme Soviet, and others.

The discussion was summarized by A. Pavlov, chief of the State and Legal Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

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Armenian Supreme Soviet Decree On Environmental Measures

IS300746a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
1 Jul 89 pp. 2-5

[Decree of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on the Ecological State of the Republic and Measures to Improve It issued 25 June 1989]

[Text] The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet notes that a number of important measures to improve the ecological situation have been implemented in the republic in recent years. The Armenian Nuclear Electrical Power Plant has been closed down. A sewerage receiving center with treatment facilities and a water pipeline around Lake Sevan is under construction.

The Razdan Mining and Chemicals Combine has been converted into a modern precision machine building enterprise.

The conversion of the Kanaker Aluminum Plant from the production of primary aluminum to the manufacture of aluminum foil has made it possible to prevent pollution of the air in the city of Yerevan with fluorine compounds and dust.

At the Nairit [Chloroprene Rubber] Research and Production Association, the rubber production facility No. 1 has been closed down and production capacity reduced by 33 percent.

The production of diacyandiamide and melamine from it at the Kirovakan Chemicals Plant has been halted, as has the production of calcium carbide at the plant. The shops at the enterprise that produced calcium cyanamide, weak nitrogen acid, and ammonium nitrate have also been closed. The question of converting the plant is now under discussion.

The construction of the Armbiotekhnologiya [Armenian Biotechnology] Research and Production Association's experimental-industrial plant in the city of Abovyan has been halted. The question of its conversion is also under review.

Efforts are being made to reduce automotive transport emissions into the atmosphere; the construction of a motor beltway around the city of Yerevan has been completed, and the number of automobiles fueled by liquefied and compressed natural gas is being increased.

At the same time, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet notes that, despite the implementation of a number of important measures to improve the state of the environment in the republic in recent years, the ecological situation remains acute, especially in the cities of Yerevan, Kirovakan, Razdan, Alaverdi, Ararat, Kafan, Kadzharan, and the corresponding rayons.

As a result of active seismic and exogenous processes, mudslides, erosion, and landslides, land is being taken out of agricultural production, and losses of fertile soil layers continue.

The volume of polluted sewage water is growing at a time when the commissioning of corresponding water-treatment capacity is being inadmissibly drawn out. The use of water for irrigation and sprinkling is still relatively inefficient.

Efforts under way to recultivate soils and to plant grass and trees are inadequate.

Each year, automotive transport and enterprises of non-ferrous metallurgy, the chemical industry, the building materials industry, and power engineering discharge more than 30,000 tons of polluting substances into the republic's air.

Maximum one-time concentrations of polluting substances often substantially exceed maximum allowable levels.

The use of minerals is ineffective, which is having a negative impact on the ecological balance.

The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet **resolves:**

1. Proceeding from the vital need to solve these problems from the standpoint of the republic's population, to deem the consistent implementation of measures to protect and improve the state of the environment, on the basis of the changeover to new managerial methods, to be an extremely important task of all Soviet, state, and economic agencies, associations and enterprises, public organizations, and every labor collective and every citizen of the republic.

To direct the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers to draw up, present for national and expert discussion, and submit to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet for confirmation as early as possible an all-embracing, long-term program for the comprehensive improvement of the ecological situation in the republic, bearing in mind that the primary facets of nature preservation efforts should be:

- to ensure everywhere the favorable ecological state of the environment on the basis of strict observance of scientifically validated nature-protection standards;
- to ban pollution of atmospheric air throughout the republic;
- to ensure rational use and protection of land and water resources;
- to strictly enforce air purity;
- to ensure preservation and reproduction of the gene pool of fauna and flora, with the creation of forest zones around the republic's cities and protected areas;
- to ensure rational use of mineral resources;
- to implement in every possible way a policy of resource conservation and the introduction of low-waste and waste-free production processes;
- to reduce energy consumption everywhere and to introduce on a wide scale the use of nontraditional energy sources (the sun, wind, geothermal sources, biological gases, etc.);
- to show special concern for the ecological condition of Lake Sevan and the Ararat valley and for measures to make rational use of their resources;
- to organize ecological education for the public and especially for the younger generation.

2. In view of the special danger of the production activity of the Nairit Research and Production Association for

the city of Yerevan and surrounding rayons, as well as the fact that measures taken to date to remove this danger have been unavailing, and to accommodate numerous complaints and requests from citizens, to close the Nairit Research and Production Association in 1989.

3. To set up a commission, to include representatives of public and scientific organizations, to study a package of organizational, managerial, technical, and technological measures to close down the Nairit Research and Production Association and to convert the closed hazardous production facilities to the production of ecologically clean output.

4. To note that, by proposal of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers and local agencies, the Alaverdi Mining and Metallurgical Combine will close as of July 1, 1989, and that mining operations, ore enrichment, and the production of black and refined copper and sulfuric acid are being halted.

5. To direct the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers to halt the production of chemical substances at the Kirovakan Chemicals Plant and to fully convert the plant to the production of artificial crystals and consumer goods.

6. In view of the fact that the construction in Abovyan-skiy Rayon of an experimental-industrial complex for the production, storage and regasification of liquified natural gas and the expansion of the Razdan State Regional Electric Power Plant are taking place without the required preliminary expert review, to direct the Armenian SSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature to conduct a comprehensive expert review as quickly as possible and to submit a corresponding report.

7. To direct the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers and the Yerevan City Soviet Executive Committee to formulate and implement comprehensive programs of immediate and long-term work to develop electric-powered transport and a subway, to divert general-use buses away from the central part of the city, to convert public and freight automotive transport in all areas to the use of liquified and compressed gas, to strictly monitor emissions of automobile exhaust gases, and to devise and implement a set of measures to reduce these emissions and to improve passenger and freight flows in the city.

8. To direct republic soviets to ensure effective coordination of the activities of all associations, enterprises, and organizations within their jurisdiction, regardless of departmental affiliation, in the sphere of environmental protection and use of natural resources.

To provide the utmost assistance to nature protection agencies in accomplishing the tasks before them, to invigorate the activity of deputies and deputy groups and of posts at enterprises and in organizations charged with preventing environmental pollution, and to ensure the effective use of financial and material resources allocated for environmental-protection measures.

In formulating comprehensive plans for economic and social development, to provide for measures to ensure favorable ecological and sanitary-hygienic conditions for the population's vital activity; to systematically monitor, in conjunction with agencies of the Armenian SSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature, progress in fulfilling plans for the construction of environmental-protection facilities; with respect to the construction of production and nonproduction facilities, to take necessary measures to ensure the immediate commissioning of facilities and equipment to prevent environmental pollution and to treat and render harmless industrial and household wastes.

9. To direct the Armenian SSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature to take effective measures to monitor the protection and use of land, surface and subsurface water, atmospheric air, the plant and animal world, and mineral resources; to comprehensively supervise environmental-protection efforts in the republic; to formulate and implement a uniform scientific and technical policy in environmental protection and rational use of natural resources; and to coordinate the activities of ministries, departments, and organizations in this sphere.

To ensure the thorough and highly skilled expert ecological review of blueprints for enterprises under construction and reconstruction.

10. To instruct the republic Procuracy and law-enforcement agencies to strictly apply the measures specified by legislation to institutions, enterprises, and individual citizens who violate ecological regulations.

G. Voskanyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

A. Stepanyan, secretary of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

25 June 1989, Yerevan.

Decree On Armenian Earthquake Reconstruction Progress

18300746b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
1 Jul 89 p 2

[Decree of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on Progress in Fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Resolutions on Relieving the Effects of the Earthquake in the Armenian SSR, issued 24 June 1989]

[Text] The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet notes that the destructive earthquake that occurred on December 7, 1988 and the numerous aftershocks of considerable force that followed it caused enormous psychological and material damage to the republic's economy and to the entire people.

The natural disaster affected more than 40 percent of the republic's territory, an area with a population of almost

1 million people. More than 20 cities and rayons suffered damage, as did 342 villages, 58 of which were completely destroyed. There were tens of thousands of dead and injured, more than 530,000 people were left homeless, and nearly 8 million square meters of housing was lost.

The water, heating and electric-power systems were completely disrupted, and municipal- and consumer-service facilities were destroyed.

One hundred seventy industrial enterprises suffered damage, as did 604 kilometers of general-use motor roads.

In the almost seven months that have passed since the earthquake, with the active participation and assistance of all the union republics, USSR ministries and departments, Soviet Army soldiers, the country's party, soviet, and economic agencies and public organizations, and the republic's citizens, as well as of foreign states and individuals, a set of measures has been carried out to rescue, evacuate, and provide temporary housing for the stricken population and to organize the operation of trade, transportation, and communications enterprises, health-care institutions, and other vital facilities.

At the present time, the second stage of work is under way on a broad scale—the restoration and construction of residential buildings, social and cultural facilities, transportation, communications, and industrial and agricultural enterprises.

A sizable number of power-engineering, heat- and water-supply, and other municipal facilities have been restored.

Efforts to set up facilities for construction organizations have entered the final stage. From January through May of this year, 332.4 million rubles' worth of construction and installation work was performed in the earthquake zone, as against the plan figure of 321.9 million rubles for the five-month period. In other words, the plan was fulfilled at a rate of 102.9 percent.

At the same time, the accelerated performance of construction and restoration work is being impeded to a considerable extent by the operational inefficiency of a number of republic ministries and departments and local soviets. The republic Council of Ministers, the Armenian SSR State Committee for Construction, the Armenian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee, and a number of soviet executive committees have failed to ensure the prompt allocation of tracts of land for the construction of buildings and structures. The republic State Committee for Construction, the Armgosproyekt [Armenian State Design], Yerevanproyekt [Yerevan Design], and Armremproyekt [Armenian Repair Design] Institutes, and others are failing to meet deadlines for the preparation and submission of design and cost-estimate documentation. There are serious shortcomings in the organization and performance of repair and restoration work.

Residents of the stricken areas often receive the established compensation for the loss of property after delays and are experiencing certain difficulties in finding employment.

Local soviet executive committees, the republic State Agromustrial Committee, and farm officials have been slow to resolve matters having to do with the prompt allocation of tracts of land for individual housing construction. Matters concerning the provision of building materials and the allocation of equipment to be used to assist individual builders are being handled in an inefficient fashion. The network of trade and service-sphere enterprises is not being expanded adequately, prompting justified complaints from the public.

While taking a positive view of the efforts of the enlisted organizations, USSR ministries and departments, and union-republic Councils of Ministers in making preparations for the construction and restoration of facilities in the stricken zone, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet notes that, on the whole, the situation remains extremely difficult and strained. As a result of unjustified sluggishness, complacency, and the lack of constant oversight of the performance of work in the earthquake zone, the construction of facilities is organized at a low technical and organizational level, and supplies of materials and construction machinery and equipment are inadequate. Subdivisions are not staffed with skilled workers and mid-level managers.

An extremely strained situation has developed with respect to the construction of housing and other social and cultural facilities, an area in which only about 10 percent of the year's quota of construction and installation work has been completed.

The construction of union ministry enterprises in the earthquake zone is proceeding at a slow pace—in Leninakan, an electric motor plant, a small electric motor plant, an electrical equipment plant, the Omega Plant, the Strommachina [Building Materials Machinery] Plant, an analytical instruments experimental plant, a consumer-goods plant, a branch of the Elektron [Electron] Plant, and the Magnon [Magnon] Specialized Design and Engineering Bureau; in Spitak, the elevator plant; in Stepanavan, the Promsyyaz [Industrial Communications] Plant; and a number of others.

The Armpromstroyaterialy [Armenian Industrial Construction Materials] Production Association has failed to organize the production of local building materials and their supply to construction-industry facilities and enterprises. The activities of organizations taking part in efforts to relieve the earthquake's effects are not properly coordinated.

There are serious shortcomings in work to unload freight cars on the railroad.

The sanitary and epidemiological situation remains strained. The Armenian SSR Ministry of Health, other ministries and departments, and local soviet executive

committees are implementing at a slow pace measures specified by the comprehensive program for ensuring sanitary and hygienic well-being in the rayons and cities affected by the earthquake. In rural communities, work to restore water supplies, to clear avalanches, and to remove debris is proceeding at a slow pace, and sanitary and hygienic regulations governing public-catering and trade facilities are being violated.

In order to speed efforts to relieve the effects of the earthquake in the republic, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To direct the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, republic ministries and departments, and city and rayon soviets in the disaster zone to immediately review at presidium, collegiums and soviet executive committee sessions progress in performing restoration and construction work in each rayon and city and to adopt effective measures to eliminate existing shortcomings, to create conditions for the unconditional fulfillment of 1989 assignments, to develop capacity for the production of local building materials, and to fully restore production potential associated with the public's vital needs.

- To devote special attention to the quality of construction and installation work.

2. To request the CPSU Central Committee Politburo's Commission for Relieving the Effects of the Earthquake in the Armenian SSR:

- a) to require that USSR ministries and departments and union republic Councils of Ministers step up oversight of the performance of construction organizations engaged in restoration and construction work in the disaster zone, and to instruct them to ensure an immediate increase in the volume of work under way and the fulfillment of 1989 assignments for the commissioning of residential buildings no later than November;

- b) to instruct the USSR Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry, the USSR Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems, the USSR Ministry of Construction, Road, and Municipal Machine Building, the USSR Ministry of Machine Building, the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Electronics Industry, and the USSR Ministry of Communications to take the necessary measures to implement formulated comprehensive programs for the restoration and new construction of enterprises in place of enterprises that were completely destroyed;

- c) to instruct the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, and the USSR Ministry of Construction, Road, and Municipal Machine Building to accelerate the delivery to the republic of material and technical resources called for in party and government decisions

for the performance of restoration and construction work, as well as increases in the production of local building materials.

3. To direct the Armenian SSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply and the Armenian SSR State Planning Committee to ensure

a) the receipt by Dec. 1 of this year of 31,000 residential mobile homes and their transfer to city and rayon soviet executive committees for distribution in the established procedure;

b) the sale at republic enterprises in July and August of this year of material resources for the construction of 16,000 small wooden houses.

4. To direct the Armenian SSR State Committee for Construction to complete no later than July 1989 the preparation of design and cost-estimate documentation for the 1989-1990 work volume, including design and cost-estimate documentation for reinforcement and restoration work.

5. To direct the Armpromstroymaterialy Production Association to ensure by the end of the third quarter of this year the development of capacity for the production of local building materials to a level sufficient to fully meet requirements. To organize the regular supply of output to users.

6. To direct the Armenian SSR State Committee for Construction and the Armenian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee to take urgent measures to increase work volumes and to reinforce and restore damaged residential buildings and other social-sphere facilities damaged by the earthquake.

To establish that city and rayon soviet executive committees in the disaster zone bear full responsibility for the restoration of all vital production, social, and cultural facilities, as well as residential buildings suitable for use, that were damaged by the earthquake, with a view to providing the population with housing, food products, water, electric power, fuel, and all types of services and to creating conditions for the employment of the able-bodied population within their jurisdictions.

7. To direct city and rayon soviet executive committees in the disaster zone and construction organization and enterprise directors to ensure work for student construction detachments, devoting special attention to observance of safety requirements.

To take measures to create the requisite housing, living, and sanitary-hygienic conditions for student construction workers.

8. To direct the Armenian SSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply to provide assistance to republic ministries, departments, enterprises, and organizations in utilizing allocations of material and technical resources needed for construction and restoration work.

9. To direct the Armenian SSR Ministry of Trade and the board of Aykoop [not further identified] to ensure the accelerated delivery of material and technical resources to the trade network and their sale to individual builders, and to take measures to fully satisfy requirements.

To take immediate measures to restore and significantly expand the network of specialized stores and warehouses for the sale of lumber and buildings materials and to strengthen their material and technical facilities with a view to fully meeting public demand.

10. To direct the Yerevan Division of the Transcaucasian Railroad to ensure in 1989 the completion of work to increase the carrying capacity of railways in the earthquake zone.

11. To direct the Armenian SSR Ministry of Health to establish strict oversight of progress in fulfilling comprehensive programs to ensure sanitary-hygienic and epidemiological well-being in the rayons and cities of the Armenian SSR struck by the earthquake.

12. To direct the Armenian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee and rayon and city soviet executive committees to make persistent efforts to fulfill programs for increasing production volumes of meat and milk and improving the supply of fruit and vegetable produce to the population, to develop personal auxiliary farming operations in every possible way, and to substantially increase their contribution to the cause of supplementing food resources.

13. To direct the Armenian SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, city and rayon soviet executive committees, and ministries and departments to take measures to ensure the effective employment of the able-bodied population, to provide comprehensive assistance in staffing enterprises and organizations with necessary personnel, and to conduct extensive explanatory work with respect to matters of labor organization and remuneration. To establish that the entire able-bodied population should be employed by year's end.

14. To direct the Armenian SSR Ministry of Communications to ensure implementation of the decisions taken by the commission of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo concerning the restoration of communications in the earthquake zone. In doing so, to speed the preparation of technical documentation for the construction of communication centers and to ensure that construction proceeds according to the schedule set by the government.

15. To direct the republic administration of the USSR State Committee for Standards to step up oversight of the quality of construction of all residential buildings, other social-sphere facilities, and industrial enterprises under construction in the areas stricken by the earthquake.

16. The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet calls the attention of the Armenian SSR State Committee for Construction, Armenian SSR ministries and departments, city and rayon soviet executive committees, and all organizations participating in design and construction to the need to impose order in earthquake-proof construction as quickly as possible, to drastically improve the quality and technical level of construction and installation work, and to unconditionally meet established requirements for the strength and reliability of the buildings and structures being put up in the seismologically active zone.

17. To direct the Armenian SSR State Planning Committee to clarify, with due regard for the enterprises and organizations damaged by the earthquake, regional and the republic structural programs for prospects for the development of production forces in connection with enterprises' changeover to the new managerial arrangements.

18. To direct city and rayon soviet executive committees to actively provide sponsorship assistance to rayons in the disaster zone and to enlist in restoration work on a broad scale labor collectives from unaffected areas. To take measures to prevent the departure of skilled workers by giving them the opportunity to work in the earthquake zone.

19. To direct the Armenian SSR State Committee for Construction, the Armenian SSR Ministry of Health, the Armenian SSR Ministry of Public Education, and the Armenian SSR Ministry of Social Security, in designing the construction and creation of social facilities, to provide for the development of social, psychological, medical, and occupational rehabilitation complexes.

To direct the Armenian SSR State Planning Committee, in conjunction with the Armenian SSR Ministry of Public Education, to provide for the training of specialists in this area, beginning with the new academic year.

20. Guided by the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on speeding the country's social and economic development, and for the purpose of restoring the republic's economy following the destructive earthquake as quickly as possible, to deem expedient the creation of a free-enterprise economic zone in the republic, in the context of preparations for the Armenian SSR's changeover to the new principles of managing the economy and social sphere based on self-management and self-financing. To this end, to direct the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers to formulate a concept for the creation of a free-enterprise economic zone within the republic's territory that follows from the long-term strategy for developing the republic's economy as an organic and integral part of the country's single economic complex.

21. To direct the Armenian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Armenian Republic Procurator to intensify oversight of the safety of goods and material

valuables coming into the republic. With the participation of the general public, to take immediate measures to identify and hold accountable persons guilty of theft, extortion, bribetaking, corruption, speculation, concealment, and spoilage of material valuables. To widely publicize instances of theft and various kinds of abuses.

To ensure the observance of social justice and citizens' legal safeguards.

G. Voskanyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

V. Stepanyan, secretary of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

24 June 1989, Yerevan

'Armenian Pan-National Movement' Officially Recognized

18300745a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 1 Jul 89 p. 3

[Decree of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on the 'Armenian Pan-National Movement' Organization, issued 25 July 1989]

[Text] In consideration of the fact that the organization "Armenian Pan-National Movement," operating within the framework of the Constitution, and guided by the principles of democracy, seeks to attain social justice and expedite the economic, social, and cultural tasks now facing the Armenian people, as well as to further the interests of other peoples and nationalities presently residing in the republic, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR herewith resolves:

1. That in accordance with Article 49 of the Armenian SSR Constitution, the "Armenian Pan-National Movement" shall be recognized as a social organization.

2. That the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium shall register the charter of the social organization named in accordance with proper procedures.

[Signed] *G. Voskanyan, Chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium*

V. Stepanyan, Secretary of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Yerevan, 25 June 1989

Armenian Second Secretary Lobov on Party Cadres, Other Issues

18300745b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 4 Jul 89 pp. 1, 3

[Interview with O.I. Lobov, second secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, by Armenpress correspondent: "On the Paths to Perestroika"]

[Text] [Correspondent] You were a participant at the first Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow, the

composition of which is in effect entirely new, as well as at the session of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet, where, to the contrary, the tenure of the deputies chosen by the people was coming to an end. What did you find in common in the work of these two forums, and what were the fundamental factors distinguishing them one from another?

[O.I. Lobov] Let me say at the outset that both of these events—each at its own level—confirm a genuine fact of our public life, namely, that democracy is becoming institutionalized with the passage of congresses and conferences. Before our very eyes new prospective leaders are appearing with new names which in the course of a day become known to the entire public. The formulation of issues and exchange of ideas is acquiring a keenly contested character. Moreover, the urgent nature and topicality of these issues are too obvious to need demonstration. It appears that we are approaching the point in our meetings where instead of discussing the formal agenda we may deal in broad terms with the most sensitive matters of concern.

As for fundamental differences, I would not put them in separate categories. It is clear that the Congress and the session are distinguishable in terms of their character as well as their anticipated results. It is no accident that at the Congress in Moscow the formulation and discussion of issues bore a more general, abstract character; whereas at the republic session matters were discussed more substantively and concretely. And these were matters for which it was necessary to find practical solutions for social and historical reasons. It is noteworthy, too, that the people invited to attend the session were considerably more active than those invited to the Congress.

I should like to mention one other aspect of these two forums. Unfortunately, although this is understandable, the tone and character of discussions often exceeded the bounds of civic and ethical responsibility. No sooner were the "radicals" or the "conservatives" displeased about something than they immediately made accusations of "interference" or "trying to create a schism," etc. I think both sides were at fault. Generally, aggressive confrontation in such matters is not acceptable; just as a stubborn refusal to recognize changes in life is not acceptable. I am convinced that intelligent consensus and amicable agreement with the result will become accepted as the only possible basis for constructive solutions to problems as they arise.

[Correspondent] How do you feel about the dialogue that took place at the session of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet with representatives of the informal or non-official organizations? What do you expect to emerge from contacts with them?

[O.I. Lobov] I feel optimistic. But I would hope that the resulting activity of the people would lead more rapidly to the establishment of mature social organizations, which can help to resolve the more critical political and social issues of republic life, defend the interests of

nationalities, and represent the interests of all peoples residing in Armenia. This activity could aid in fostering the development of contacts with countries abroad, which are of such importance in solving the problems that have accumulated. I would hope also that it would have an impact on that aspect of perestroika which is tied up with the education of the individual person, raising the level of his intellectual and political culture and national self-consciousness.

[Correspondent] The CPSU Central Committee plenum on inter-nationality problems is approaching. If you should get the floor at this plenum, what specific proposals would you make? That is, mindful of the fact that you are one of the political leaders of a republic that has a good many problems in this respect.

[O.I. Lobov] You are right. Today no one can remain indifferent to the theme of inter-nationality relations and nationality policy as a whole. This is understandable. The life of the society in this respect is ambiguous and at times dramatically turbulent.

Here, the most reliable guideline is Lenin's nationality policy. Much must be resolved not simply in compliance with the law but in accordance with conscience. Accordingly, let us say, with respect to recognizing the genocide of 1915, I do not foresee anything to prevent this bloody massacre of the Armenian people from being known and studied in depth throughout the Union republics. Through diplomatic channels it is necessary to get the word out to the socialist countries and the non-socialist countries alike, providing them with detailed information regarding the destruction of 1.5 million Armenians.

A principled and uncompromising political appraisal by official bodies of the 1915 genocide in the form of resolutions adopted by the Congress or passed by governmental or party forums will enhance the prestige of every peace-loving state in the eyes of world public opinion. Naturally, this applies more than anything else to our country and our Union republics. A clearly defined appraisal just such as this should be made of events in Fergan as well as of the Sumgait vandalism.

The position of various organs of the mass media and of officials who attempt to interpret the premeditated murder of a person, simply because he belongs to a different nationality, as incidental criminal or domestic conflict is incomprehensible to me. It must be borne in mind that whatever the impact of the political appraisal and self-evaluation resulting from such murders, it cannot denigrate the people among who the murderer appeared. On the contrary, self-evaluation is an act of self-purification and heightened spiritual strength by the people themselves; it is an essential defensive reaction for the preservation of the nationality itself. It must be remembered that however powerful these political appraisals of such events may sound in their repercussions, they remain simply words on paper, incapable of restoring a single innocently ruined life or restraining a single tear of those who have been left alive. There need

be no hesitation therefore in condemning the murders and those who instigate them nor reservations in expressing words of good will for the victims.

The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh concerns everyone, including myself. There are many arguments in favor of conflicting solutions, and they have been increasing. I think that even here Lenin's legacy has been somewhat shoved to one side, and the issue is at an impasse. I would not want to aggravate the wounds of either the Armenian or Azerbaijani peoples, and so I will proceed on the basis of the facts. Progress has been made in restoring organs of self-government as well as in achieving the genuine independence of the oblast. The people of the NKAO must be given an opportunity to live for themselves without being dictated to by the Union republic, and to institute their own administrative system. It is necessary to look the truth in the eye. If a family member is displeased with you, you may be the one at fault. This is the approach that must be used in dealing with such problems.

With respect to nationality policy as a whole, we must not underestimate the amount of distortion and outright breach of Leninist precepts permitted in the past. An auspicious set of circumstances has now been created for straightening out the negative consequences of the arbitrary system of administration by command, and it is necessary, above all, to make use of the leverage of socio-economic policy in order to achieve independence. Without sovereignty and independence of economic management, all talk about sovereignty and harmonious collaboration is irrelevant. For sovereignty and independence are not ends in themselves.

It is necessary, I think, to progress still farther and achieve the economic independence of the autonomous formations—even of the rayons, the cities, and villages. The very possibility of arbitrary administrative rule will be eliminated. The mutual relations between the republic and the central government must be based in practice on agreed-upon principles. The same is true with respect to the autonomous formations.

Finally, it seems to me that it is necessary at the present time to create a legal system with a complex of laws with respect to peoples and nationalities, self-government, the Union republics, and the autonomous formations, as well as other laws, making it possible to deal unambiguously with questions that arise with regard to the interests of each side and the federation as a whole.

[Correspondent] It is well known that Armenia, like the other republics, is preparing to make the transition to economic self-sufficiency and self-financing. But it is also generally recognized that special conditions have been developed owing to the dire poverty here. How should the party organizations structure their operations in this plan?

[O.I. Lobov] That is a difficult question. To restore the national economy of the republic to its former level, economists estimate, will require more than 13 billion

rubles. Here in the republic therefore—and not only here—doubts have been expressed about the possibility of switching over to self-sufficiency and self-financing. I think these doubts are unjustified. Cost accounting and self-financing, together with the aid given, is bound to become a potent factor, and it is essential in view of the extreme conditions into which the republic has fallen. We need only a sensible approach and a balanced economic policy.

Party organizations should direct their efforts primarily to mobilizing the communists and the labor collectives to replenish reserves, and to searching for unconventional solutions that will make it possible to increase results of work in construction and industry—not merely in terms of percentage points but many times over. Party organizations should try to achieve, above everything else, a review of the psychology of managing skilled workers; the discarding of obsolete methods of work; and a bold approach to external trade through the creation of free enterprise zones. They should study and teach; they should seek out and introduce initiatives and bold leaders; they should speed the process of delineating managerial and party functions; and they should achieve the effective transfer of power to the soviets. The party organizations should become the generators of ideas and the spokesmen for the opinions of the people.

With respect to the concept of regional economic self-sufficiency, three basic ideas should be distinguished. First, equivalent exchange between regions; second, a clear definition of the economic obligations of the republic vis-a-vis the Union and of ways of its participating in deciding the major economic tasks (there can no longer be any question of the republic's not participating in them); and, third, the establishment of a system of intra-republic economic and legal regulatory controls.

We should begin with the premise that the territory is capable of functioning effectively only when its fundamental economic unit, the self-sufficient enterprise, is independent, possessing a right to go out to both Union and international markets and a right to enter into any kind of contract or association. There should be no external economic constraint with respect to such an enterprise whatever. Under no circumstances will a replacement of the arbitrary Union administrative system or of dictation by the party by the dictates of numerous social organizations be tolerated. That constitutes a real threat. A local bureaucracy would like to liberate itself from the supervision of the central bureaucracy, while leaving in place its own prerogatives and powers of leverage. We must therefore sharply repulse any efforts to reject the idea of republic self-sufficiency and change the enterprise system of subordination (that is, to replace Union with republic subordination), gearing Armenian industry primarily to meeting its own needs. To strive for economic self-isolation and autarchy, would mean to doom the economy to a low level of effectiveness, the people to poverty, and the republic to degradation.

Currently, a redistribution of functions is taking place between the center and the Union republics. The administrative independence of the republics is markedly increasing, especially in the field of social development and in terms of meeting the needs of the population residing within their territories. Administrative control of practically the entire social sphere, together with the regional industrial infrastructure, will be concentrated under the jurisdiction of the Union republics and regions.

With the adoption of the General Principles of Restructuring the Management of the Economy and the Social Sphere in the Union Republics, relations between the republics and the enterprises subordinate to the Union have been changing. Previously, their relationship had a predominantly non-economic character, whereas now economic ties are being fostered. All Union enterprises must contribute a substantial share of their income or profits—up to 40 percent after payment for resources—to the republic budget. Additionally, all payments for natural or labor resources are made to the republic budget.

To perform their new functions, the financial capabilities of the republics should be enhanced. In this connection an important precondition is the elimination of enterprise unprofitability. This is closely tied up with the realization of the underlying principle of cost-accounting—cost-recovery [samookupayemost].

Nevertheless, in the past six months not a single unprofitable or low-profit enterprise has been converted to a rental contract so that the funds released could be contributed as republic budget income for the development of the social sphere.

The problem is aggravated by the fact that the earthquake for a certain length of time—essentially, the time required to convert the Union republics to territorial cost-accounting and self-financing—makes conditions for us more difficult to obtain sources of income for our own development. For the first time in many years, a subsidy representing an incremental part of the national income is anticipated in the republic economy during the period 1989-1990. In other words, the incremental increase in the national income that is used will be significantly greater than the increase of the national production income.

The special features of the economic situation as it exists at the present time determine the activities of the party organizations. They now face the task of critically analyzing the problems restraining the progress of *perestroyka* in the social and economic sphere: extending democratic forms of the social organization of production and labor; coordinating and unifying efforts; and stimulating the social and political activity of the workers as a way of creating a healthy and morally sound atmosphere in enterprises and collectives, in cities and rayons.

There should be one principle in effect: to be open in dealing with people without sidestepping sensitive social and political issues. People should be able to see and realize that this is a party that is open to two-way discussion. It is of the utmost importance that efforts to normalize all aspects of the republic's social and economic life, and to establish a reliable base for the transition to territorial economic self-sufficiency, develop properly in each party organization locally.

[Correspondent] What do you think—Is everything going well with respect to our cadre policy? What is being done, and what further should be done, to improve the caliber of personnel at all levels?

[O.L. Lobov] I do not think all is as it should be in our cadre work. For this reason we are incorporating new forms of personnel work and taking new directions. We are being persistent in our efforts to hold alternative elections, and we are resorting to them in as many situations as possible. This enriches our real knowledge of people and makes it possible to detect opportunities anew. For example, not long ago in Shamshadin, in place of the rayon ispolkom chairman, the voters elected S. Gukasyan, second secretary of the party rayon committee, as well as G. Papyan, chairman of the rayon Committee of People's Control. The more experienced S. Gukasyan was chosen as a result of secret balloting. At the same session, however, the communist deputies requested the party rayon committee to review the candidacy of G. Papyan for the vacated position of rayon committee second secretary. This proposal won the endorsement of both the rayon committee buro and plenum. G. Papyan was elected.

We should refrain from electing deputies from the social organizations at the present time. We should similarly refrain from holding pre-election meetings in rural districts.

I believe that one aspect of cadre work that is of fundamental importance is conducting an age census for a variety of official positions.

Under present conditions, a renewal of cadres in the republic is now going on at all levels. In the period from June 1988 through March of this year, for example, 165 of our party and soviet workers were replaced, including 43 senior officials of the Armenian CP Central Committee apparatus (not counting instructors), more than half the first secretaries, more than a fourth of the second secretaries, and more than a third of the party's rayon and city committee secretaries. Moreover, in the last year 22 chairmen of the rayon and city soviet executive committees and 20 top leaders of the ministries and departments were replaced. More and more leaders with extensive professional training and high scientific qualifications are in the party organizations. Among them are five doctors of science and some 50 candidates of science.

An important step forward is utilizing the judgment of primary party organizations and labor collectives in

naming workers to the party apparatus, including the Central Committee. The schedule of appointments [nomenklatura] of the Central Committee Buro has been substantially curtailed, and the resolution of many cadre matters relegated to lower links. We must go further in this direction.

Not everything is proceeding smoothly and easily with regard to cadre turnover. In connection with this problem I am mindful of a question that has recently arisen about the desirability of selecting persons of Russian nationality as second secretaries of the CP Central Committee. Here, new approaches are called for. It would be useful, for example, to organize the study of the languages of peoples in the USSR by persons enrolled in the Academy of Social Sciences under the the CPSU Central Committee, so that these people might constitute a reserve for the republics. The final word, however, for selection of leaders must remain with the republic concerned.

Intra-republic cadre rotation merits careful consideration. Here, it is important in electing leaders to highlight personal characteristics other than nationality, including moral attributes, political skills, and business acumen, among other qualities. It is of interest that in the small Union republics, by virtue of certain features in their development, there are often large numbers of qualified personnel available in certain fields of learning or areas of the national economy. These very people to start out with could be sent to the center or to other regions where there is a shortage of such skills. Needless to say, for the foreseeable future, a majority of the leaders will be drawn from the local nationality. Serious consideration must therefore be given to their comprehensive training.

Uzbek First Secretary Addresses Party on Fergana Crisis Lessons

*18300748 Tashkent PR AVD1 VOSTOK1 in Russian
17 Jun 89 pp 1-2*

[Speech by Uzbek CP Central Committee First Secretary R. N. Nishanov at the 15 June 1989 meeting of the republic party-economic aktiv]

[Text] Comrades!

The nationalistic manifestations and tragic events in Fergana Oblast have brought pain to the hearts of the workers of Uzbekistan and of all the country's peoples. Today, when only several days have passed since the tragedy that occurred, when tension still continues, it is difficult to give a single answer to all the questions that have been raised by these events. We must examine what has happened in detail, must establish the true causes, the truth, and, most importantly, must do everything possible to exclude any chance that such a thing will be repeated in the future.

Our party conscience, our civic and social duty, our responsibility to the workers of the republic, to the entire nation, obliges us to do this.

The tragedy in Fergana has caused serious concern on the part of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government and of all Soviet citizens. As you know, members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo have arrived in the republic: the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. I. Ryzhkov and Central Committee secretary V. M. Cherbrikov. Their meetings and talks with people on the scene who are familiar with the circumstances and their visits to refugee camps have shown that the main thing today is to extinguish the conflict, not to permit it to spread, to put an end to the tension, not to permit passions and emotions to flare up again, to examine what has happened, and to punish those guilty.

Party committees, soviet organs, ministries and departments, social organizations, each of us, all healthy forces within the republic must consider this to be our most important task at the present time. All the more so as various kinds of rumors and conjecture are being spread with growing intensity around these cruel and dramatic events and are exciting public opinion.

Let us take a look together at what has in fact taken place in Fergana Oblast.

Events which occurred in Kuvasay in late May of this year are being presented as one of version. Here, where about 3000 Meskhetine Turks [Turok-Mesketinetsy] were living, scuffles that arose between groups of persons belonging to the indigenous and the Meskhetine Turk nationalities were intentionally distorted and skillfully utilized by corrupt and criminal elements in order to accomplish their own dirty political aims.

An artificial inflammation of inter-ethnic differences, specially organized massive disorders and excesses by shameless young thugs, accompanied by pogroms, arson, murders, by violence and acts of vandalism, have taken hold of large regions and cities in Fergana Oblast.

At the end of the day on 3 June a large group of young people in an aggressive mood, having ignored the explanations and warnings of party, soviet and law-enforcement organs, instigated pogroms and burnings in the village of Tashlak, and later at the "Komsomolskiy" construction and water-transport workers settlement in the city of Margilan, in places where dense Meskhetine Turk populations are found. The excesses were accompanied by particularly cruel murders, outrages, violence, and acts of vandalism. In subsequent days the geographical area of the disorders spread to the city of Fergana and the agricultural regions lying nearby.

These excesses were presaged by mass gatherings at which demands for immediate resettlement of the Turks were presented in ultimatum form and by threats aimed at other non-indigenous ethnic groups. The targets of attack were no longer solely the Meskhetine Turks, but

also became industrial enterprises, the railroad station, the communication center, and the militia building. The excited crowd broke into the rayon party committee and even into the oblast party committee. The excesses increasingly began to take on not only an inter-ethnic but also an anti-Soviet character.

In this extreme situation a republic-level governmental commission was established, headed by the chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, G. Kh. Kadyrov, and, by decree of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, a curfew was imposed beginning at 2200 hours on 4 June. At the request of the republic and upon the decision of all-union organs, detachments of the USSR MVD internal forces, numbering almost 1300 men, were transferred to Fergana on an rush basis.

This for a certain period of time reduced the urgency of the situation in Fergana and Margilan. However, on 7 June, the pogroms again resumed and subsequently spread to the city of Kokand and to Rishtanskiy, Uzbekistanskiy, and Kirovskiy rayons. Coordinated actions by the government commission, party and soviet organs, and also the USSR MVD internal forces made it possible to put an end to the bloodletting and excesses.

It has been established that 93 persons died as a result of these tragic events. Of them, 64 were Meskhetine Turks, 17 were Uzbeks, and the rest are being identified. There were no children among those who died. More than 1000 persons were injured or maimed. The wounded included 173 military personnel of the USSR MVD internal troops and 57 militia workers, one of whom died. More than 700 homes and other buildings and 168 transportation vehicles were burned.

The scale and tragedy of these events have made it necessary for party, soviet and administrative organs to take other extraordinary measures in order to protect the Meskhetine Turks from mass violence. Urgent action was taken to resettle to them in camps on the military reservation in Fergana and at the settlement of Naugarzan in the neighboring Ashtskiy Rayon of Leninabadskaya Oblast in the Tajik SSR, which were placed under armed guard. Everything necessary was done to provide for their normal daily activities at these places of temporary residence and to ensure uninterrupted food and medical services.

Such is the external aspect of the events. But the picture would not be complete and objective if we did not take a deep look into the conflict's preconditions, causes, and internal motive forces.

The working people are justified in asking today how such a thing could happen within a republic whose strength lies in its inter-ethnic traditions, where for decades representatives of more than 100 nationalities have lived and worked side-by-side with the indigenous population. How could this happen in Uzbekistan, which gave refuge to millions of Soviet people during the

war years, which shared its blood and bread with them, which helped people unjustly repressed by the Stalin regime?

These tragic events occurred first of all because the Fergana Oblast party committee, the city and rayon party committees, and the oblast, city, and rayon soviet executive committees lacked a thorough command of the situation and were unable to exert a substantial influence on it in time. Party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol activists were not mobilized in a timely manner to combat these unlawful activities.

Under the extreme conditions that developed, many ideological institutions and social organizations demonstrated passivity and confusion. Teachers at certain schools and vocational schools not only were unable to prevent outbreaks of hooliganism on the part of young people and thugs, but some of them even participated themselves in these disorders. It is no accident that bottles containing flammable mixtures, manufactured by students, were discovered in a number of educational institutions.

Despite the fact that, from the very first hours, events developed rapidly, took on unforeseen forms, and got out of control, the oblast's administrative organs calmly watched all this without demonstrating necessary firmness and from the very start failed to take effective operational measures to put a stop to the shameful acts of vandalism and to localize the fires of discord.

The sad events in Fergana and the attempts to spread the disorders to the territories of neighboring oblasts and republics have shown with special clarity the extreme complexity and the contradictory nature of the processes of restructuring in Uzbekistan. It must be recognized that many of us, while taking note of individual negative events and outbursts, assumed at the beginning that, as a whole, the process of renewal would develop without conflicts and difficulties. In fact, however, what party committees have run up against is that deformations uncovered under conditions of glasnost and democratization have produced extremely serious breaches of social balance and stability.

Obviously, we will more than once have to think about, in its entirety, the whole complex of factors that has produced such an impermissible and uncontrollable development of events. But it is unquestionably clear that one of them is people's dissatisfaction with the tempo of social and economic change and the skillful utilization of this dissatisfaction by those base forces who would like to distract the attention of the republic's party organization and of the entire population from the struggle to improve the situation, the struggle against organized crime and corruption, the struggle for a truly socialist revolutionary renewal of all aspects of our lives.

We cannot and have no right to delude ourselves relative that some sort of largely accidental confluence of various circumstances has conditioned this tragedy. What we are talking about here is an obvious and naked attempt

under the slogan of raising national independence to inflame nationalism and localism, to exacerbate inter-ethnic relations, to play on the real difficulties of the present stage in the republic's development, on the many sore spots in the economy, the social sphere, culture, and ecology.

There are also, of course, reasons for what has happened that are related to gross distortions in socioeconomic development. The years of stagnation have inflicted upon us enormous losses in all spheres of life and have placed the republic, it can be said, on the brink of a true crisis. This has been reflected most heavily in development of the productive forces and in the living standard of the population.

The structure of our social production has been deformed in the most serious way, both with regard to sectors and territorial distribution. Speaking frankly, since the time of the war, nobody here has been concerning himself seriously with the structure and distribution of the productive forces and their development has, for the most part, be haphazard or one-sided. Over the course of many years, primary emphasis has been placed on the development of sectors oriented toward the production of raw materials and intermediate products, the share of which within the total volume of production has reached 60 percent. At the same time, no capacity was being created for the manufacture of finished articles. It is known that only 9 percent of cotton fiber, our main wealth, is processed within the republic, and this mainly into fabrics for use as raw material.

The concentration of industry in the capital oblast and several large centers has resulted in the growth of surplus labor supplies in other regions. Added to this, our population growth rates are more than three-fold the all-union level. During the past 10 years, our population has increased by almost 7 million persons. At the present time, every fourth family—and, in rural localities, every third family—has 5 or more children younger than 18 years of age. Dependents comprise more than two-fifths of the total population.

Over the years, the cotton single-crop system that has become developed here has undermined the scientific bases for an agricultural economy, has exhausted the soil, and has sharply limited our possibilities for cultivating fodder and food crops. In essence, we have come to a dead end in the development of agriculture—while investing enormous funds, we are in fact receiving no return from them. A whole bunch of problems has accumulated here. On one hand, it is necessary to feed the population and to strengthen the economy of the kolkhozes and sovkhoses, and on the other—to solve the problem of people's employment and of raising their standard of living.

All these factors in combination with the principle of assigning left-over funds for social purposes and for the

conservation of nature have led to a serious lag in the living standards of the people and to a sharp worsening of the ecological situation.

The Uzbek CP Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the government of the republic have self-critically and thoroughly analyzed the situation that has been created. A fundamentally new concept has been developed for accelerating the social and economic development of the republic during the period to 1995 and this has been reviewed by the USSR Council of Ministers and approved by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The draft program, which has been published in the republic's press for discussion, envisages the carrying out of important measures for equalizing economic potential in the various oblasts, for preferential development of the social sphere, and for a substantial rise in the living standards of the population, including that of the Fergana valley.

And here the socioeconomic and ecological problems appear more severe than for the republic as a whole. A shortage of land, one of the highest concentrations of cotton-growing, a low income level, and existing oversaturation of the region with chemical, petrochemical and other ecologically harmful production facilities have created a particularly tense situation in the valley.

Every year the labor resources of Fergana Oblast increase by 22,400 persons. Of this increase, however, one out of every five persons is unable to find a place for himself in social production and settles into home or individual subsidiary work. A large portion of the free labor resources is concentrated in the Uzbekistanskiy (27,300 persons), Ferganskiy (26,500 persons), Akhunbabaevskiy (15,000 persons), and Tashlaksii (14,200 persons) rayons.

These are mainly young people. And their nonemployment in social production results in their isolation from labor collectives and in a large part of the young people being, as I already said, outside the sphere of influence of party, Komsomol, and social organizations. For a part of them, the lack of real possibilities to organize their lives is producing a dissatisfaction with their situation, increased agitation, and sharp aggravation of feelings of their own lack of self-worth. To this it also must be added that what are, on the whole, positive processes of increasing national self-consciousness have been accompanied by a growth of tensions in inter-ethnic relations, provoked by a lack of resolution of many linguistic and natural-cultural problems.

We also cannot leave out of our assessments the fact that those who, as a result of the processes of purification and the struggle against negative phenomena, have been removed from the positions they occupied and punished, have also developed an interest in destabilizing the situation, in undermining restructuring. Taking advantage of the situation that has developed in recent times, a part of them are trying to negate the work done since the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee to

restore healthy conditions and to portray this work in the eyes of public opinion as being a limitation of the dignity and honor of the Uzbek people. But we, the Communists, must look truth in the eye. We cannot show even the slightest tolerance of these people, who have disgraced themselves through distortion, misappropriation, bribe-taking, and misuse of official position. We will firmly implement this principled party line toward self-purification and self-improvement.

We will state directly that recently increasing tensions have been facilitated also by the inadequately considered statements of certain leaders of the informal associations, including of the nonregistered "Birlik" association, who have sometimes called upon the population, particularly young people, to present as ultimatums the questions which are bothering them. In doing so they have frequently distorted the real reasons for economic and social difficulties, have attempted to sow a lack of faith in the possibility of their solution by local party and soviet organs. Certain of them have been pushing the thesis that one of the main reasons for the worsening living standards of the population is the immigration into the republic of persons from other regions in the country.

This, comrades, is a situation in which even the smallest spark could result in a conflagration.

We must clearly recognize that we are dealing not with random actions of individual bandit and hooligan groups. What is it that strikes our attention? During the entire time of the events, they have demonstrated flexibility in changing tactics, in some cases correcting them to take account of the activities of forces for the maintenance of order, and their communications and early warning have been well organized.

Analysis of the course of events at flare-up points also indicates that the soil for agitation had been prepared beforehand: There has been intensive dissemination of various provocative rumors and falsified photography, supposedly serving as evidence of Meskhetine Turk insults to the Uzbeks and Tajiks.

I would like to also call attention to the following circumstance. Some are now trying to present events in Fergana as a movement of the Uzbeks against the Turks. This is a primitive and thoroughly false conclusion. In their absolute majority, the Uzbek people decisively condemn the actions of the extremists. There are many instances when a rebuff is being given to the bandit sallies, when many residents are helping to save the lives of Meskhetine Turks and are assisting party and law enforcement organs in establishing order. It is necessary to distinguish very precisely between those who, in pursuit of their own dirty goals, have taken the knife, the ax, arms into their hands and those who, deceived by high-flown phrases, often intimidated by the bandits, have been drawn into the general crowd. They have been stupefied by a small group of criminal and corrupt elements.

These elements are being uncovered and will continue to be uncovered and they will be punished to the maximum extent of the law. According to preliminary data, 30 criminal proceedings have already been instituted. About 200 persons have been arrested for committing violations of the law during the period of massive disorders, 20 of them as suspects in particularly serious crimes. This work will go on. Up to the present time, it has been possible to identify a total of 600 persons who took part to one degree or another in the commission of serious crimes. The organs of the procuracy and court must do everything to ensure that not one of the illegalities and criminal acts that have been committed goes without punishment, without establishing responsibility.

At the same time, it would be incorrect to regard what has happened only as a criminal manifestation. Such facts, for example, as the appearance of green banners within the columns of those committing excesses, the distribution of fliers containing religious symbolism and signed by a previously unknown organization called the "Holy Uzbeks [Svyashchennyye uzbeki], the defilement of Soviet laws, attempts at physical violence against party and soviet workers, the pronouncement of appeals to continue the traditions of the basmach leaders, etc. require deep consideration and evaluation.

In a word, there are serious grounds to suppose that this is a previously and carefully planned and prepared provocative action, possibly even specially timed to coincide with the congress of USSR peoples deputies.

But let us ask ourselves: Were these events absolutely unavoidable? Certainly not. Otherwise we should simply acknowledge our own helplessness, the inability of state and political institutions to exert a decisive influence on the processes within society.

It is necessary today to openly acknowledge that our own personal miscalculations in party political work also had an effect on the dramatic development of events. What were these?

To what I have already said at the beginning of my address, I would like to add that they first of all lie in our inability to realistically evaluate the situation and analyze its further development, to analyze and take into account the mood of people and correspondingly to change the tactics of political work on a timely basis.

Indeed, we have known for a long time about the growing tension in the socioeconomic and inter-ethnic spheres. This has been repeatedly noted recently also by the party committees of almost all oblasts. However this did not prompt them to decisively turn their faces to the people, to enter broadly into an open dialogue with the masses.

All possibilities were not utilized in order to let people know in an understandable way what kinds of measures are being planned and undertaken for the fastest resolution of the vitally important problems that are worrying them, to convince them that it is possible to solve these

only through joint effort, in a constructive and business-like setting, and not by method that involve ultimatums and mass-meeting democracy. All this should have been accompanied by concrete and decisive actions for the restoration of social justice and for introducing order into trade and the services sphere.

It was also a mistake that the party committees in local areas and, yes, let's say it straight out, also the Uzbek CP Central Committee, underestimated the overall danger of the influence which the incident in Kuvasay had on the social and political situation within our republic, that they initially considered it a local conflict and did not sense the sharp rise in tensions. A lack of objective information and of timely counteraction to provocative rumors also had an effect, and the potentials of the press, radio and television were not fully used for these purposes.

We must also address serious complaints to the law enforcement organs. Indeed, as early as at the end of May, they had in their possession reliable information about actions being prepared in Tashlak, at the "Komsomolskiy" settlement, and in the city of Margilan. However, they showed passivity in carrying out necessary preventive work and did not use all measures envisaged by the law to bar these criminal intentions. Moreover, according to some data, certain of the militia workers simply stood back and watched what was going on. A certain indecisiveness and inflexibility in actions during the initial stage of the development of events and poor material and technical supply of internal affairs organs also had an effect.

Comrades!

Today, when these tragic events have occurred, each of us must to a necessary degree feel a moral responsibility for what happened. The consequences are heavy. There is no way to make up for people's deaths or for the pain and grief of their families.

Great material damage has been inflicted and labor rhythm has been disturbed. But the moral damage is immeasurably greater. People are beginning to lose their faith in the ability of party, soviet, and other state organs to ensure protection of their constitutional rights. The moral and psychological situation has been aggravated practically in all regions. Anxiety and alarm for their own lives and security are growing among the population. A mood of panic has seized a majority of those living in the republic, not only the Meskhetine Turks. People of various nationalities are turning to party and soviet organs with increasing frequency with demands that they be protected from possible violence.

The existing situation necessitates a basic change in the forms and methods of organizational and political work. Today, all the party committees in the republic are acquiring bitter but necessary experience in operating under extreme conditions, when it is essential to win anew authority and confidence within the masses.

Not only are the events in Fergana Oblast being evaluated, but a new analysis is also being made of earlier conflicts in Dzhumabazar and in Akadamskiy, Yazvavanskiy and Peshkunskiy rayons, in the dormitories at the geological survey technical school in Tashkent, and finally of the nonsanctioned meeting that was conducted on 19 March in the capital of the republic.

Staffs headed by party committee first secretaries have now been established as a part of all oblast, city and rayon party committees. They are located in places having a dense Meskhetine Turk population and are working to resolve questions of preserving public order through the use of local voluntary public order forces [druzhenniki] and inter-ethnic troops [voiny-internationalisty] and also of providing the population with food products and vitally necessary goods.

The presence of the leaders of oblasts, cities and rayons of various farms, and of representatives of republic-level organs in the very hottest spots is implanting in the Meskhetine Turks and the rest of the population a confidence that they will be protected and is serving as a serious element of restraint.

For purposes of cutting off the enormous wave of provocative rumors and conjecture, propaganda and explanatory work is now being carried out within the republic. Political and propaganda-and-agitation groups have been created with involvement of the most authoritative and deserving people, involving scholars, cultural figures, party and soviet activists, and veterans. Representatives of the clergy, activists of the Makhallin [makhallinskiy] committees, and of women's councils have also been drawn into this work. Active use is being made of the press, radio, and television.

All oblast, city and rayon newspapers have published the appeal of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the USSR Council of Ministers as well as the appeals of USSR peoples deputies who participated in the congress as well as the appeals of veterans, in which the essence of the fratricidal events in Fergana Oblast, its hostile, anti-Soviet direction is revealed, and have called upon the population to maintain its good sense and organization.

The political and organizational role of the party committees is already evident in the fact that an increasing number of people are actively rebuffing the bandits' sallies and are returning to socially useful labor. With the help of public forces organized by the city party committee, which have come out in opposition to the extremists, it has for example been possible to considerably reduce losses in the city of Kokand. In Margilan, with a rising threat that children might be taken hostage, party organizations raised large forces of workers, young people, and inter-ethnic troops who took all children's preschool institutions under protection.

Now on the whole, party committees, soviet organs and social organizations, with the active help of USSR MVD troop units, have succeeded in finding approaches

appropriate to the real situation, which has made it possible to stabilize the situation to a certain degree and to prevent at this stage the centers of conflict from unravelling into other regions of the republic.

Nevertheless, the situation remains tense, especially in the Fergana valley and in Samarkand, Tashkent and other oblasts. And this means that, without delay, all of us must undertake a whole complex of both urgent and large-scale measures for its normalization.

What is it necessary to do?

First. The government commission together with party, soviet, law enforcement organs and social organizations must carry out exhaustive measures to normalize the situation, to fully restore social order, and to create conditions for removal of the curfew in Fergana Oblast, considering this to be a decisive factor for stabilizing the social and political situation in the republic as a whole.

Delays of any kind must be excluded in carrying out investigations and identifying guilty persons, their cases must be promptly taken to court, and the sentences they receive must be given publicity. It is no less important to promptly restore normal labor rhythm and to ensure steady operation of enterprises in transportation, trade, public catering, and the services sphere. Ministries, departments, the executive committees of local soviets, and trade union organs must undertake the strictest oversight of questions of ensuring that people's vital needs are met and must not permit even the smallest interruptions their supplies of the most essential products and goods.

Much needs to be done for an effective evaluation of the harm that has been done and for determining specific measures to undo it, including also extending help to the population in the restoration of residences and compensation for lost property. Maximum attention and tact must be shown in organizing the evacuation of residents who are located at the military training reservation and who are living temporarily in the three RSFSR oblasts.

Second. Party committees, soviet organs and social organizations must take all necessary measures of an organizational and political character so as not to permit the appearance of new centers of conflict in other regions of the republic. For this, in the very near future, they must everywhere hold meetings of labor collectives and assemblies of citizens at which the essence of the events taking place will be explained and a call will be made for consolidation of all social forces and for a showing of support and calm. Broad and responsible participation in this work by all party, soviet, and social activists, by all of our cadres, by every Communist must be ensured.

All those who have gone to Chirchik Oblast must be convinced of the need to return to their own homes, to the places they come from in Tashkent Oblast. In places with dense populations of Meskhetine Turks and other ethnic minorities it is necessary to take concrete measures aimed at strengthening mutual trust and to practice

the establishment under the makhallin committees and in settlement and kishlak soviets of inter-ethnic commissions or coordination groups which would examine in a timely way arguments and everyday conflicts that arise and would take steps to reconcile people.

They must make it clear to the Meskhetine Turks, the Crimean Tatars, and the Germans that the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies has issued appropriate instructions to the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet for the examination of questions which they have raised. At the same time, people need to form a correct understanding of the fact that these problems cannot be resolved instantaneously, that attempts to exert pressure on the organs of power, the issuing of ultimatums, will not contribute to objective and calm resolution of a question, and that businesslike and constructive circumstances are needed for this.

It is necessary to place a particular accent on work with youth, to purposefully concern ourselves with the organization of young people's socially useful labor and that their leisure activities rich in content, particularly at places of residence and also in student and worker dormitories. The entire weight of social formations, the family, the school, the Komsomol, must be utilized in order to forestall young people from ill-considered actions and to direct their energies along constructive lines.

Third. The most important task of the day is the formation of a correct understanding of the events that have occurred on the part of the population. In order to prevent a spread of various kinds of provocative, panic and evil rumors, conjecture, and gossip, it is necessary above all to restructure the work of the press, radio and television, to make it more operational, to ensure that transmissions, communiques and publications are thoroughly weighed, objective, correct, precise and do not serve as a cause of panic and inciting passions. It is necessary to organize special rubrics "According to Rumor and In Fact," and regular appearances in the papers and television and the radio of workers in party, soviet, and law enforcement organs, prominent scholars, and cultural figures—of direct lines with the competent people, through which people will be able to obtain timely, exhaustive answers to the questions which are bothering them. And of course, as never before, it is important for our activists and all our cadres to have direct contacts, dialogues, with people directly within the labor collectives and at places of residence. And the members of elective organs within the republic party organization must set an example in this.

Fourth. We must not weaken our vigilance. The law enforcement organs, in close contact with party and soviet organs and with the forces of society, have the obligation to do everything to ensure the safety and peace of citizens, making use both of the power of persuasion and of the power of the law.

And finally, fifth. The resolution of immediate problems must not distract us from the long-range questions. That which has happened has once more shown that we have practically exhausted the time limit allotted for overcoming phenomena of stagnation in the economy, for restoring health to the financial situation, and for accomplishing our priority social tasks. It is necessary to develop purposeful work around the principle points of the draft program for accelerating the social and economic development of the republic, which is now being discussed.

People must develop a precise understanding that the designated measures as a whole realistically will allow us to overcome disproportions, to increase employment and the living standards of the population. To eliminate the single-crop economy, to fundamentally increase the production of food products, to improve the availability of housing and everyday services for the working people. They must know what realization of this program will give for their oblast, city, rayon, labor collective, for each of them, and also what each person must personally do so that the program does not remain empty words, but will become a reality. It is necessary to encourage people to engage in interested discussion of the program and to make constructive proposals concerning it. And the republic council of ministers, together with the USSR Gosplan and other departments, must resolve problems of shortening time periods for the construction of already agreed-upon light and processing industry projects.

Comrades!

This meeting of the activists of the Uzbek party organization is taking place shortly after the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies, which we can term revolutionary. The congress showed that the processes of democratization and restructuring of our entire society are entering onto an irreversible track. The Soviet people and the entire world have tied their hopes for better things, for stability, and for future prosperity to them. The processes of improvement in the international situation are growing the dialogue between East and West is deepening, as shown by the visits by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet M. S. Gorbachev to the Chinese Peoples Republic and the Federated Republic of Germany.

In these conditions any attempts, actions and events that cause harm to restructuring, renewal, and democratization produce elements of despair and engender completely justified alarm not only among the Soviet people, but also throughout the entire world. Especially when these entail people's suffering, human victims.

In the history of our republic there have been many crisis situations. But always the party organization has found within itself the strength to correctly evaluate and firmly and decisively overcome them. I am convinced that also in today's exceptionally complicated situation, the Communists will be able to take upon their own shoulders the entire burden of the responsible tasks we face and achieve their fulfillment and that they will be able to consolidate all healthy forces around themselves. This is what the workers of Uzbekistan and the entire Soviet people expect from us today.

Georgian Commission Examines Violation of 1920 Treaty with RSFSR

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[Article by Akakiy Surguladze, corresponding member of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences: "Restore the Historical Truth"]

[Text] As we know, the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet created by resolution the Commission on Questions of Political and Legal Assessment of the Violation of the 7 May 1920 Treaty Between Georgia and Soviet Russia. Several sessions of the commission have already taken place, a plan for future work has been outlined, and the problems to be studied and specific objectives of research work have been identified.

At the request of a GRUZINFORM correspondent, Akakiy Surguladze, deputy chairman of the commission and corresponding member of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences, tells about the purposefulness of this commission and the nature of its work.

By the act of 26 May 1918, Georgia restored its statehood, which it had lost on the basis of the manifesto of Emperor Alexander the First on 12 September 1801. The manifesto stated: "It is not for increasing forces, not for expanding the borders of the already most vast empire in the world that we accept the burden of governing the Georgian Kingdom—a common dignity, common honor and humanity impose on us a sacred duty, heeding the prayers of the sufferers, in an aversion to grief, to institute in Georgia a rule which could establish justice and personal and property security, and give everyone the protection of the law." Hidden behind this hypocritical statement of the Russian monarch were disregard for the Russian-Georgian Treaty of 1783, ignoring it and total annexation of Georgia, which was accomplished in the first decade of the 19th century.

The Georgian people never reconciled themselves with the colonial yoke of tsarism. They tirelessly fought to restore national sovereignty. The act of 26 May 1918 was a victorious conclusion to this struggle.

The process of international recognition of the status of Georgia's state sovereignty proved to be quite long and painful. The time was difficult and unfavorable: 1918 was the concluding stage of World War I, and all the countries that took part in this war were trying to feather their nest at the expense of small and weak states. By the treaty of 28 May 1918, Kaiser's Germany was the first to recognize Georgia's state independence, but this treaty nevertheless was not based on equality. By the way, in August 1918 the Soviet Government indirectly recognized Georgia's independence when it agreed that Germany recognized this independence. As we know, in November 1918 the monarchical regime in Germany fell, and the above-mentioned treaty turned out to be short-lived.

At the Paris Peace Conference between 1918 and 1920, Georgia's delegation raised the question of recognizing its state sovereignty. The ruling circles of England, France, and the United States at that time were hoping for the White Guards counterrevolution which was fighting with the Soviet power and operated under the slogan of restoring a unified and indivisible monarchical Russia. The White Guards generals also considered Georgia to be part of this unified Russian monarchy. Therefore, the Entente refrained from making any decision about Georgia's independence. It should also be stated that each country (England, the U.S., France, and Italy) each had their own interests with respect to Georgia and the Caucasus.

The treaty of 7 May 1920 was the first document by which the Georgian Democratic Republic, on the one hand, and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, on the other, concluded an agreement and ratified an alliance. The first paragraph of the treaty states: "Proceeding from the Russian Republic's proclaimed right of all peoples to free self-determination, up to and including complete secession from the state of which they are a part, Russia unconditionally recognizes the independence and individual initiative of the Georgian state and renounces voluntarily any sovereign rights which belonged to Russia with respect to the Georgian people and land."

Ten months after this treaty, the situation changed radically in Georgia: The government of independent democratic Georgia was overthrown, and Soviet power was established. After the capitulation, the government was forced to seek refuge in Paris. The government in exile considered the act of 25 February 1921 to be a unilateral violation by Soviet Russia of the treaty of 7 May 1920 and aggression. Public opinion in Europe also considered the Soviet Army's entry into Georgia to be just another act of "Red imperialism."

However, the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia and the Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) [RKP(b)] found justification for the events of February 1921: the version was disseminated, and subsequently legitimized, that a uprising of the armed working masses had taken place in democratic independent Georgia in order to overthrow the government that was unacceptable to them, and they had requested fraternal assistance from the government of Soviet Russia. On instructions from V.I. Lenin, the Red Army indeed helped the working people of Georgia and by doing so carried out its international, revolutionary duty.

This concept was legitimized in Georgian and Russian historical party literature. Only in 1985, after the establishment of democracy and glasnost and as a result of new thinking gaining scope, did there appear the basis for a new assessment of the domestic and foreign policy of the government of democratic independent Georgia and the reasons for its downfall.

A number of articles have been published in which some of the researchers believe that the act of 26 May 1918 was a legal and exceptionally progressive event in the life of the Georgian people, and that the act of 25 February 1921 was a violent encroachment on this act and a unilateral violation by Soviet Russia of the allied treaty concluded with Georgia on 7 May 1920. Some researchers call this action the "annexation of Georgia," some call it the "secret annexation of Georgia," some call it "armed intervention" by the Red Army into Georgia, and still others call it the "occupation of Georgia." In short, there are many qualifications, but none of the authors have tried to substantiate scientifically and with reason their concept. And such a substantiation is necessary.

The above-mentioned commission of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet is called upon to ascertain how much these new qualifications correspond to reality and how legitimate the concept was which has prevailed up to now in our historiography. In short, all the main problems, beginning with the treatise of 1783 up to February 1921, must be studied all over again and interpreted from the standpoint of the rules of international law. The commission must submit to the session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet a thoroughly substantiated conclusion about the events of February 1921.

The commission has to study the legal nature of the Russian-Georgian treaty of 7 May 1920 and ascertain when and under what circumstances it was violated. It is known, for example, that after this treaty, Soviet Russia sent an embassy to Georgia, which often complained that Georgia was systematically violating this treaty. The "Documents and Materials of the Struggle for the Victory of Soviet Power," published in Tbilisi in 1958, cite notes from the Soviet embassy about violations of the 1920 treaty by the government of Georgia. We must ascertain whether the democratic government of Georgia actually violated the treaty it had signed or whether this incident hid a specific plan: Who and which side provoked all of this. It is also known that in Georgia in 1918-1920, repeated actions by the workers were organized under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party for the purpose of establishing Soviet power, but they all suffered defeat. A real hope appeared for the Bolsheviks in Georgia after the victory of Soviet power in Azerbaijan. The leadership of the Caucasus Bureau of the RKP(b) persistently demanded the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia by forces of the Red Army. Active champions of this action were S. Ordzhonikidze and S. Kirov, who had Stalin's vigorous support from Moscow. It is necessary to bring to light additional materials on the point of view of the Caucasus Bureau and the Politburo of the RKP(b) and V.I. Lenin personally in connection with the problem of the Sovietization of Georgia.

The attitude of foreign states toward this treaty requires careful study. The recognition of Georgia, first "de facto" and then "de jure," was to a considerable extent the result of the treaty of 7 May 1920. But why were the ruling circles of the major European states and the U.S.

so slow in doing this? I will cite one example: Memoranda of the government of Georgia to the member-countries of the Paris Peace Conference, in connection with the recognition of independence, state that in the early 19th century Georgia voluntarily became part of the Russian Empire. Such was the social-democratic version of the act of 1801. It is namely this version that gave the politicians of foreign states reason to doubt the expediency of Georgia's independence. In late 1920, a delegation from Georgia raised the issue of admitting independent Georgia into the League of Nations. This question was studied in the League, but denied. In connection with the question of Georgia's independence in 1920 U.S. Secretary of State Colby sent a note to the members of the League of Nations stating that it was not advisable to recognize Georgia's independence, since it had voluntarily become a part of Russia. As far as Armenia and Azerbaijan are concerned, they have the right to demand independence, since they were seized by Russia. As we see, the treaty of 7 May 1920 and the question of Georgia's statehood are in the genetic mutual relations with the treatise of 1783 and the manifesto of 12 September 1801. The commission will have to present these acts with new proof.

In connection with all the problems noted above, our specialists (historians and jurists), which the commission has involved in its activities, will have to work in the Central State Archives of the October Revolution and Socialist Construction of the USSR, the Central State Archives of the USSR Soviet Army, and the Central State Archives of the October Revolution and Socialist Construction of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in order to get new materials.

Last year, the Central State Historical Archives of Georgia received from Paris a microfilm of the archives of the government of the Georgian Republic and the Social-Democratic and Workers' Party. Intensive work is now under way to put these archives in order. This work must be accelerated so the commission will have the opportunity in the near future to study the archives, from which we expect much new information. A group of researchers is also planning a trip to Paris to study the emigre press and public opinion of Europe during the 1920's.

As we see, there is a huge amount of work ahead, and time is also very limited. But the commission will try to use this time intensively and in the next few months carry out its assigned duty. We hope that the researchers the commission invites to study this problem will join in our common activities without hesitation.

The commission believes that it is possible that some families may have preserved material associated with the problems mentioned above (documents or narrative sources). I think it is the patriotic duty of the owners of such materials to pass copies of them to the commission, if only for temporary use. When the commission's documentation is published, the owners of these materials

will be mentioned with gratitude, and their copyright will be observed without fail.

Our address: Tbilisi, House of Government, Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of Political and Legal Assessment of the Violation of the 7 May 1920 Treaty Between Georgia and Soviet Russia. Telephone: 93-32-93 or 93-79-66.

Georgian Academic Views History of, Prospects for Meskhetian Turks

18300757b Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
11 Jul 89 p 3

[Article by Professor Nodar Lomouri, head of the Department of Byzantine Studies of the Oriental Studies Institute imeni G. Tsereteli of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences: "The Tragic Past and Bitter Reality: On the Question of Meskhetian Turks"]

[Text] *In proceeding to describe one of the historical areas of Georgia—Samtskhe-Saatabago—the 18th century historian Vakhushti Bagrationi writes: "The name of this country, strictly speaking, is Kartli because it is an independent principality of Kartlos..." The historian goes on to say that the southwestern part of Georgia, which encompasses the upper reaches of the Kura River and part of the Chorokh Basin right up to the sea, under the son of the legendary forefather of the Kartvels (a Georgian) Kartlos—Mtskheta—was named "Upper Kartli." And according to all other sources, this area of Georgia was called "Upper Kartli," although during various periods it was also called Meskhetia, Tao-Klardzheti, and Samtskhe-Saatabago.*

According to the latest linguistic and archaeological research, the territory of ancient "Upper Kartli," or Meskheti, was part of the settlement area of natives speakers of the Kartvelian languages, that is, ancient ancestors of Georgian tribes (4th-3rd centuries B.C.). During the 2nd-1st centuries B.C., according to Assyrian and Urartean sources, the tribal formations Dayayeni-Diaukhi have been certified here, whose name was preserved in the name of the Georgian province of Tao, and also the Mushkov ethnic group, linked to the name of Meskhi.

In ancient times, according to the information of Greco-Roman authors, this area of the Transcaucasus was named the Country of Moskhi; mention is also made of the Moskh Mountains. There is also no doubt that the Moskhi means namely the Georgian-Meskhi, and ancient authors unanimously consider the Moskhi to be Kartvelian (Georgian) tribes, disagreeing only in the fact that some consider them to be Iberians, that is, east Georgian tribes, and others call them a Kolch tribe.

In the middle of the 1st century B.C., when the ancient Georgian states of Kolchida (Egrisi) and Iberia (Kartli) were formed, the country of the Moskhi became a part of the latter, although one area of it—"Maritime Klardzheti" (Achara—Adzhariya) went to Kolchida.

From that time on, Meskheti and all its provinces—Samtskhe, Dzhavakheti, Artani, Klardzheti, Tao, and others—were a part of the Kartli Kingdom, and the ethnic group "Meskhi" was a collective name for all residents of this land. Obviously, the Meskhi played a significant role from the very beginning in forming the Kartli Kingdom. It is believed that the name of its capital—Mtskheta—comes from this ethnic term Meskhetia.

In the first centuries A.D., Christianity spreads throughout this area, and in the 30's of the 4th century, like in the rest of Kartli, it becomes established as the predominant religion.

In subsequent centuries, Meskheti, despite the political troubles resulting in it sometimes being annexed from the rest of Kartli, always remained inseparably linked to the other Georgian political formations in an ethnopolitical and ethno-cultural respect. True, in the early Middle Ages (6th-10th centuries) an Armenian population also appeared in the southeastern areas of Meskheti, but Georgians were the main ethnic nucleus here, and the chief conversational, literary, and church language was Georgian.

In the 7th century, like in the rest of the Eastern Transcaucasus, an Arab domination was established in Meskheti; later in the 8th-9th centuries, a Byzantine influence spread here. In the 9th-10th centuries, during the course of the struggle against foreign invaders and development of feudal relations, individual feudal kingdoms and principalities gradually formed on the territory of Georgia. One of these was the Tao-Klardzheti Principality, headed by the Bagrationi family and which encompassed all of historical Meskheti. It was this principality that played the leading role in the struggle to unite Georgia, which was completed in the 11th century by the formation of a unified feudal Georgian state. It is not by chance that it was this state was headed by the Bagrationi family, which came from the southern area of Meskheti—Speri—and had its own personal possessions in this area.

In the early feudal era, Meskheti (Tao-Klardzheti) held a leading position among the Georgian kingdoms and principalities, not only in a political but also a cultural respect. It was into a powerful center of medieval Georgian culture. Construction of monasteries began everywhere here. In such monasteries as Khandzta, Shatberdi, Bana, Khakhuli, and many others, a wave of scientific and educational activities took place; remarkable original hagiographic, hymnographic, and theological works were created; and church books were translated, copied, and written. Magnificent architectural monuments were built in Meskheti, becoming part of the gold fund of medieval Georgian architecture. A unique school of gold-forging was formed here... Finally, Shota Rustaveli also was a family from Meskheti. Meskheti retained its cultural importance in later centuries.

In the 11th-13th centuries, Meskheta was one of the largest administrative areas (called *eristavstvo*) of unified Georgia, headed by the Dzhakeli royal family. In the early 14th century, one of the Dzhakeli family received the high court title of *atabaga* (vizier of the czarist court, educator of the heir to the throne). Hence emerged the name of Meskheta-Samtskhe-Saatabago (Samtskhe Atabagstvo, the name Samtskhe can be traced back etymologically to the Meskhi ethnic group).

The Samtskhe Atabagi showed the first signs of separatist tendencies in the 1260's during the Mongol domination, when this area was separated from Georgia and subordinated directly to the Mongols. However, in the 1330's, Tsar Georgiy the Brilliant (1314-1346) returned Meskheta to the bosom of a unified Georgian state, which it remained a part of until the second half of the 15th century.

Here, one can sum up the first result: The area of Meskheta, beginning from time immemorial, was populated by Georgian tribes. Later, in the pre-ancient, ancient, and early medieval times and in the age of developed feudalism, this area was a country of the Meskhi, Meskheta, Tao-Klardzheti, and Samtskhe-Saatabago were politically, economically, and culturally an integral part of the Georgian world, one of the areas of the Kartli kingdom, one of the Georgian political formations, and one of the administrative units of the unified Georgian monarchy. The main population of this area was Georgians, with the collective name of "Meskhi." Of the other peoples, only the Armenian population has been certified as being here for a specific time. We find no other ethnic groups here. Let us dot the i's: According to all available sources—foreign and Georgian chronicles, documentary and epigraphic materials, monuments of material culture, and toponymic and hydronymic data—any presence of even an insignificant Turkish ethnic element in this region is not only not observed before the 18th century, but is completely ruled out.

The new, ill-fated era in the history of Meskheta and the Meskhi began in the 15th century, when unified Georgia broke up into several independent states, one of which was the Samtskhe-Saatabago Principality. Like the other Georgian political formations, Samtskhe became an arena of constant encroachments on the part of aggressive neighbors—Iran and the Ottoman Turks. Turkey was the most active here, and in the 1570's seized Meskheta once and for all and turned it into one of the administrative districts of the Ottoman Empire—the Akhaltsikh or Chipdyr (Gurdzhistan) Vilayet. Representatives of the Dzhakeli family, who had adopted Islam and been given the title pasha, headed the vilayet. The first pasha was Beka Dzhakeli—Saparpasha.

The misadventures in the history of the Meskhi began at that time. The Turkish conquerors abolished the more advanced system of farming and implanted the outdated Ottoman system of land use and also extensive forms of farming; they forced the local feudal nobility to convert to Islam, which of course gradually turned them into

Turks. The common people resisted the Turkish influence longer, preserving both their religion and native language longer. It was not without reason that Vakhushti Bagrationi wrote in the 18th century that, to him, in modern Samtskhe-Saatabago the "princes and nobility are Moslems, but the peasants are Christians; however, in Klardzheti most of the peasants are also Moslems." Consequently, the process of Islamization of the productive sections of the population—the Meskheta peasants—had already begun in the 18th century. This process also concluded in the 18th century with most of the peasants adopting Islam.

The establishment of the Turkish yoke also entailed another measure, unusually severe in its consequences: political expansion accompanied ethnic expansion. Not wishing to adopt Islam, many Samtskhe peasants fled to Georgia which remained more or less independent. From the end of the 18th century the Turkish administration began to resettle here Turkmen nomads and Kurds, which also was to help mix the local Georgian population with Turks. Thus, only beginning in the late 18th century did a population of Turkish origin appear in Meskheta, that is, "Tarakami" ■ Turkmen ■, and along with them the Kurds.

It cannot be said that Georgian political leaders have not demonstrated concern for the Meskhi who were separated from their homeland. Thus, for example, one of the reasons for the involvement of Erekle II in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 was to liberate Samtskhe-Saatabago and reunite it with Eastern Georgia. However, thanks to the traitorous actions of General Totleben, these plans were not fated to be carried out.

Only as a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 did General Paskevich manage to win from Turkey 10 of the 24 *sancaks* [administrative unit] of Akhaltsikh Vilayet—historical Samtskhe and Dzhavakheti. The rest of the areas of Meskheta remained part of the Ottoman Empire.

It could be assumed that, with liberation from the Turkish yoke of that part of the Meskhi that was within Tiflis Guberniya of the Russian Empire, it gained the opportunity to return again to the paternal faith and native culture. But this was not fated to happen. All Moslem Meskhi were declared Turks; on these grounds, the Meskhi nobility was deprived of privileges of Russian nobility. All this caused part of the Meskhi to resettle in Turkey. The Russian government immediately settled the vacated land with Armenians resettled from the Arzurum area. Deprived of an opportunity to receive an education in the "noble" educational institutions of Russia, the Meskhi nobility sent their children to Turkey, which naturally contributed to a further the Turkish influence with the Meskhi and, what is more, to implant Pan-Turkish sentiments among them. These sentiments also spread among the broad sections of the peasantry. Measures carried out in the second half of the 19th century by leading Georgian figures, headed by I. Chavchavadze, for the purpose of regenerating among

the Meskhi the Georgian language, culture and self-consciousness had little or no results. The colonial policy of tsarism counteracted this.

It is most paradoxical that a similar policy was also carried out with respect to the Meskhi in the first decades of Soviet power. Having declared atheism to be one of the fundamentals of its ideology and waging a relentless struggle against religions and religious institutions, representatives of Soviet power in Georgia suddenly declared the religious principle to be their main criterion in solving the Meskhi problems. They sharply delimited Moslem Meskhi and Christian Meskhi, declaring the former to be Turks and the latter to be Azerbaijani. Convincing them of this and thus forcing them to record their nationality, they made them study in Azerbaijani schools opened for them and so forth. All this contributed to a further loss by the Moslem Meskhi of their age-old ethnic culture and ethnic self-consciousness and intensified the distinction and contradictions between "Tatar" Meskhi (as they were called in Georgia) and "Georgian" Meskhi. And these contradictions, often turning into open hostilities, created conditions for Moslem Meskhi to become closer to and blend in with the Turkish population (with the "Tarakami"). As a result, quite an abnormal situation had taken shape in Meskheta by the 1940's: the vast majority of Moslem Meskhi spoke Turkish, considered themselves Turks, and set themselves against Georgian Meskhi. Only in some 20 villages did they know the Georgian language and consider themselves Georgians.

In November 1944, by decision of the country's leadership at that time, the Moslem population of Meskheta was evicted one night and exiled to Central Asia. This was explained by the untrustworthiness of the Moslems here, which was becoming dangerous in the given military-political situation. It would be difficult to ascertain the real reasons, or rather grounds, for this action today. But this was an inhumane action, typical of the regime in power at that time. So, the tragedy occurred: more than 130,000 people were forcibly separated from their age-old place of residence and exiled to a foreign land only under the pretext that they were Moslems and therefore not politically trustworthy.

Just who were these people who were evicted from Meskheta? I think that the figures still have to be made more precise. **In doing so, it must be taken into account that most of the Meskhi evicted had at that time already lost both the Georgian language and Georgian self-consciousness—they considered themselves to be Turks.**

What happened there, on the foreign land? Pro-Turkish tendencies, sentiments, and consciousness grew stronger in the vast majority of those evicted, who in their homeland had already actually been denationalized in the Moslem-Turkish environment. They blended in once and for all with the true Turks who resettled with them and lost even those insignificant ethnic realities which somewhere, possibly, glimmered in their customs and

way of life, and today they are true Turks with a fully formed Turkish self-consciousness.

I would still like to talk about the term "Meskhetaian Turks." How legitimate is its usage? The term, undoubtedly, is artificial, has no history, and emerged recently. If we are to say it that way, it gives it only one meaning: "Turks from Meskheta," that is to say, the word "Meskhetaians" is understood to mean "people who come from Meskheta." However, in the press, on television, and in everyday life, we sometimes also encounter the terms "Turkish Meskhi," "Meskhi of Turkish descent," and "Meskhi-Turks." All these terms are incorrect and are not legitimate. It is necessary to remember that the Turks and Meskhi are completely different peoples and they cannot be considered identical.

Now, about a timely issue of today—the return resettlement of Turks from Meskheta to Georgia. As we know, this issue has become more acute, especially after the events in Fergan. We are filled with deepest sympathy for these people who have again come upon misfortune. However, we are forced to cast all emotions aside when resolving this issue of their resettlement in our republic and soberly assess the situation. First of all, we should take into account that the number of Turks wishing to resettle in Georgia comprises a huge number of people, the vast majority of whom demand to return to their old place of residence—Meskheta. But it is impossible to do this. First, the peasants living in Meskheta today are experiencing a critical shortage of land. Second, Georgia is one of the most multi-nationality republics. And we will not hide the fact that lately the interethnic relations have become considerably aggravated. To resettle in the republic a new people, now already distant to us, will aggravate the situation still more. In addition, the recent natural disasters in Svaneti and mountainous Adzharia have caused a critical need to provide a place of residence in the low-lying areas for a large number of people. All of the republic's already meager land reserve will go for this.

If all of the above is taken into account, there can be only one conclusion: at this stage, Georgia is unable to accept migrants, no matter who they are. It is distressing to realize this, but, in my view, for the time being there is no other solution.

1962 Novochoerkassk Strike, Demonstrations Reviewed

18300741 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jun 89 p 13

[Article by Vladimir Fomin, LG Northern Caucasus correspondent, and Yuriy Shehekochikhin, LG special correspondent, in "Ethics and Law" department under new rubric "USSR Supreme Soviet Dossier": "Then in Novochoerkassk"]

[Text] Rostov-na-Donu—Moscow—At the recent Congress of Peoples Deputies of the USSR, Deputy A.

Sobchak, a lawyer, recalled the 1962 events in Novochoerkassk and suggested that justice should be restored and the participants in those events exonerated. The Congress asked the USSR Supreme Soviet to review the court proceedings of the Novochoerkassk people who had been found guilty and act on its findings. Today we publish a feature by our special correspondents on what actually happened in Novochoerkassk in the early 1960s. We hope it will help the Supreme Soviet in its review of the events. We propose to continue to publish, under the new rubric, materials designed to facilitate the successful work of the country's supreme legislative body.

In the middle of December of last year, 1988, he received a letter he had been awaiting for more than 20 years:

"Matvey Kuzmich!

"Your appeal for steps to be taken for your exoneration has been reviewed by the Main Military Procurator's Office and resolved positively. The decision of the chief of the investigation department of the KGB Administration for Rostov Oblast dated 6 December 1967 to halt criminal proceedings against you for non-exonerable reasons has been annulled and your case has been closed in view of the absence of any criminal offense. . . During the investigation of your case by personnel of the KGB Administration for Rostov Oblast no laws were violated and all procedural actions were in accordance with the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code. Actions committed by you in the 1960s provided sufficient grounds for indicting you for anti-Soviet propaganda. Only in the conditions of perestroika and democratization of all aspects in the life of Soviet society has it become possible to judge you not guilty.

[Signed] "1st Deputy Military Prosecutor-General L. M. Zuka."

A week later Matvey Kuzmich sent a letter to the Military Prosecutor-General, B. S. Popov:

I am sincerely grateful to your apparatus for their attention and for the degree of objectivity displayed in reviewing my case, which was passed on to you from the Supreme Court of the USSR. At the same time, and of necessity, I feel compelled to ask you to explain some statements. Thus, the aforementioned document states: 'Actions committed by you. . . I must say that this 'literary' device gives cause for wonder, and here is why:

The thing is that these words would seem to refute all that is said before them about the absence of any criminal intent in my actions. Also, as I attentively—very attentively—read those two lines which speak of my 'actions' in the 1960s I couldn't help thinking that the author or authors of the documents referred to were for some reason trying to shield, in terms of the 1960s, the people who had caused the bloody events in Novochoerkassk. . ."

The response from the Military Prosecutor-General's office which Matvey Kuzmich received in January of this year (1989) says nothing about "perestroika and

democratization," nor of the "actions" once committed by him. It merely states curtly that he has been "fully exonerated" and has the right to raise the question of restoring all his rights before the appropriate authorities.

What is this correspondence we have quoted here? What accusations were levelled at the person in the 1960s and quashed in the latter 1980s? What, finally, were the "bloody events" that the Military Prosecutor-General's addressee refers to in his letter?

Over the last four years we have found out so many things that one begins to feel as if we have finally cleared the well of all the dregs that accumulated on the bottom for decades. There are no more secrets. Rejoice, new generations just entering life: we have accomplished at least that much! But no, it is still too early to rejoice.

The fate of Matvey Kuzmich Shaposhnikov, lieutenant-general of the tank troops, Hero of the Soviet Union, in the early 1960s first deputy commander-in-chief of the North Caucasus Military District, then in the mid 1960s under criminal investigation, expelled from the CPSU in 1967, and only now, in May 1989, completely exonerated and reinstated in the party, is linked with one such page of our history, first mentioned by KOMSOMOL-SKAYA PRAVDA on June 2 of this year.

What did happen in Novochoerkassk in early June 1962?

The easiest thing, it would seem, would be to find out from newspapers of that period. We diligently went through files of the Rostov oblast paper MOLOT and the Novochoerkassk city ZNAMYA KOMMUNY. On 1 June 1962 both papers (like, doubtlessly, all other papers in the country) carried on their first pages a Central Committee address to the people in connection with an increase in meat and butter prices: "...This is a temporary measure. The party is confident that Soviet people will successfully implement the measures in the field of agriculture adopted by the March Plenum of the CC CPSU... which will make it possible to reduce the prices of agricultural produce in the near future." MOLOT, 2 June: "N. S. Khrushchev attended a ceremony of the opening of a Palace of Young Pioneers and Schoolchildren in Moscow, he rode through the park in a motor train..." MOLOT, 3 June: "Soon the temporary increase in food prices in cities will transform into better supplies for the working people, which will ultimately lead to a reduction of prices..." ZNAMYA KOMMUNY, 5 June: "...The working people of Novochoerkassk approve the measures taken by the party and the government aimed at rapidly boosting the output of livestock products..."

June sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth... Nothing...

Putting the papers aside, we went to A. N. Kononov, chief of the Rostov Internal Affairs Administration. Perhaps the militia archive has some document shedding light on the tragedy in Novochoerkassk? A report, account, communique? "Alas," the general spread his arms. "I wanted to see for myself. But there's nothing there..."

Then maybe there is something in the oblast KGB archive? Some photograph, perhaps, even just one? "Nothing," we were told. "We would have liked to see one ourselves, but unfortunately, we found nothing..."

Finally, in a darkened yellow folder in the archive of the Rostov Party Obkom we found the minutes of a meeting of the city party *aktiv* held June 4th, 1962, with the flowery title: "Concerning Facts of Disturbances and Disruptions In the Normal Life of the City and the Tasks of the City Party Organization For Mobilizing the Working People of the City For Successful Implementation of the Plans of Communist Construction."

We read:

"...Present were members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU Com. F. R. Kozlov, Com. A. I. Mikoyan, Com. D. S. Polyanskiy, and Secretary of the CC VLKSM Com. S. P. Pavlov."

The agenda mentions a speech by Kozlov. What did he say? Nobody knows: there is no text in the folder. The minutes go on:

"Tyunenko, shop party organization secretary, Electrode Plant: 'We have never lived so well, in such conditions as now. The shameful events were typically hooligan outbursts, and it's a pity that those rabid hooligans were able to influence young workers... Electrode Plant workers demand that such persons—I don't know their names—be deported to parasite territory and made to work there.' (Laughter in the hall.)"

"Ovodoz, professor, Land-Improvement Engineers Institute: 'I would hope that the operations that have been prepared, of which Frol Romanovich Kozlov spoke in his speech concerning the provocateurs, be implemented as quickly as possible.' (Applause.)"

"Yadrintsev, communist work team member, Synthetic Products Plant: 'The disgraceful bunch of rioters from the Electric Locomotive Plant...'"

"Proposal from the floor: 'City party organizations must step up patronage work with Soviet Army units stationed in the garrison, because some comrades do not correctly understand the behavior of army units.' Kozlov: 'This should be written down as a resolution.' Chairman: 'The meeting of the city party aktiv is hereby declared adjourned.' (Stormy applause.) Com. Kozlov: 'We wish you success, comrades.' (Stormy applause.)"

Laughter, stormy applause, and guidelines from the distinguished Moscow guest. The usual attributes of a usual meeting.

But even this only accessible document says nothing of the main thing: What was the *aktiv* applauding?

It appears that entire pages have been ripped out of the past, and those that remain have been refurbished, edited and rewritten, as in Orwell's novel "1984" which has only just become available to our readers.

Viktor Valentinovich Kondrashov, candidate of psychological science, came to see us at the hotel. A year ago he had written a letter to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA: "You keep writing about 1937... When will it be the turn of 1962, of Novocherkassk?"

In the spring of 1962 he had finished the 5th grade at school. June 2 was a Saturday.

"Mother sent me downtown for margarine. Before Revolution Square the bus stopped: people with red flags and banners were marching along Lenin Prospekt, which was then called Moskovskaya Street... I got out of the bus. A crowd of people was standing in the park in front of the party Gorkom... The Gorkom doors were wide open. I got curious..."

"Did you understand then what was happening?"

"No, I was only curious. I had never been inside the building so I went right in."

"What did you see there?"

"At the first-floor doors there were four soldiers who wouldn't let anyone in... I went up to the second floor, to a huge hall with a parquet floor. People were walking about the hall... I went out onto a balcony. I heard shouts: 'How can we continue like this? There's nothing to eat as it is!' The words didn't surprise me because I had heard such talk every day from morning till evening..."

"Was there any damage?"

"I didn't see any damage. Only several sheets of paper were scattered on the floor in the Gorkom hall. And people were opening the doors of empty offices because (as I found out much later) all the Gorkom personnel had run away..."

"Did you spend a long time in the building?"

"No, I saw tanks drive in from a side street and soldiers in tight formation pushing the crowd away from the Gorkom building. I was curious, of course, so I ran down. I slipped through the soldier ranks and took up a position to one side of them. All the soldiers were carrying automatic rifles. An officer wearing an ear-phone headset came out onto the balcony, followed by a soldier with a backpack radio. The officer leaned over the railing and shouted something, then turned to the soldier and said something to him. It was still all so interesting to me: the crowd, the flags, the soldiers, the automatic rifles. The soldier said something into the microphone and all at once a volley rang out. Then another. People dashed for cover. The square emptied rapidly. I saw some people lying in the square, then a woman in tears, then a running man carrying a woman with a bloodied head in his arms. I walked slowly away from the square and saw tanks driving up and down Lenin Street. Wounded people were lying in a yard in front of a pharmacy."

The following day they were told at school: "Yesterday enemies of the people and spies attempted to stage a provocation." The terminology was reminiscent of those memorable 1930s.

V. Kondrashov had witnessed the finale of the bloody tragedy...

What preceded it was recounted by Petr Petrovich Siuda.

We visited him in his tiny room in Novocherkassk. There were piles of papers on the floor, on the table, on shelves, in closets. Six months ago he had left the Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Plant in order to devote himself completely to reconstructing the history of the Novocherkassk events, which some had so diligently attempted to expurgate from the chronicles of our time.

"Back in 1950, when I was in a children's home, we kids would argue heatedly about how many years of our lives we would sacrifice for a day of our beloved Stalin's life. I grew up in a children's home, and until I was 14 I didn't know that my mother was in a camp and my father had been arrested."

P. Siuda's father, who died in jail, was a member of the party since 1903, he knew Stalin, Voroshilov and Mikoyan well, and in 1962 the very fact of his dead father's erstwhile friendship with Mikoyan would save his son's life.

In 1962 Siuda was only 25 years old. He was arrested June 1, one day before the soldiers lifted their automatic rifles. Today the circumstances of his case can help us reconstruct the picture of the Novocherkassk events.

The verdict on Siuda's case states:

"During 1-3 June 1962, criminal hooligan elements provoked mass disturbances in Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast, and at some enterprises of the city; the disturbances were accompanied by pogroms, attacks on local government workers and public representatives, disruption of the work of industrial enterprises and railway transport, and other excesses... On 1 June 1962, P. P. Siuda went to the factory and joined the rioters; he climbed onto a truck parked in front of the plant management building and asked plant chief engineer S. N. Yelkin a question of a provocative nature which incited the crowd to continue the mass disturbances. On the railway tracks he called for preventing a passenger stopped by rioting elements from proceeding on and engaged in an argument with plant activists who had arrived to establish order and resume railway traffic. In the evening of that day Siuda addressed a crowd from a tunnel ledge, calling for the people not to go back to work but to proceed to the CPSU Gorkom with provocative demands; he proposed sending 'delegates' to other plants to stop work at them. Upon arrival of militia personnel at the plant he tried to prevent them from establishing public order and demanded that they depart."

That was how Siuda's actions were characterized in the court's sentence. The consequence was 12 years in a strict regime colony. But here is what he himself tells of those events:

"Starting in January 1962, rates at the Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Plant were again reduced by up to 30-35 percent. The last rates reduction was for workers of the steel foundry. That was already in May. Then, in the morning of 1 June, it was announced over Central Radio that prices for meat and butter were being raised. But it was not only the price increase that led to the strike. The housing problem was not being addressed at the plant, and the rent for private apartments at the time was 35 to 50 rubles per month, that is, 20 to 30 percent of a worker's monthly wages... There were virtually no meat products in the stores, and at markets everything was very expensive... On the 1st, people on the way to work voiced their indignation at the price hikes. In the steel foundry workers gathered in groups. The plant director Kurochkin came to the shop and said something that, naturally, incensed the workers: 'If you haven't enough money for meat and sausage eat liver patties.' Those words provided the spark that led to the tragedy. The workers turned on the factory whistle. Workers from the 2nd and 3rd shifts began to come to the plant. The strike began... Signs appeared: 'Give us meat, butter,' 'We need apartments'..."

"What did you yourself do?" we asked Siuda.

"I didn't want to speak at the meeting which had begun spontaneously in the factory square, but I was concerned about talk of taking over power in the city. I remembered the stories of participants in the events in Hungary and Georgia only too well. So I spoke of the need to maintain firmness, order and organization. I called for everyone to go into town the following day, formulate common demands, and submit them to the authorities."

"Were there any acts of violence against the authorities?"

"Neither the preliminary investigation nor the court could discover any acts of violence, except for two minor cases. The plant chief engineer Yelkin was forced into the back of a truck, but no one beat him. In the other case one of the 'activists' was punched several times by his own subordinates... Later that night some workers tore a picture of Khrushchev from the front of the plant management building, and other pictures were taken from all offices, dumped in a heap and burned in the square... But I didn't see what happened the next day, June 2, because I had already been detained..."

According to Siuda, 105 people were sentenced for their involvement in the Novocherkassk events. Seven were sentenced to death by shooting (including one woman). The sentence was carried out. Siuda's mother managed to get through to Mikoyan, which is why he did not figure in the most extreme "death" case. Of the 12 years of his sentence Siuda spent four and a half behind bars.

We asked whether he had asked for his own exoneration.

"No," Siuda responded. "To me exoneration of all participants in the strike and the restoration of historical justice is more important."

That is why he has devoted his life to setting up his own archive of those events. There is, as is known, no other.

We walked along the highway from the plant to the city center. It's a pretty long walk, some 10-12 kilometers. That day, June 2nd, a crowd of 7,000 workers followed this road, carrying red banners and a picture of Lenin. The road is narrow. At one point it passes over a small stream called Tuzlov. There were tanks on the bridge. The crowd swarmed over them, but they did not fire a single shot.

Now we know why.

In mid May 1962, Lieutenant-General Matvey Kuzmich Shaposhnikov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the North Caucasus Military District, was conducting a meeting of district commanding officers. One day after the 20th of May, General I. A. Pliyev, the district commander-in-chief, received orders to place troops on combat alert and concentrate them in the Novocherkassk area.

"In the end of May, that is before the 1st of June?" we asked Matvey Kuzmich again.

Yes, he said, he remembered it clearly. The orders, as he understood, were from Khrushchev, through Malinovsky, then minister of defense.

"For me, a military man, when I am told that troops must be placed on combat alert, that is, with weapons and ammunition, it is apparent that this is not to deal with some natural calamity. It means something has happened. Pliyev had left earlier. I wound up the officers' meeting and headed for Novocherkassk, stopping over at home in Rostov to change."

We asked the general what he saw in Novocherkassk. According to him things were calm in the city, but he noted the presence of army patrols. Pliyev told him that it was necessary to proceed to the Electric Locomotive Plant area and assume command of units arriving there. Before leaving for the plant Pliyev told Shaposhnikov to report to Kozlov and Mikoyan.

"That is," we asked again, "two members of the Central Committee presidium were in Novocherkassk before the 1st of June?"

"Yes," General Shaposhnikov confirmed. "I found them in the medical aid post of the tank division, where their quarters were set up. When I arrived on the grounds of the military garrison I noted that tanks and automatic riflemen were positioned inside around the entire perimeter, and I couldn't help wondering from whom the two distinguished Moscow visitors were being protected so much.

"After introducing myself to Kozlov and Mikoyan I immediately voiced my apprehensions: The troops were deployed with ammunition, moreover not just the riflemen but the tankers, too. This could result in big trouble. Mikoyan remained silent, but Kozlov brusquely interrupted: 'The troops commander, General Pliyev, has received all necessary instructions.' I was convinced that a mistake was being made, so I suggested to Pliyev and Military Council member Ivashchenko that we send a joint cable addressed to Khrushchev requesting at least to take the ammunition from the troops deployed in the Novocherkassk area. General Pliyev raised a finger: 'There are members of the Central Committee presidium above us.'"

General Shaposhnikov arrived at the plant, around which troops were already being concentrated, and on his own authority ordered: "Unload automatic rifles and carbines and relinquish ammunition to company commanders." The same orders were issued for tank ammunition.

"What did you see at the plant?"

"Workers were milling around in the shops," the general said, "but there were still no rallies. The only talk was about the cut in rates: the decree on price increases had not yet been published."

"Did local authorities come to talk with the workers?"

"They behaved like scared rabbits," the general said. "Two men arrived, but when the workers rushed towards them to voice their complaints they escaped through the attic... To draw attention to themselves the workers halted traffic on the railway."

"Why?"

"They wanted Moscow to know about them, unaware of the fact that two members of the CC presidium were just a few kilometers away protected by tanks and soldiers."

On the first, according to General Shaposhnikov, workers emerged from the shops and filled the factory square. They wanted to meet with the plant management, but the doors to the administration building were barricaded. The rally continued all day long.

The 2nd of June dawned.

"Around eleven o'clock the plant gates swung open and a crowd of seven or eight thousand people carrying red banners headed in the direction of Novocherkassk. I approached the workers and asked: 'Where are you going?' One of them said, 'Comrade General, if the mountain doesn't go to Mohammed, then Mohammed goes to the mountain.' I reported by radio to General Pliyev that the workers were heading for the city center. 'Stop them!' I heard Pliyev's voice. 'I don't have the forces to stop seven or eight thousand people,' I responded. 'I am dispatching tanks at your disposal. Attack them!' Pliyev's order followed. I replied, 'Comrade commander-in-chief, I see no enemy before me for our tanks to attack.' Pliyev

angrily threw down the microphone. Sensing trouble, I tried to overtake the column in my jeep. On the way I met General Parovatkan, whom I had dispatched earlier to get instructions directly from Pliev. 'The commander-in-chief has issued orders to use weapons,' he told me. 'Impossible!' I exclaimed. Then general Parovatkan handed me a writing pad, flipped it open, and I read: 'Use weapons.' Parovatkan and I jumped into the jeep so as to overtake the crowd and prevent bloodshed. But we were some 400 meters from the square in front of the party Gorkom when we heard volleys of automatic rifle fire."

"How many do you think were killed, Matvey Kuzmich?"

"Twenty-four people, including one schoolboy, and 30 were wounded. I recall that I told General Parovatkan: 'You know what, let's drive over to Kozlov and Mikoyan and demand, as witnesses, that all those who used arms should be tried right in the square.' 'What are you saying, Matvey Kuzmich?' Parovatkan responded. 'No one will understand us there.'"

We asked the general what would have happened if he had obeyed orders and the tanks standing on the bridge over Tuzlov River had attacked the crowd. "Thousands would have died," he said.

On the way to the plant someone threw a rock at his jeep, hitting him on the shoulder and ripping off his left shoulder-strap. The general leaned out of the car, shouted at the person, "You stupid fool!", and drove on.

"When I heard that the city party *aktiv* would be meeting I decided to address it and informed the member of the Military Council of my intention. I wanted to say that we shouldn't have done what we did. I also wanted to remind them that our Party Program even states that from the point of view of internal conditions our society has no need for an army. I wanted to prove to them that it was lawless and a violation of all humanitarian norms. I wanted to ask the KGB and MVD leaders why they had dressed their own people in dirty coveralls while we were in uniform. There were many things I wanted to say, but they didn't invite me to the *aktiv* meeting. Then I decided to write a letter and asked my aide-de-camp to find the volumes of Lenin in which he gives his assessment of the Lena shootings and Bloody Sunday."

"Whom did you want to write to, Matvey Kuzmich? The Central Committee? Khrushchev?"

"That's the whole point: I realized there was no one to write to, at least not at those addresses."

Soon after that strange letters addressed to "Soviet writers" began to arrive at the Soviet Writers Union on Vorovskiy Street in Moscow. They were signed equally strangely "Furious Vissarion":

"...The party has become a vehicle driven by a bad driver who often drives under the influence and violates traffic regulations. It is time to revoke the driver's licence and thus prevent an accident..."

"...It is extremely important for us that the working people and industrial intelligentsia understand the essence of the political regime under which we are now living. They must understand that we are being ruled by the worst form of autocracy which relies on a vast bureaucratic and military machine."

"It is important that people should start to think instead of relying on blind faith that transforms us into animated machines. In a nutshell, our people have become an international laborer of a kind they have never been before, with no political rights."

The letters to the Writers Union arrived in rapid succession, and one can only imagine the reaction they caused—no, not among "Soviet writers," whom they probably never reached, but in those organizations to which they were, as later became apparent, dutifully forwarded from the Writers Union.

What did this Hero of the Soviet Union, lieutenant-general, first deputy commander-in-chief of the North Caucasus Military District (later even acting commander-in-chief for a year and a half), that is, a person standing high on the ladder of the Soviet military hierarchy, hope to achieve by engaging in an activity so inappropriate for a general? What compelled him daily to make entries in his diary, reflecting less on military art than on the difficult science of civic-mindedness? (Incidentally, the diaries, like the letters—though not all—were returned to him only this year.)

What forced him to do this? Apparently abhorrence of the psychological slavery which the administrative system cultivated in generation after generation, stripping people of everything human.

And what did he hope for? Probably for times like these, which we have called *perestroika*.

How long could it go on?

"Gradually I began to notice some odd things," Shaposhnikov recalls. "Letters I received usually arrived in damaged envelopes, while my correspondents began to complain that my letters to them would also arrive in tampered envelopes. I summoned the chief of the district special section and asked him to find out who felt it necessary to monitor my mail. He looked embarrassed, then several days later reported that the envelopes were damaged because of the bad work of postal workers."

In June 1966, General Shaposhnikov was retired at age 60. He wrote at the time in his diary: "Today I received an answer to my letter to Malinovskiy which I had sent 6/8/66. The note on it reads: 'Comrade M. K. Shaposhnikov: We were unable to find a service slot for you, which is why you have been retired. There is nothing more I can do. Malinovskiy.'"

In late August 1966, Shaposhnikov was driving with his wife in his Zaporozhets car from suburban Moscow to Rostov. On the road out of Moscow his car was stopped. "What's the matter?" he asked. "Did I commit a traffic

violation?" The traffic officer responded, "No, we are simply checking your documents." Standing with the officer were several smirking civilians.

"Usually I would drive through Kharkov, but this time I decided to go through Voronezh, cutting 150 kilometers off my route. Just as I was leaving Voronezh several cars with flashing lights blocked the road. 'Where are you coming from, Comrade General, and where are you going?' I was taken aback. I always drive in uniform, with my Hero's gold star medal. They looked at my papers and let me drive on. But just before Rostov I was stopped again. 'Will you also be asking who I am, from where and to where I'm going?' The young traffic officer looked embarrassed and lowered his eyes.

"I drove into my yard, but the arch through which I always enter was blocked by a ditch. Then I noticed that not only my house but the entire block was surrounded. The first person I saw in the yard was the chief of the military district's special section in the company of a dozen or so people in uniform and civilians. He approached me. 'How-do-you-do, Matvey Kuzmich. Park over here and get out.' As soon as my wife and I got out they began a search, perhaps hoping to find a hidden printing press. We went upstairs. Some strange-looking young people were standing on the landings above and below my apartment. One lock was broken. We barely gained access to the apartment. I was shown a search warrant. I asked the special section chief where he wished to commence the search. He immediately pointed to my den, sat down at my desk and pulled out the very drawer containing my personal archive, including originals of the 'Furious Vissarion' letters on the very top.

"'You're a poor conspirator, Matvey Kuzmich.'

"'I had no intention of concealing anything...'

"I am a very tidy person, and one glance at my desk told me that it had already been thoroughly inspected. All the papers were misplaced. There was also an appeal concerning the Novochoerkassk events which I had copied in 1962. They said they would not detain me, but I would be required to give a written undertaking not to leave town. When they left my wife lifted the wall rug in our bedroom and we saw two holes drilled in the wall behind it with little tubes inside. Their technology was apparently pretty primitive."

M. K. Shaposhnikov was indicted under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code—for anti-Soviet agitation and

propaganda. Only after an appeal to Yu. V. Andropov was the case closed—but without any exonerating circumstances. For that reason the materials were all handed over to the party commission of the Rostov Oblast Party Committee. On 26 January 1967 then first secretary of the party Obkom I. A. Bondarenko took away General Shaposhnikov's party card.

Of course, he appealed his case over and over again. He wrote to the Central Committee, to the Procurator's Office, to party congresses. He recounted his life as a young worker who had become an officer, participated in tank attacks and was awarded the title of Hero during those grim wartime years. He wrote about the tragedy in Novochoerkassk, about the past and the future. Over 20 years he has accumulated volumes of copies of letters and responses to them. He has linked his fate with the Novochoerkassk events. As a military man he realized the need for order and discipline (even in our time of rallies we cannot pass off elemental passions for democracy). But he could not accept the methods of achieving order. It was necessary to listen to the people, not drown their voice in a roar of tanks. He never recalled his own words: "I see no enemy before me for our tanks to attack." On the contrary, he wrote, appealing already to the 27th party congress: "As for myself, today, as then, I continue to castigate myself for failing to prevent the bloody action in June 1962."

Perhaps those words express the most stern self-evaluation which we all are so frequently incapable of.

In May 1967 General Shaposhnikov wrote in his diary:

"Personally I am far from harboring any grudge or hate for the perpetrators of unrestrained arbitrary acts. I am only sorry that I was not able to really combat that evil. In the struggle with arbitrariness and petty tyranny I lacked the ability to engage in mortal combat. In the struggle with the arbitrary actions of petty tyrants, baseness and hypocrisy, which are so prevalent and entrenched in army conditions, I lacked an adequate weapon, besides an illusory belief that truth could—just like that, by itself—win, and justice would triumph..."

Matvey Kuzmich Shaposhnikov is now 82. But there is no old age in him. He has forgotten nothing. He does not wish to forget anything.

Circumstances may be stronger than a nation as a whole, but they may still be weaker than a single person. We have the example of General Shaposhnikov before us.

Samarkand Taxi Drivers Fear More Attacks, Refuse Nighttime Work

*18300656 Tashkent PRUD1 VOSTOK 1 in Russian
12 May 89 p 4*

[Report by I. Tokarev, UZIAG correspondent: "Everyone Has One Life." For related reporting, see page 61 of the JPRS series SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, JPRS-UPA-89-018 dated 21 March 1989]

[Text] In protest against the murder of a comrade, taxi drivers have refused to work at night.

Having refused to work the night shift, drivers from Samarkand's taxi depot No 4 have demanded protection against attacks by thieves. This decision was taken after taxi driver Khamza Mamadiyev was killed on the night shift, he was knifed, his body thrown onto the street, and his vehicle driven off.

"This could happen to any one of us," said A. Davronov, chairman of the labor collective council of convoy No 2. "At two o'clock that morning, I came out through the gates after my shift looking for someone to drop me off on his way. As luck would have it, Khamza Mamadiyev, a workmate of mine, drove by. He took me home then hurried off to meet the night bus from Andizhan, in hopes of getting a fare. He was killed on the way."

The atmosphere at the taxi depot has become fraught since the funeral of the drivers' murdered comrade. Seeing the little orphans in their sorrow, they decided then and there to stay away from work.

Between two and three in the morning, I and photographer R. Gafurov caught sight of a group of excited people at the taxi depot. We were showered with stories and questions: "How long is this going to go on?"

Yes indeed... It was only last March, and also at night, that G. Tyrtvshiny, a taxi driver, was shot. "We know that the criminals were arrested, but our comrade is gone!" This year several drivers have fallen victim to robbers who get in pretending to be paying passengers, then on some dark street - which most in this city are - brandish a knife and make off with the receipts.

In the Mamadiyev case, the police had some suspects in custody within half an hour or so. This we were told by Police Sergeant A. Dzhalilov and junior sergeants E. Rustamov and A. Anarkulov.

"On routine patrol we noticed a taxi stopped in the street and wondered what was wrong. As we approached the vehicle, two people armed with knives jumped out at us. We brought them in."

It was promptly discovered that the vehicle belonged to Khamza Mamadiyev, who had been killed just a short time before.

According to the head of the oblast Internal Affairs Administration, Police Lieutenant G. Gayryan, those arrested were Zh., aged 21 and employed at the Chekhov

Drama Theater and M., an unemployed eighteen-year-old. The investigation is proceeding. A meeting was held at the taxi depot attended by members of the police force, who reported on measures taken to increase the safety of drivers working at night. A deadline of fifteen days was set for these measures to go into effect.

"It is high time for law and order to be reinforced in good earnest in Samarkand," G. Gayryan announced. "I suggest the formation of workers' detachments, as has been done in Gorkiy. The number of voluntary patrols has dipped sharply of late. Instead of the 1,700 people we used to have on patrol, there are now no more than two or three hundred, the majority of whom are first-year students. Since making the transition to economic accountability, the plants, factories and building concerns have practically stopped participating in the maintenance of public order. But when this happens, what kind of money are those collectives making? People are afraid to go on the second and third shifts..."

Robberies aside, more pockets are being picked in Samarkand these days. The taxi drivers talked about that too. The police confirm that it is difficult to catch a pickpocket red-handed; the city residents must help. But do they really have to become detectives? No, this is a job that should be supervised by the officially designated individual.

The events at taxi depot No 4 have captured the attention of urban authorities and social organizations. The drivers have had visits from representatives of the passenger transportation trust, the City Executive Committee, and the republican Ministry of Automobile Transportation. While discussing the build-up of problems, the drivers have found a lot to be upset about: the fact, for instance, that a plan target for receipts - up to 45 rubles per day - has again been foisted upon them on the grounds that it has been done before, although private taxis now outnumber their official counterparts several times over. They have to pay with their own money for almost all spare parts. Shafts have to be taken for grinding to other depots, and that too comes out of their pockets. There is no drivers' club, and they gain nothing from auxiliary economic activities...

The drivers have announced that they will wait out the two promised weeks and will continue to work... But to wait three years or more for what they have been promised, as has happened more than once, is something they have no intention of doing.

KGB General Discusses Border Troops

*18001471 Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian
No 13, Jul 89 (signed to press 20 Jun 89) pp 66-68*

[Interview with KGB Border Troops Major General V. Vinogradov by PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN correspondent E. Gasanov: "On the State Border"; date and place not given]

[Text] At the invitation of the political directorate of the USSR KGB Border Troops a group of journalist visited a

number of outposts in the Transcaucasian border district where they met with soldiers and officers and with the local population. Their discussions were frank. Interest was mutual. The journalists had occasion not only to ask questions but also to answer various ones.

Following the visit to the border units, our correspondent asked the first deputy chief of the USSR KGB Border Troops Political Directorate, Major General V. Vinogradov, to comment on the life of the border troops, on how restructuring is proceeding in the troops, how political and educational work is being organized. Today we are publishing this conversation.

[Correspondent] In the minds of the people the frontier guard is a model soldier: brave, skilled, a patriot and citizen of his country. How are young border troop soldiers being taught these traits today?

[General Vinogradov] We value such trust by the people and we are trying to justify it. During the last year alone seven border guards—V. Ukhabov, A. Bogdanov, F. Shagaleyev, V. Kapshuk, I. Barsukov, N. Lukashov, and V. Popkov—were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Our service, its tasks and functions remain unchanged. On the other hand, the content and forms of work to prepare the young generation for it are changing. A great deal depends here upon the energetic actions of party members and upon the activities of political organs. We are devoting much attention to strengthening the party's immediate influence within those units that are directly related to protection of the border. What this means is the border outposts, passport control points, border patrol vessels, and other units. This also explains the particular attention we are paying to the selection of soldiers, sergeants, sailors, and petty officers for party membership. There are party organizations and party groups at almost all border outposts. They are the political core of the military units. Members of the party and the Komsomol set the example of a highly conscientious attitude toward service in defending the state frontiers of our socialist motherland.

We are striving to have the workers in political organs associate to a greater extent with the soldiers and sailors. This is important to emphasize because with us as well, in the troops, we had begun to see a style in which those who are supposed to be carrying out educational work within the units preferred to remain in their offices. Now, essentially, the political workers are to be constantly found among the troops themselves; they are assisting the party activists, are devoting themselves to the cadres, and are doing a great deal of work with regard to implementing the suggestions and proposals of Communist Party members.

We need to bear in mind that the main principle of military organization is one-man management [yedinonachaliye]. And, of course, political workers as well are accustomed to being guided by this. Today, we are pointing them toward mastering the methods of political

leadership. This, it would seem, is not a new problem. But, when we approached it in earnest, we discovered that it has not been thoroughly worked out, on either a theoretical or a practical plane. We have analyzed the activities of the party organizations at border outposts and the political organizations in border units and districts. We plan to raise this question at a military scientific and theoretical conference in order to generalize everything useful for the present day that has been accumulated and then to work out specific recommendations for the party organizations and the political organs.

One of the methods of increasing the responsibility of party members for carrying out approved decisions and specific party instructions is to report on them at party meetings concerning the fulfillment of duties laid down by the party rules. A certification of party members is underway. Not a certification along professional lines, but a certification in the party committee, where each person is being called to account for the work he has done. Here, mistakes that have been made are being subjected to criticism and practical advice is being given.

And nevertheless there are great difficulties in educational work in the units. And here is why. The practice of education which we have developed over the decades is undergoing important changes. On what plane? The teachers themselves are being called upon to demonstrate more openness, more energetic activity, more dynamism. Our propagandists have the obligation to transmit, via themselves and their understanding, literally all the processes that we see going on in society and, in an easily understood form, to reach every soldier, every sailor.

[Correspondent] Is all this being somewhat successful?

[General Vinogradov] I will tell you that, as a whole, it is successful. We also cannot underestimate the influence of the mass information media. We are striving to see that all the news, the events which are taking place within the country and on the international arena, reaches every soldier. You yourself understand: A person is doing service on the very frontiers of our homeland. And he must fulfill this service conscientiously, with an understanding of his own responsibility. It is important for the border guard to be politically prepared to carry out his duty. The deputy commanders of political units and the party members who belong to organizations are engaged in implementing this task. An important role is assigned to the system of comradely education. We have television sets and dozens of newspapers at practically every outpost.

Nevertheless, as I have already said, there are many difficulties in this work.

Every outpost is an multi-national family in which various of our country's peoples are represented. And those difficulties which now exist, for example, in inter-ethnic relations, are found in one or another form in the troops as well. The military organism, if it can be so

expressed, is overcoming such symptoms of this illness as manifestations of nationalism and is not permitting the introduction of discord into the lives of the personnel. But there are objective difficulties. Today, every political worker has to know the culture and customs of those peoples who have sent their sons to serve on our frontier. And this is not always happening. We are striving to strengthen ties with the regions from which our border troops have been called; with the enterprises where they worked before their service; with the educational institutions where they studied. And also with their families, directly with their relatives.

It is necessary to keep in view that today's border troops bring into the military all the problems being experienced by society, thus, we have members of informal organizations. They come into the service with the views and ideas of these organizations. Everything has to be considered, studied, generalized. Without this, it is impossible to do our job of educating a soldier who conscientiously fulfills his civic duty on the state border.

Of course, the most painful questions are those connected with strengthening discipline. There are both cases of drunkenness and cases of mutual relationships which are contrary to the rules, those which it has now become accepted to call "god-father relationships" [dedovshchina]. No family is without its black sheep. We also have them. But it is necessary to emphasize that "god-fathers" are not characteristic of the border units. There are also some who are inclined to be lazy in fulfilling their military duty, who try not to be burdened with carrying out their professional and even sometimes their party obligations. We are working with them. Primarily through the party organization.

[Correspondent] What kind of ties do the border have with the local population, with the public?

[General Vinogradov] Ties with the people or, more precisely, with the population of the border zone are the foundation for the reliability of the defense of state borders. These close ties have existed since the first days that our Soviet motherland's border troops began their activities. Hundreds of border guards are deputies to local soviets. Many of them have been elected to local party organs. Almost daily, the border troops maintain ties with the directors of kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and enterprises located in the border zone. Without the help of the people we cannot function in practical terms. Therefore we are constantly deepening our ties, are concerned about how they can be enriched by new forms, by new content. We need contacts with the population so as to get help in defending the border. They play a major role in the matter of educating our personnel. At the same time, many of the border guards work with pupils in the schools, in Pioneer and Komsomol organizations. You probably have heard about such military-patriotic organizations for young people, and more precisely for school children, in border rayons such as the detachment of young friends of the border troops? Today, the network of these has been developed throughout the entire

country in the border zone. We have many examples when, under the influence of meetings with border troops, of constant association with them, young people who are completing their school studies are entering border troop training schools, are becoming officers, are binding their own lives to the border, and are continuing this work, but now in a new capacity, at a border outpost. And frequently these graduates end up in the same regions where they were born and studied, where they know the customs, traditions and language of the local population and, by this very fact, they are deepening and strengthening ties with the people even more.

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Spetsnaz Activities Described

18001389 Moscow GUDOK in Russian 16 Jul 89 p 4

[Article by A. Rostovtsev under the rubric "USSR MVD": "Soldiers of a Special Purpose"]

[Text] Moscow Oblast—Having torn past the half-obstructed fence without hesitation, the men "dashed" into the two-story building. Next they headed under an arch and onto a bridge with swaying girders. Everything was in flames, so that the heat "drowned out" that day's scorching sun. They overtook the "criminals" only after they had reached the end of the field.

"Hmm...Somehow this time it wasn't that great." The sub-unit commander of the imeni Dzerzhinskiy special purpose unit, Major Sergey Lysyuk, shook his head. "We'll try it again tomorrow. To your vehicles!"

A huge area at the training center is clearly partitioned off. It includes a firing range, an obstacle course (the same one Major Lysyuk's soldiers just completed), a speedway, an area for psychological training, an aircraft, and a building—"the prison"—where they master methods of freeing hostages. On the whole it is a model of an entire village in which various emergency situations can be simulated.

And quite a few occur. The need does arise to protect state sites of corrective labor institutions, to assist the police, and to end disturbances. In this center personnel are trained. The "spetsnazy," or the sub-unit carrying out particularly difficult tasks, train here as well.

Here is "spetsnazovets" Private Andrey Mikheev:

"On May 20 we were placed in an airplane and sent to Kizil, in the Perm Oblast. We were greeted by the town leadership, and they explained the situation to us in detail on the way to the train station: a number of hostages have been taken prisoner; they are in an investigative "isolator" [special prison for political detainees and espionage suspects]. It was our first real operation. We devised a plan. And can you imagine what we felt? They trusted us implicitly and placed all of their hopes

on us. Of course we were nervous: there were not only one or two, but 15 terrorists there. But it all ended well, and within 15 minutes."

A few hours later the special purpose detachment which had intended to return to Moscow took off for the Kirov Oblast, where once again—this time in a colony—hostages had been taken. This rescue operation took five minutes.

Private Andrey Mihkeev, a railroad man by birth, has served in the domestic troops for one and 1/2 years. His father Vladimir Aleksandrovich has been a diesel and electric locomotive engineer for many years. His mother, Lidiya Petrovna, was a switchman, and now she works as a crane-operator at the Rtishchev depot. Andrey himself completed an education as a railroad engineer at the Rtishchev railroad technical school in the Saratov Oblast.

"When I was drafted into the army, I was already working as a road fitter. Many people envied me, saying, 'You're going to Moscow; you'll get to see the capital.' And I thought to myself, 'I'll patrol in Moscow and see alot.'"

"And did I see alot?"

"Sure. Within one and a half years we passed through Moscow all of one time. We spent the whole time where things were 'hot.'"

Sergey Lysyuk, with his nearly two-meter height and unusually broad shoulders, stands out in outward appearance even against the background of his co-workers. He relates that in this year alone his sub-unit has taken part on ten occasions in various dangerous operations. And altogether his special detachment has existed for 12 years.

"We choose primarily volunteers among those who come to serve in the unit," the major explains. "But of course those we take are physically healthy. And another prerequisite is that they be mentally highly fit. We work alot on training soldiers psychologically: they should not fear explosions or fires. They are also trained in hand-to-hand combat."

I ask:

"But in two years their service ends and the soldiers are demobilized. Don't they become hardened? They have been taught to and are able to attack other people."

"First of all, as yet there have been no such cases, although hundreds of our men have gone to 'the civil war.' And second, honestly speaking, I think a sub-unit

such as ours should be professional. Our fellows face unusual work, and they risk much more than others. And it isn't easy to prepare people to respond to extreme situations every two years. As to your question about men becoming hardened, I think that Private 1st Class Kharchenko will explain everything to you."

Valentin Kharchenko, a former worker, incidentally, for the Kiev Metrostroy, was silent for a moment after having heard my question. Then he slowly began to recall:

"It was June 4. We were on our way to dinner when suddenly our commanding officer gave us an order: 'Finish your dinners quickly and change into your camouflage uniforms!' In a few hours we were in Fergana. As we drove through the city everything became clear. We saw undressed women whom the extremists had forced to dance in front of the rayon party committee building; we saw burning neighborhoods, houses, and apartments with charred corpses. Rocks were constantly thrown at our bus. And they shot at us...."

"On June 5, about five kilometers from Kokand, no longer in a special bus, but rather in a normal route bus, we were attacked by raging hooligans. They shouted, 'Do you have any Tatars or Turks in there?' We answered 'No.' 'Then come out here,' shouted one of the thugs to Senior Lieutenant Oleg Chebykin, who was sitting inside the vehicle. The thug pulled out a knife. They beat the officer unmercifully, to within an inch of his life, hit him in the head with a stake, and tossed him into an irrigation ditch. And you ask about malice. Yes, there is malice, and it stays with you. You just don't forget something like that."

Then I was given some figures. One hundred and three dead in Uzbekistan. According to the authorities, the instigators each paid 1,000 rubles per murder victim.

"Not everyone can withstand the kind of psychological pressure that my excellently trained soldiers were burdened with. Those who undergo events like this grow up quickly." And in conclusion Major Lysyuk added, "And you know, it's not that they have become hardened. They have experienced a serious spiritual and mental shock."

Domestic troops. Their creation is connected with the birth of the Soviet state. In the civil war years they led the struggle against the counterrevolution. In the twenties and thirties they rendered criminal bands harmless, protected railroads and enterprises, and caught spies and saboteurs during the Great War of the Fatherland. And today the soldiers of the Dzerzhinskiy unit of domestic troops face an acute struggle with the rise in criminal activity.

**ArSSR: YerAZ Plant Karabakh Committee
Sympathy Strike Seen As 'Fruitless'**

18300684a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
27 May 89 p 3

[Armenpress report: "Who Is Right?"]

[Text] The usual noise in the shops and in the production sectors of the ErAZ Plant is not heard. The machines and units have subsided, the production line has come to a stop. The collective of the enterprise is on strike. Before Monday, 22 May, two demands were advanced here—the convocation of a session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic and the release of the members of the Karabakh Committee. As of 22 May, the first question was withdrawn.

We will not dispute the deep sympathies toward the members of the Karabakh Committee on the part of the toilers of the enterprise. Their ability to lead people, the demand to pose sharp questions pertaining to corruption and the solution of a number of national problems found a wide response. It is possible, it would be more correct to enter into a political dialogue with them, to give the committee the status of an informal organization. To work out jointly measures for overcoming the negative phenomena that took place in various spheres of the republic's social life. But this question will still become the subject of discussion. And time will dot the "i". But we stay on that path—the strike, which the collective selected to solve the painful problems.

"'The strike.' What will it bring the collective in the conditions of the Soviet economy?" said A. Akopyan, the secretary of the ErAZ Party Committee? "We will make a small excursion into the year 1988. Several months of the strike have saddled the collective with heavy material losses for every family. Irregular wages, the deprivation of bonuses, and the disruption of the solution of a number of social problems. And the results of these sacrifices have been reduced to nought. Practically none of the questions advanced by the strikers have been fulfilled. And people have returned to their work stations. Difficult days have begun for the toilers of the enterprise. Work on Saturdays, the lengthening of the shifts could only with difficulty cover the indebtedness of the plant. But there were no bonuses as before. Beginning in May of the current year, in accordance with the proposal of economists, it was planned to bring about a fundamental correction of the situation, to pull the plant away from a break-down, and to establish bonuses. But... again strikes started. Today they have already brought losses to ErAZ in the amount of more than 600,000 rubles. And what will tomorrow bring? And will this help in the solution of the question in regard to the business of the Karabakh Committee? It seems that it will not. Thus, life itself suggests the erroneousness and harmfulness of the method chosen. And if we multiply this by the entire industry of the republic, the new forms of management, self-financing and *khozraschet*, then we can say: Whoever calls for strikes in our reality is politically short-sighted. For such a practice weakens the economic, and

not only the economic, might of Armenia, and hits it budget like a ricochet. It can lead to the unprofitability of a number of industrial enterprises and their forced closing. Let us take, for example, the Baltic. Today it is no secret for everyone that many questions have been solved there. But for whom is it not a secret that they never used the method of the strike there. For it was clear for everyone there that it will lead to a weakened republic. And where is the way out? In our view, in a dialogue of the government and the representatives of the working class in official appeals to the leadership of the country and the republic adopted in meetings, but in no case through economic pressure, which is practically directed against the people and its well-being.

The strike today intoxicates, tickles the nerves. But this is a fruitless, blind alley.

**Armenian Officials on Mass Poisoning
Investigations**

18300684b Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
27 May 89 p 3

[Interview with U.G. Pogosyan, deputy minister of health, chief sanitary inspector of the republic, L.V. Pogosyan, deputy chief of the Administration for Medical and Disease-Prevention Service of the Ministry of Health of the republic, and V.S. Orekhov, first deputy procurator of the ArSSR by S. Makaryan and G. Rubinyan: "Not Give Way to Panic; date and place not specified]

[Text] In the preceding issue of KOMSOMOLETS, we promised to discuss in more detail the cases of mass poisoning in a number of the republic's enterprises. We call to your attention an interview with representatives of the Ministry of Health and the ArSSR Procuratura.

Ursula Gevondovna Pogosyan, deputy minister of health, chief sanitary inspector of the republic:

Indeed, beginning on 14 May of this year, a number of group complaints started again to be received from a number of the republic's enterprises—complaints about the sudden deterioration of their state of health, expressing itself by a number of symptoms: Indisposition, headaches, dizziness, sometimes the itching of the exposed parts of the body. All in all, as of 24 May, approximately 300 people had asked for medical assistance, of them 26 were hospitalized. Basically these complaints come from workers of the enterprises belonging to the system of the republic's Ministry of Light Industry, and the geography of such cases is rather broad—they have been recorded in Artikskiy and Step-ananansky rayons of the republic, in Kafan, Razdan, Charentsavan, Goris, Yerevan, and a number of other places. In particular, many know about the recent incident at the Masis Footwear Production Association. The sanitation and hygiene investigation conducted in these enterprises did not detect an excess of the maximum permissible concentration of harmful substances connected with the technology of production. I would like to

note especially that the functions being carried out by the workers of the sanitation and epidemiological stations includes the study of the production environment for its content of only the toxic substances which are connected with the technology of production and which have a methodology for determination and norms of maximum permissible concentration. Meanwhile, there exists a large quantity of toxic substances for which such methods and norms have not been developed. At present, a great deal of work is being done—laboratory research for the determination of the nature of enigmatic illnesses. A government commission has been created, the question of organizing a specialized laboratory and involving in its work a body of highly-skilled chemists is being solved. Up to now, I repeat, on our part, a factor that could call forth such an unusual streak of mass complaints about health has not been discovered. If the reason for these cases is a toxic substance brought into the enterprise from the outside, then their investigation falls already within the competence of the law enforcement organs, with which we are working in close contact.

It is necessary to emphasize especially the fact that the May incidents are in no way connected with the use, in the work process, of thread supplied from the Sumgait High-Bulk Yarn Factory, since, after the precedents of mass poisoning that had taken place in a number of enterprises, including the Anush TPO [Transportation Consumers' Society], a prohibition on its further delivery and use was imposed by the republic's State Sanitary Inspection. Incidentally, all yarn being received in the republic is now checked.

Levon Varazdatovich Pogosyan, deputy chief of the Administration for Medical and Disease-Prevention Service of the republic's Ministry of Health:

Together with the Administration for Public Health of the Yerevan Gorispolkom and the rayon public health organs, our ministry is undertaking all necessary measures to provide highly-skilled medical assistance to the victims. To this end, all the leading specialists and clinical physicians of the Ministry of Health, as well as of the Scientific Research Institute for General Hygiene and Vocational Diseases have been mobilized. In every single case, the geography of which, unfortunately, has become very widespread, special medical assistance is being extended, and those who, on the basis of the symptoms, need it have been hospitalized—basically in the Republic Clinical Hospital and in the clinic of the Scientific Research Institute for Hygiene and Vocational Diseases.

Of course, the establishment of the diagnosis and treatment can be valuable and most effective only in the case when the reason for the ailment has been determined. Unfortunately, to date we have no definitive knowledge of the effective substance causing the symptoms of poisoning.

For this reason, the people hospitalized will have to be treated only on the basis of the symptoms of the illness

manifested. Fortunately, the condition of the sick is satisfactory, and everything is being done for their complete recovery. At the same time, preventive examinations of the workers of the enterprises and health observation are being conducted.

Viktor Sergeevich Orekhov, first deputy procurator of the ArSSR:

At every session of the special commission of the Armenian CP Central Committee for the study of the incidents of the poisoning of people that have taken place in some enterprises, the ArSSR Procuracy renders an account of the results of the work that has been done. Unfortunately, it must be noted that a number of serious criticisms addressed to us are justified, since the number of such cases continues to grow, and the reasons for this have up to now not been established. For the period before 24 May, we have registered incidents of group appeal of citizens for medical help in connection with a sharp deterioration of health in 24 enterprises of the system of the Ministry of Light Industry, the State Committee for Services (Goskomuslug), and other departments. To say unequivocally that poisoning took place in all cases we do not have the right, if only because the symptoms bear a general character and are not clearly expressed, and consequently they may be called forth not only by some poisonous substances, but also be the result of overwork, weakness of health, difficult working conditions, etc. Secondly, not in a single case of poisoning are there up to now findings by court and chemical experts concerning the presence or absence of any poisonous substance in the samples taken for investigation, and there are no findings about the seriousness of the damage inflicted to the health of citizens.

On the whole, the chronology of such cases is the following. The first of them was registered in December of the past year in Yexernadzorskiy branch of the Yerevan Knitted-Goods and Glove Association, a month later—an incident of that sort happened at the a knitted-goods and glove factory in Yerevan. And here, from 25 March, the case of appeals with complaints about poisoning began to take on a systematic character—basically in enterprises of the system of the Ministry of Light Industry, although cases in other sectors are already being observed. For every incident, a group of workers of the Procuracy, the Ministry of Health, and also operational staff members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB of the republic at once leave for the place of the incident, a careful examination of the pace of the incident is conducted, samples are taken of the air, dust, the raw material used in production, and the necessary laboratory analyses involving the victims are carried out by the sanitary services. In spite of this, for the time being we cannot report anything definite—the investigation continues. The course of the investigation is also materially impeded by the circumstance that no substantial proofs of any kind were discovered at even a single one of the enterprises indicating the presence of toxic substances, with the exception of one of the last incidents at the Kanakarskaya

Sewing Factory, where substances were found with an acid smell, which is now being subjected to expert examination. In a number of others, we are also examining the version of deliberate criminal acts aimed at the destabilization of the situation in the republic, which today can be characterized as very tense.

With respect to all these incidents, criminal proceedings have been instituted by the procuracy of the republic, an investigation-operational group of 7 investigators, headed by an investigator for especially important cases under the republic procurator, has been created and is operating, and it also includes operational workers of the ArSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Having traced the chain of the entry, into the republic, of the thread which may be the source of the poisoning, the investigator of the USSR Procuracy attached to us for the investigation of this case, went to Novopolotsk, from where the raw material came to Sumgait, and then to Yerevan. Within a short time, an investigator of the USSR Procuracy will begin work in Azerbaijan as well. Operative work at the local level is also being conducted by the organs of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The version of violations of the technological process in the manufacture of thread are also not being excluded. Although, even after the prohibition of the receipt and use of Sumgait thread, cases of poisoning were observed in enterprises using raw material from other union republics, as well as from imported production.

And further. It is impossible not to take into account the fact that rumors, too, do their black deed. Frequent are the cases where, in investigating these or those statements about poisonings, it turns out that the latter have a completely different character and are not connected with deliberate poisoning. Thus it was, for example, in the Yerevan Taxi Depot No 2, where it turned out that the two drivers claiming to have been poisoned contracted the poison as the result of the leakage of gas, being in the unventilated cabin of the car for a long time. This is how it was also with the food poisoning in Masis, and in the Tumanyanskiy Rayon, which was caused by the violation of the sanitary and hygienic system in the enterprises manufacturing ice cream. So that there is no need to succumb to panic, to dramatize things unnecessarily, and to see poisoning in every case of indisposition.

We are taking all conceivable measures for the quickest possible investigation of all registered cases. The work has been joined by an expert group of the Scientific Research Institute for Court Examination of the USSR Ministry of Justice, a scientific research laboratory for court examinations of the ArSSR Ministry of Justice, the Institute of Biochemistry and Toxicology, as well as expert commissions, whose members include representatives of the public and scientists.

The investigation of the "Masis Case" of the poisoning of female workers of the Garun Sewing Association in

June 1988, which has many concerned, is continuing. In spite of the fact that the best experts and chemists of the country have been involved in the conduct of the examination, it has not seemed possible to determine which substance or combination of which substances caused the poisoning. For the time being it proves impossible to establish even the source of the poisoning. To date, a final conclusion in this case has not been pronounced, the work is continuing.

From the editors: As you see, the situation is a complicated one. Of course, it is impossible to dispel with appeals to be calm the fear and alarm which grow with every new information about the next poisoning. And all the same, let us not panic, not succumb, and, the main thing, not spread unverified rumors.

Armenian Ideologue Views Nationalities Issue Under New Thinking

*18300771 Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
22 Jul 89 p 4*

[Article by A. Sarkisyan, sector chief of the Armenian Branch of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism: "New Thinking and the National Question"]

[Text] The process of the normalization of the socio-political situation in the country, which began after the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, among other things, gave high priority to the task of a fundamental improvement of the system of inter-nationality relations in the USSR. And this is entirely as it should be. The revolutionary transformations in our multinational country cannot be put into effect selectively, without a comprehensive approach, without the consistent application of the principles of the new political thinking, not only in foreign policy, but also in all spheres of social relations.

By the new political thinking, which is an integral component of the theory and practice of restructuring and its ideological foundation, we understand, above all, the repudiation of the dogmatic approaches and stereotypes that have become obsolete and have not proved themselves in practice, pretentious slogans, and the transition to democratic methods of solving socio-political problems, which correspond to the generally-recognized norms of human morality and international law.

It is precisely from these positions that, in our view, the measures must be assessed that are aimed at the improvement of the system of inter-nationality relations.

An obvious manifestation of the new political thinking in this sphere is the fact that the party has officially recognized the gross perversions and deformations permitted in the sphere of nationality policy and the presence of acute unresolved nationality problems. At the February (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the

necessity of improving nationality-state building in the spirit of the democratization of Soviet society was pointed out.

All of this has created conditions for the more open discussion of the acute nationality problems.

At the same time it is necessary to also talk about the fact that the new political thinking in actual fact does not go beyond establishment [konstatatsiya], in the best case—the recognition of the existing nationality problems, and only with difficulty forces its way into the sphere of fundamental practical actions.

However, the recognition of the mistakes that have been permitted cannot be an end in itself. It presupposes the necessity of practical steps for their elimination. Nationality should not be limited, as V. I. Lenin noted, "by the bare, formal, purely pretentious recognition of the equality of nations, which practically does not entail any commitment to anything, to which the bourgeois democrats limit themselves. . . ." (V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 161).

We must, first of all, proceed from the fact that nationality relations are an integral part of the system of social relations of the Soviet state and without the elimination of the deformations and gross distortions of the nationality policy that have been permitted under Soviet power, without overcoming the negative trends in this sphere, the successful advancement of the country along the path mapped out by the 27th CPSU Congress seems impossible.

Thus, in order to successfully solve the task of improving the system of inter-nationality relations, it is necessary, above all, to establish, to carefully analyze, and then to eliminate the reasons that lie at the basis of the aggravation of the inter-nationality relations in a number of regions of the country. Above all, it must be recognized that the aggravated inter-nationality problems emanate also from the very structure of the federative relations and are indicative of the deep crisis of the present-day model of the Soviet federation.

An analysis of the present-day state of inter-nationality relations quite evidently indicates that one of the basic reasons for the aggravation of the situation in this sphere is the actual inequality between the different peoples. In our country, a whole hierarchy of nations and nationalities and their cultures has been created, the hierarchy of republics and autonomous formations, which found its reflection in the Constitution of the USSR. Among the peoples of the USSR there exists at present four types of qualitatively dissimilar state formations, which have different rights. As a result, "there is also a difference in the possibilities of the satisfaction of national needs and requirements of the different peoples" (A. Ye. Zharnikov, "Problems of Nationality and State Building and the Individual," in the collection "Natsionalnyye problemy v sovremennykh usloviyakh" [National Problems in Present-Day Conditions], Moscow, 1988, p 160).

Such a structure leads to the necessity of the artificial combination of interests of the union republic and the autonomous units that go to make it up. Hence also the objective possibility of contradictions and even the conflict of interests of peoples, especially as the union republic, using the levers of power (subjective factor), has the possibility of solving the contradictions that arise in its favor. Proceeding from this, we support the opinion of the scholars who believe that "the search for new ways and forms of improving nationality-state building must proceed from the conception of the qualitative equality of all Soviet peoples and their state formations" (Ibid. p 162).

The importance of this task must not to any extent be underestimated, for, as V. I. Lenin wrote, ". . . Nothing so holds back the development and consolidation of proletarian class solidarity as nationality injustice, and the 'resentful' members of national parties [natsionaly] are to nothing as sensitive as to the feeling of equality and to the destruction of this equality. . . ." (V. I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works, Vol 45, p 360).

The facts indicate that many concrete decisions that were taken in the 1920's and 1930's in the sphere of nationality-state building were dictated not by the principles of the solution of the nationality problems officially proclaimed by the party, but by the concrete political situation and the correlation of forces of the conflicting sides in one or another region. In other words, in those times it was frequently not the right of nations to self-determination, or factors of the national-ethnic, historical and economic character that triumphed, but the principle of great power expediency, which, unfortunately, continues to act even today.

The very existence within the framework of some union republics of national-state formations, in its turn, is faulty for a number of reasons. First of all, in various republics the autonomous units are in unequal conditions. Secondly, in the presence of frequently-arising contradictions, the union republic inevitably has priority. Thirdly, given such a structure, one people appears as ruling with respect to another (the people of the union republic with respect to the people of the autonomous unit) and in the conditions of the arbitrary interpretation of Article 78 of the Constitution of the USSR the fate of this people is decided.

What, at the present time, are practical ways of solving the problems that have accumulated in the sphere of nationality-state building? In order to develop a conception of the solution of these problems, it is necessary to answer the following questions with all determination and clarity: a) Do we consider it possible to the recreation of the Leninist character of socialism in our country within the framework of the Stalinist model of the Soviet federation; (b) do we consider possible the harmonization of inter-nationality relations without the elimination of the reasons giving rise to the nationality conflicts and without the elimination of the crying injustices permitted with respect to certain peoples.

If so, then it should be said at once that it is impossible to solve this difficult problem through cosmetic means, and the unsettledness of the national question jeopardizes the whole cause of restructuring. The analysis of the present-day state of inter-nationality relations in the USSR, as some scholars and party leaders of our country note, "quite obviously show that radical measures are needed here" (V. A. Mikhaylov, "The 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU on Inter-Nationality Relations," in the collection "National Problems in Present-Day Conditions," Moscow, 1988, p. 3).

In the conditions of restructuring, in order to overcome the actual inequality between the nations and nationalities of our country, the unification of all types of nationality-state formations and the imparting of an adequate status to them must become a part of the reform of the political system. In other words, not only union republics, but also autonomous nationality-state formations must become the subjects of the federation. The direct appearance of the autonomous units at the center will not only put an end to dual subordination, but also create the legal prerequisites for the elimination of the errors permitted in the past with respect to the small peoples.

Those peoples who do not have their own state formations and live in compact groups within another national environment, in our view, should receive at least the right to cultural-nationality autonomy (national rayons, national rural Soviets).

In speaking about the creation of a new model of the Soviet federation, we are aware of the fact that the solution of this problem is linked with overcoming a whole series of objective difficulties and contradictions. It is necessary, above all, to proceed from the fact that this problem must be solved not by administrative command methods, not by instructions from above, but above all on the basis of the free will of the people, expressed through a referendum. The change of the forms of the nationality state system should be not an obligation, but the right of a given people.

The situation is complicated by the fact that complex ethnic processes have taken place during the past decades on the territory of the traditional residence of many peoples. In many autonomous republics, the indigenous peoples which gave a republic its name at the present time constitute a clear minority of the population (in Karelia—11.1 percent, in Abkhazia—17.1 percent, in Buryatia—23.0, in Bashkiria—24.3 percent, in Udmurtia—32.2 percent, in Mordovia—34.2 percent, etc.). (Cf. S. I. Bruk, "Ethnic Processes and Questions of the Optimization of the Socio-Administrative Division of the USSR," in the collection "Nationality Problems in Present-Day Conditions," Moscow, 1988, p. 136). But nevertheless, this fact cannot serve as a serious obstacle to the transformation of the autonomous republics into union republics, for the strengthening of the sovereignty of the republic and the elimination of the actual inequality between the union and autonomous republics

emanate from the interests of the entire population. In addition, it should not be forgotten that the indigenous nation was the basis of self-determination in the creation of the republic.

In the creation of a new model of the Soviet federation, it is necessary to take into account also the presence of the artificially created autonomous units which, for example, the Adzhar ASSR which goes to make up Georgia. It is well known that the Adzhars are the same Georgians, only those who have accepted Islam. Being an integral part of a single nation, the Adzhars, of course, have no grounds to form a sovereign republic. In such cases, we see the way out in the elimination of the autonomous units that have not been created on the basis of nationality.

It is also impossible not to take into consideration the fact that the nationalities of some autonomous units, such as the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and the Nakhichevan ASSR, do not live in their primordial historical territories. For example, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, which goes to make up the RSFSR, cannot, naturally, "cannot break away" from the composition of the RSFSR and form a sovereign republic, for it has no legal and historical rights to this territory.

In the broadcasts of Central Television on internationality-relations, bewilderment was expressed by some of the participants in the discussion in regard to the present status of the Nakhichevan ASSR, which is located on the territory of historic Armenia, but is part of Azerbaijan, in spite of the 30-kilometer distance from its borders. Many are surprised by the fact that the Nakhichevan ASSR, whose basic population is now composed of Azerbaijanis, nevertheless in the rights of an autonomous unit enters into the composition of Azerbaijan (it is impossible to understand on what basis).

Until 1921, the Nakhichevan province constituted an integral part of Armenia, including during antiquity and the Middle Ages. After the joining of the Eastern Armenian lands to Russia, beginning in 1829 it became part of the Armenian Oblast and then Yerevan Gubernia.

According to statistical data, in 1917 53,900 Armenians lived in Nakhichevan; at the present time, only 1,000 to 2,000 Armenians live there (according to the census of 1979—3,400—1.4 percent of the entire population). Of the 44 Armenian settlements of the pre-revolutionary period, only 2 villages have remained today ("Kavkazkiy kalendar na 1917" [Caucasian Calendar for 1917], Tiflis, 1916, Statistical Section, pp. 215-221); "Chislennost i sostav naseleniya SSSR" [Numerical Size and Composition of the Population of the USSR], Moscow, 1984, p. 126).

For this reason, in the determination of the status of the Nakhichevan ASSR in a new model of the Soviet federation, it will be necessary to examine: What was done with the indigenous nationality of this territory, to which autonomy was granted.

We have cited only some difficulties which must be overcome in order to create a new model of the Soviet federation. But even they are indicative of the fact that it is impossible by any single, even if the most radical act, to attain the elimination of all the defects of the existing structure and fully repudiate the idea of autonomous formations in the present stage. The elimination of autonomous units must be a strategic goal to which it is necessary to aspire. Consequently, a differentiated approach is needed here, on the one hand, and, on the other—a gradual approach. For a beginning, it is necessary if only to eliminate the actual inequality between the autonomous formations themselves, to unify all types of autonomous units, having expanded their rights in so doing. But the most important thing consists in proceeding already now to the creation of a legal mechanism that would regulate the complicated process of nationality-state building.

A necessary prerequisite for the improvement of the present-day structure of nationality relations would be the granting the constitutional possibility to change the forms of statehood to the autonomous formations (with the exception of those which, in our view, are subject to liquidation). It is also necessary to grant them the right to change their republic membership. Such a solution of the question would deliver the central organs from many troubles and problems that are connected with the defense of the vital interests of small peoples. As a matter of fact, knowing about the constitutional possibility of such territorial changes, the union republics that have autonomous formations in their composition would show maximum concern for them. The existing mechanism created the ground for the infringement of their rights.

In the course of the reform of the political system, it is necessary to constitutionally solve the whole range of problems of its second stage that are connected with the realization of these aspects of the right to self-determination. In so doing, it is very important not only to constitutionally strengthen the right of the autonomous units to self-determination, but also to create a legal mechanism guaranteeing the possibility of the realization of this right.

Can one consider it normal that an autonomous oblast or republic cannot change even its republic membership, while a union republic has the right to self-determination right up to withdrawal from membership in the USSR.

The absurdity of such a situation is especially obvious if it is supposed that one of the union republics wishes to make use of its constitutional right to secede from the USSR. In this case, the fate of the peoples of autonomous units that go to make it up is automatically decided, since in accordance with Article 78 of the Constitution of the USSR not one of the autonomous units may secede from a union republic without its consent.

If the people of a given autonomous unit for some reason does not want to remain in the composition of one union

republic or another, then it must have the full right to withdraw from its composition. In the opposite case, this will be the forceful unification of peoples, which is irreconcilable with the moral and legal norms of the socialist state. Let us recall how V. I. Lenin imagined the Soviet federation: "We want a voluntary union of nations—the kind of union which would not permit any force of one nation over another. . . ." (V. I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," Vol 40, p 43).

All of this dictates the necessity of the revision of the Constitution currently in force, the bringing of it into conformity with the Leninist principles of nationality policy, as well as with international pacts and conventions adopted by the Soviet Union.

There is a special need for the more precise definition of Article 78 of the Constitution, which actually grants a veto right to some union republics in the solution of the destinies of small peoples. We can constantly talk about the necessity of the strengthening of friendship of peoples, but until the inequality between them is eliminated, bare slogans, which are not reinforced with deeds, will have the opposite impact, increasingly more heating up nationality passions.

The imperfection of the constitutional-legal mechanism of the regulation of nationality relations has become obvious also in connection with the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, in the discussion of which completely different legal phenomena, consciously or unconsciously, were confused: The demand of an autonomous oblast for the change of its nationality-state status, based on the free will of the people, was identified with the territorial dispute between two republics. In the new Constitution there must be a clear delimitation of these legal concepts, for in the first case the issue involves the establishment of the forms of nationality statehood, which are legitimate methods for the realization of the right of nations to self-determination, and in the second—about purely territorial changes or specifications that are dictated by economic and other social factors, which are not directly connected with nationality relations.

Summing up what has been said, it can be established that the new political thinking in the sphere of nationality relations presupposes, above all, the creation of a legal mechanism guaranteeing the realization of the right of nations to self-determination.

In connection with this, it is necessary to understand the reasons which prevent the affirmation of the new thinking in the sphere of inter-nationality relations. Indeed, the process of the repudiation of the old and the transition to the new approaches is moving very slowly and painfully, if we consider the speed with which the geography of inter-nationality collisions is expanding.

The facts indicate that in the sphere of nationality policy, as in other spheres of the country's socio-political life, the braking mechanism still continues to act. The process

of renewal in this sphere is colliding with the vitality of the dogmatic methods of problem-solving and the stereotypes of thinking.

Instead of developing definite criteria and a legal mechanism for the regulation of the complex nationality relations, slogans of the type "perestroyka—ne perekroyka" ("restructuring is not reshaping"). By "reshaping", naturally, should be understood the arbitrary redistribution of frontiers. But, taking into account the fact that this slogan is advanced in connection with the demand for the realization of the right of the people to self-determination, there remains no doubt that similar slogans are nothing else than an attempt to brush aside the solution of the practically existing nationality problems in order to create the ground for the "freezing" of the further development national-state building. In connection with this, we cannot agree with the opinion of A. Volskiy, the chairman of the Committee for the Special Government of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and department chief of the CPSU Central Committee, that "to recognize the stability and inviolability of the present territorial organization of the country means to recognize the correctness and validity of the action of the regime which in other spheres led socialism to terrible deformations. And if today we are restoring the historical and political justice in the relations of individual citizens, we all the more must restore such justice such justice in the relations of whole peoples" (Newspaper SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 1989, 30 April).

A basic argument against the just solution of the nationality question in the USSR is the threat that these changes will lead to "unforeseeable consequences". But is it legitimate to talk about unforeseeable consequences when the issue is the just solution of problems in the spirit of the Leninist principles of nationality policy. The affirmation of new thinking in foreign policy, as is well known, has only strengthened the authority of our country and has significantly relaxed international tension. And the horrible cries about the fact that the return to the Leninist nationality policy will lead to a "chain reaction", the "disintegration of the imperium," etc., etc., these are only attempts to "immortalize" the existing territorial status quo, to deny, under any plausible pretext, the right of nations to self-determination. As far as the tragic events are concerned that have taken place on the ground of nationality, they are the result of the deviation of from Leninist nationality policy, and not the result of its realization.

In connection with this, it is necessary to reflect seriously about precisely what may lead to unforeseeable consequences: The restoration of the Leninist principles of nationality policy, or the continuation of the policy of "not doing anything." To justify the latter, a new slogan appeared—"It is impossible to cut what is living." This next "impossible", calculated for the creation of a negative emotional sentiment against any territorial changes, sounds convincing against the background of progressing nationality diseases, which are in need precisely of

surgical intervention. A skillful surgeon also cuts what is living, but he does so as to heal a man and to return him to life.

It should also not be forgotten that, in the history of Soviet nationality-state building, part of the territory of some republics has repeatedly gone over into the composition of others. From the RSFSR, for example, such a large oblast as the Crimea was transferred to the Ukraine in 1954.

Large changes also took place in the territorial demarcation of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, between Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan, Belorussia and Lithuania. There are also examples of the transition of nationality-based autonomous formations from the composition of one union republic to the composition of another. For example, the Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast has repeatedly changed its republic membership (Cf. "Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], 3rd edition, Vol 11, p 381, Moscow, 1973).

These territorial changes were not perceived as the "reshaping" of frontiers and did not call forth bloody religious and nationalistic excesses. They did not serve the weakening, but the strengthening of friendship and cooperation.

Experience shows that it is necessary to come out resolutely against unfounded attempts to artificially bring nationality-territorial claims, as well as against attempts to consciously distort the essence of the just demand of a people.

What is more, We consider it completely inadmissible when the fundamental principle of Leninist nationality policy is replaced by the economic factor. Does it really appear to someone that with the aid of the economic factor it is possible to substantiate the being of a certain territory in the composition of some state? Indeed, with the aid of such an argument one can justify any territorial seizure and annexation. "The old economists," V. I. Lenin wrote, "transforming Marxism into a caricature, taught the workers that for Marxists "only the economic" is important. The new "economists" think either that the democratic state of victorious socialism will exist without borders.... or that the borders will be determined "only" in accordance with the needs of production. As a matter of fact, these borders will be determined democratically, that is in accordance with the will and the "sympathies" of the population" (V. I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works, Vol 30, p 21).

It has also become urgently necessary to fundamentally rethink the existing possibilities of the republics in the solution of foreign policy questions. Recognizing the priorities of the central government in the determination and realization of the country's foreign policy, we cannot but speak of the urgent necessity of the creation of a mechanism of defense against the trampling of the vital interests of sovereign republics.

In the near past there were quite a few examples of how the vital interests of one people or another were sacrificed to the global interests of the powers. As an example, one can cite the declaration of the USSR minister of foreign affairs, V. I. Molotov, of 30 May 1953, to the effect that supposedly "... the governments of Armenia and Georgia considered it possible to give up their territorial claims against Turkey" (Newspaper PRAVDA, 1953, 19 July).

Granting the republics a veto right, even if only in questions that directly affect their vital interests, could become the first step on the road to the creation of the defense mechanism pointed out by us.

Thus it is necessary to search for improvements of inter-nationality relations, on the one hand, in the elimination of the very possibility of the origin of contradictions between the interests of nations and peoples, and, on the other—in the expansion of the jurisdiction and rights of the union republics and the strengthening of their sovereignty.

Non-Azeri Deputies Support Azeri NKAO Position

18310403a

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 1 June 1989 carries on page 1 an 800 word article by Ashraf Hajyev headlined "A Just Solution for the Question" on the reaction of deputies from Tambov, Rostov, and Yakutiya to the NKAO issue. Aleksandr Sitnikov (Rostov) said "it would be a very serious mistake to forget or not consider the interests of the Azeri population who live in the NKAO."

Azeri Deputies Criticized for Passiveness

18310403b

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 2 June 1989 carries on page 3 a 1,500 word correspondent's report on attitudes in Baku towards the debates on the NKAO situation at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Deputies on the Armenian side of the issue were accused of "applying pressure and trying to gain psychological dominance," whereas "Azeri deputies, in many cases, stayed outside these debates and demonstrated passiveness."

AzSSR Plans Refugee Resettlement

18310403c

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 7 June 1989 carries on page 5 a 900 word unattributed report headlined "In the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee" on a meeting of "all relevant ministries, leading organizations, party and soviet organs" to discuss the resettlement of homeless refugees living "temporarily" in the cities of Baku and Sumgait and in the Absheron Rayon to the Altyaghaj-Khyzy zone. This move is being impeded by lack of funds and building materials as well

as by "subjective factors." In addition, road construction and electrification are proceeding too slowly.

Central Media Called One-Sided in NKAO Approach

18310403d

[Editorial Report] Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri on 9 June 1989 carries on page 1 a 1,900 word article by Ismayyl Valiyev headlined "The Clarity of the Goal" in which he claims that the "organs of the central press are once again publishing one-sided articles" on the NKAO issue. In addition, "deputies have also been elected who, having gained the trust of the people, are pursuing their own filthy goals in exacerbating inter-ethnic tensions with help and financial support from secret forces." Specifically mentioned are pro-Armenian articles in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, SMENA, and KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE and statements by A. Sakharov, G. Starovoytova and S. Baruzdin.

Remote NKAO Villages Being Restored

18310403e

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 27 June 1989 carries on page 1 a 400 word article by V. Rudenko headlined "Life Restored" on measures to improve the socio-economic development of the NKAO. Noting that "more than 400 million rubles" have been allocated for this purpose, he adds that some of it is being put towards the restoration of remote mountain villages. However, "we still must lift the kind of psychological barrier that people have about returning to the restored villages. Many of them simply do not want to go so far away. Despite all this, the restoration of remote mountain villages has begun."

Goskomgidromet Chairman Lists Worst Air Pollution Cases

18300747a Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by Yu. Izrael, USSR Goskomgidromet chairman: "Clouds Over the City"]

[Text] **Speaking at the Congress of People's Deputies, M.S. Gorbachev reminded us that the quantity of harmful substances in the atmosphere exceeds the permissible standards in over 100 cities in the country. I would like to know which cities these are?**

N. Strelkov, Penza.

For clarification, we turned to the USSR Goskomgidromet Chairman, Yu. Izrael:

In addition to practical reports, USSR Goskomgidromet is compiling, for the year's results, several lists of settlements which cause alarm in the ecological area: lists of unfavorable cities in terms of the elevated content of some kind of harmful substance or another in the atmosphere. A list, where a 10-fold increase was noted in the

MPC [maximum permissible concentration] of a certain harmful substance supposedly once for the year. The number of such settlements fluctuates within bounds of slightly over 100. Last year there were 103.

However, in our opinion, this method of assessing a region's ecological condition is inadequate. Judge for yourselves. In a small village, a plant released a volley of dust—at exactly the moment when our service was taking measurements (it lasted 20 minutes). The dust rapidly settled, the local residents felt nothing, but the instruments (one time that year!) recorded a 10-fold increase in the MPC, and this village was automatically put on the "black" list along with the giants of industry, where people chronically lack sufficient clean air. On the other hand, this list does not include cities where the air and water constantly contain a "bouquet" of toxic mixtures, merely on the grounds that, taken separately, their quantity is less than 10 MPCs. However, everyone knows that the consequences of such "comprehensive" poisoning is many times more dangerous for man and nature.

Perhaps the most objective indicator of the ecological situation is not such much the chemical content of the atmosphere and water, as much as the biological factor, i.e., the general state of people and the condition of animals and plants. Unfortunately, science for the present time is only doing research to establish a cause-effect dependency between chemical pollution of the surrounding environment and human illnesses. For its part, USSR Goskomgidromet has developed a complex calculation method (it was approved by the USSR Minzdrav and USSR Goskompriroda), which makes it possible to reduce the different indicators of chemical pollution to a conventional standard denominator, to make a comprehensive comparative analysis of the ecological condition in regions, and to reveal the "chronic" ones among them. According to this method, the highest level of atmospheric pollution in 1988 occurred in the following 68 cities (alphabetically listed):

Abakan (Krasnoyarskiy Kray), Alma-Ata, Almalyk (Tashkent Oblast), Angarsk (Irkutsk Oblast), Arkhangelsk, Barnaul, Bratsk, Volzhskiy (Volgograd Oblast), Groznyy, Dzhambul, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Dushanbe, Yerevan, Zaporozhye, Zestafoni (Georgian SSR), Zyryanovsk (East Kazakhstan Oblast), Irkutsk, Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad Oblast), Kamensk-Uralskiy (Sverdlovsk Oblast), Kemerovo, Kiev, Kommunarsk (Voroshilovgrad Oblast), Komsomolsk-na-Amure, Krasnoyarsk, Krivoy Rog, Kuybyshev, Kurgan, Leninogorsk (East Kazakhstan Oblast), Lipetsk, Lisichansk (Voroshilovgrad Oblast), Magnitogorsk, Makeyevka, Mariupol, Mogilev, Moscow (southeastern part), Nizhniy Tagil, Novokuznetsk, Novosibirsk, Novotroitsk (Orenburg Oblast), Norilsk, Odessa, Omsk, Orenburg, Osh, Perm, Prokopyevsk (Kemerovo Oblast), Rostov-na-Donu, Rustavi, Sverdlovsk, Severo-Donetsk, Semipalatinsk, Temirtau (Karaganda Oblast), Tyumen, Ulan-Ude, Usolye-Sibirskoye (Irkutsk Oblast), Ust-Kamenogorsk, Fergan, Frunze, Khabarovsk, Chardzhoy,

Chelyabinsk, Cherepovets, Chimkent, Chita, Shelekhov (Irkutsk Oblast), Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

In addition, USSR Minzdrav suggested including the 15 cities with the highest morbidity levels, according to data from the "Health" system: Berezniki (Perm Oblast), Gomel, Gorkiy, Grodno, Dzerzhinsk (Gorkiy Oblast), Kokhtla-Yarve, Kremenchug, Leningrad, Monchegorsk (Murmansk Oblast), Novokuybyshevsk, Rovno, Sumgait, Tiraspol, Cherkassy, and Chirchik (Tashkent Oblast).

Goskomgidromet promptly sends the data obtained to all interested organizations. Information on pollution is regularly published in 220 cities.

Besides the enumerated cities, serious attention should be given to all areas where pollution in excess of permissible levels is observed.

Scientists Protest Planned Zagorsk Toxic Waste Facility

18300747b Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Jul 89 Second Edition p 6

[Article by A. Papusha, doctor of technical sciences, USSR State Prize winner, and S. Chernov, chief, Moscow Archeological Expedition, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Archeology, candidate of historical sciences: "Burial in the Cradle. Readers Demand Public Expert Study of Dangerous Project"]

[Text] It has become public knowledge that it is proposed to locate the world's largest complex for processing and burying toxic industrial wastes in the Zagorskiy Rayon of Moscow Oblast. It will be located between the settlements of Shemetovo and Novyy, 20 kilometers from Zagorsk. The basic component parts of the complex are a plant for the thermal processing of wastes and a burial area.

The thermal ovens, according to the project, will be able to process liquid, solid, and paste wastes containing more than 20 toxic ingredients. The burial area is intended for the interment of poisons of first-class toxicity, whose names are disturbing even to pronounce. The complex's productivity is to be grandiose: 100,000 tons of waste annually, which twice exceeds the capacity of the world's largest similar combine in the state of Texas (U.S.). The planned project will cost about 150 million rubles.

It is hard to call the project the fruit of hasty decisions. Work on it began back in the 1970s. In 1985, the leadership of the Moscow Soviet, the Ministry of the Chemical Industry and the USSR GKNT approved the assignment for designing the complex. More than 10 design organizations were working to draft the design documentation, which contains 31 volumes. The West German "MAN" Company will supply the basic segment of the industrial equipment and implement the technology transfer.

This grandiose measure is being carried out under the flag of the ecological cleansing of Moscow and the oblast. Moreover, the requisite ecological safety attributes are stipulated in the project itself. Nonetheless, the first feeling that arises on familiarity with the project is alarm. The goals of the project are supposedly positive. However, what are the means for implementing them? Are the technical solution and proposed construction site sufficiently well substantiated?

What specifically puts one on guard? The complex's universality in processing the broadest spectrum of toxic ingredients and its high effectiveness are incompatible concepts. Sorting and narrow specialization in the processing of wastes are necessary in order for the complex to operate effectively. Unquestionably, competent specialists ought to understand that we must strive not toward the concentration of capacities, but toward their dispersion, not toward the burial of poisonous substances, but toward their reprocessing. It also seems unnecessary to explain why such complexes should not be located in densely populated regions of the country, but in empty areas, far removed from large cities and big rivers. The concentration of a large quantity of toxic wastes, which has no analogue in world practice, presents an extraordinary threat during emergency situations or breakdowns in the operation of the technological equipment.

Furthermore, no matter how improved the equipment and technology may be, the plant's exhaust stacks all the same will release remnants of poisonous substances, which have not fully reacted, into the atmosphere. Numerous Goskomgidromet documents and domestic and foreign aerial and space photographs attest to the fact that poisoned plumes, under certain meteorological conditions, can be carried for many dozens of kilometers. Where, exactly? The wind rose falls in the direction of the Troitse-Sergiyev Monastery...

The designers, in order to justify the site of the complex, calculated the dispersion of exhaust gases using a special algorithm, on familiarization with which one sees that this is essentially a pursuit of the desired answer by manipulating the initial data. For example, the degree of cleansing for different toxic ingredients is considered identical in all cases.

The waste burial area, also unprecedented in world practice in terms of its scale, presents no less of a danger. Even in the design it is admitted that the hydrogeological situation in this area is unfavorable. Under such conditions, ground water contamination could occur for many

dozens of kilometers. The intensive transport of toxic wastes through the region will also create a threat to the surrounding environment. It is hard even to imagine the consequences in the event of an accident at the complex.

The choice of location for construction simply does not make sense. Even a schoolchild knows that the land surrounding the Troitse-Sergiyev Monastery is the cradle of Russian culture and statehood. The spiritual movement that had a profound influence on the historical development of Muscovite Rus was born here.

The greatest valuable historical and natural territories in Moscow Oblast are located in Zagorskiy Rayon: the protection zone for the ancient city of Radonezh, the "Abramtsevo" Museum and Park, and others. The approval of a protection zone complex for the environs of the Troitse-Sergiyev Monastery is next.

Ten reserves included in the general plan for protecting nature in Moscow Oblast, which was approved by the Moscow Oblispolkom, are located in the rayon. The Moscow Institute for the General Plans of Moscow Oblast had already drafted a design for the Radonezh Historical Nature Park (reserve) in 1985. According to the design, 30,000 hectares should be taken under protection in order to prevent the unsystematic use of valuable landscapes.

A protection plan is also needed for the northern part of Zagorskiy Rayon, which is one of the most interesting in a historical and archaeological respect. The Troitskiy Monastery appeared here, on the lands of the Verkhodubna Volost, at the turn of the 14th-15th centuries. The preserve forests north of Zagorsk hold archaeological monuments, a large part of which have not yet been brought to light. So, for instance, the Shavykinskiy Monastery, which was founded in honor of the victory at Kulikovo Field, is located in the upper reaches of the Dubna.

The monuments of history and culture and the natural landscapes and traditions of this kray are a unified fund of memory. One does not want to believe that an operator's mistake or an unpredictable accident could turn a land, valuable for every Russian person, into a "contamination zone."

We believe it necessary to submit the question of constructing a complex for processing and burying industrial wastes to independent expert groups. In this case, an ill-founded decision may lead not to ecological cleansing, but to the creation of new ecological problems and the defilement of our spiritual treasures.

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